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The Ethics of War: A New Individualist Rights-Based Account 
of Just Cause and Legitimate Authority 
 
Emily Lois Pollard 
 
Abstract 
 
My thesis focuses upon the ad bellum criteria of just cause and, to a lesser 
extent, legitimate authority. I begin by developing an account of the individual 
right to self-defence, grounded upon the individual right to lead a flourishing 
life, drawing upon Jeff McMahan’s and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s rights-based 
accounts of defence, and developing a dual account of liability to attack.  
I then outline a broadly individualist account of just cause, based upon this 
account of the individual right to defence. I explain what kinds of just causes 
for war would exist, based upon the delegation of individual defensive rights 
to a collective entity. Following this, I develop an asymmetrical account of the 
rights of combatants, based upon the dual account of liability. I argue that 
most unjust combatants are weakly liable, and I propose a general presumption 
of weak liability for both just and unjust combatants. I suggest that unjust 
combatants may therefore possess at least some rights of individual defence, 
but that just combatants have additional war rights resulting from taking part 
in a wider act of defence. 
Finally, I expand upon my argument concerning the delegation of individual 
defensive rights, by explaining which types of collective entity may receive 
delegated defensive rights and how such rights are delegated, and I also argue 
that collective entities which have been delegated individual defensive rights 
are therefore legitimate authorities, based upon a definition of legitimate 
authority as moral authority. 
Overall, my thesis aims to develop an individualist account of just cause, 
grounded upon the delegation of individual defensive rights to a collective 
entity, and to use my account to develop an asymmetric account of 
combatants’ rights and a rights-based account of legitimate authority. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
   The just war tradition has developed over a considerable amount of time as a 
response to the terrifying prospect of unlimited war, as an attempt to place 
some limits upon the nature and scope of morally permissible or ‘just’ wars, 
by arguing that only a war which fulfils certain criteria can be counted as a 
‘just’ war1.  
Such limits are necessary to forestall the danger that a theory of war might 
drift into accepting realism, the theory which argues that there can be no moral 
boundaries upon war, indeed that there is no such thing as a just or unjust war, 
that ‘war lies beyond (or beneath) moral judgement’ (Walzer, 1977: 3) 
because it is a sphere of action wholly different, indeed separate, from 
ordinary actions and ordinary life. 
Indeed, realism claims, in Michael Walzer’s words, that war is ‘a world 
apart, where life itself is at stake…where self-interest and necessity 
prevail…and morality and law have no place’ (1977: 3), in that moral rules do 
not apply within that sphere, but rather ‘every man’s being and well-being is 
the rule of his actions’ (Hobbes, 1994: 104). This, realists claim, is not a moral 
stance, simply a statement of fact, of how things are. Thomas Hobbes sums up 
this argument with the phrase ‘inter arma silent leges’ (1994: 104), meaning 
‘in times of war the law is silent’. 
   However, realism about war is not a view that most people would, for 
obvious practical reasons, wish to become widespread, however accurate a 
view of reality it might claim to represent, because the very dangers of war, 
the possibilities of large-scale loss of life, which make it so difficult to limit or 
regulate, are precisely what make it so important to try. Without such 
limitation, the dangers, the potential loss of life, would only increase 
                                                 
1 By ‘war’, I mean an organized military campaign, aimed at achieving certain goals. I would, 
however, accept quite a broad definition of a ‘military campaign’, encompassing guerrilla 
tactics and acts of sabotage against an enemy army (if used in conjunction with more 
conventional military tactics on other fronts); though I would not suggest, for reasons that will 
become clear, that it might encompass terrorist acts. 
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exponentially, especially if the realist assertion that ‘anything goes’, that ‘we 
can neither praise nor blame’ someone’s actions in wartime (Walzer, 1977: 3), 
is accepted2.  
Pacifism has been espoused instead by some philosophers, such as Cheyney 
Ryan, who argues in favour of pacifism as the ‘skeptical position’ that ‘the 
proponent of killing cannot produce a single compelling argument for why 
killing another person is permissible’ (1983: 509), or Martin Benjamin, who in 
the course of his espousal of ‘pragmatic’ pacifism argues that ‘nations – 
especially the heavily industrialized superpowers – should abandon, as 
unstated or public policy, conventional military means of providing security to 
their citizens’ (1973: 197). However, most agree that total pacifism may not 
always be an option in a world where the need for defence is so often a reality. 
Therefore, just war theory has over the past two thousand years evolved to fill 
the gap, to provide the moral limitations upon war which at least attempt to 
prevent or mitigate the potentially horrific consequences of war. Just war 
theory would therefore seem to be the best possible alternative. 
   However, over this time certain established views of just war theory have 
gradually emerged, and I believe that the time is ripe for an analysis and 
redefinition of certain aspects of these views. 
   The traditional view of the scope and purpose of just war theory runs as 
follows. As Walzer puts it, a war is ‘always judged twice, first with reference 
to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means 
they adopt’ (1977: 21).  
The first of these ‘judgements’ is the judgement as to whether the decision to 
go to war is a just or a justifiable one, and this is decided according to how far 
the war in question would correspond with a set of criteria ‘governing the 
decision to go to war’ (Bellamy, 2006: 121), known as jus ad bellum rules.  
Similarly, the second ‘judgement’ of a war is made according to a set of 
moral conditions ‘governing its conduct’ (Bellamy, 2006: 121), known as jus 
                                                 
2 Hobbes did also argue that people would naturally act ‘honourably’ in wartime, meaning that 
they would, or should, ‘satiate not the cruelty of their present passions’ (Hobbes, 1994: 104) – 
but he did not present this as a moral rule, but rather as a ‘law of nature’ (1994: 104), meaning 
that such ‘cruelty’ would be impossible for any belligerent who does not have an unnatural 
‘disposition of the mind to war’ (1994: 104). This to the modern mind (bearing in mind the 
‘cruelties’ committed by many seemingly ordinary people during the wars of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries) seems rather optimistic. 
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in bello. Even more recently, a third kind of ‘judgement’ has been developed, 
namely, a war may be judged as a consequence of ‘the ethics of the 
postconflict environment’ (Patterson, 2012: 5), according to a third set of 
criteria, jus post bellum. A war is thus considered just or unjust depending 
upon whether or not it fulfils all of the ad bellum, in bello and post bellum 
criteria. 
   The content of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria, since they are the 
older sets of criteria, is more firmly established than the newer jus post bellum.  
   Jus ad bellum is most usually thought to be determined by seven criteria. 
These have developed in order to determine when and if it is just, or even 
morally permissible, for one state to declare war upon another. 
 
1) The just cause criterion, which states that there must 
be a ‘just cause’ for war, a ‘goal, or set of goals’, in Jeff 
McMahan and Robert McKim’s words, ‘that provides the 
reason for going to war and makes it permissible, if other 
conditions are satisfied, to resort to war’ (1993: 502).  
2) The right intention criterion, which argues that those 
who declare war must do so at least primarily because of 
that just cause, the just cause must be their primary 
motivation. As Helen Frowe put it, this criterion ‘specifies 
that one cannot use a just cause as an excuse to wage a war’ 
(2011: 60). 
3) The legitimate authority criterion, which states that 
only a ‘legitimate’ authority may declare or wage a war. 
4) The reasonable chance of success criterion, which 
states that if the war is to be justified, the belligerent power 
must foresee that it has at least a ‘reasonable’ prospect of 
actually winning that war. 
5) The proportionality criterion, which argues that 
declaring war can only be justified if, in Fisher’s words, 
‘one reasonably expects that the harm caused by the war 
will not outweigh the good to be achieved’ (2012: 73). 
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6) The last resort criterion, which states that war should 
only be declared when ‘all other means of averting a threat 
or seeking redress have been exhausted’ (Frowe, 2011: 62). 
7) The ‘proper declaration’ (Bellamy, 2006: 124) 
criterion states that the declaration of war must be made 
publicly, in order to ensure that all relevant parties are 
aware that hostilities have commenced. 
 
   The jus in bello criteria determine the methods by which it would be moral 
or justifiable for a belligerent state (and its armed forces) to wage war. They 
number only two; but these two are weighty criteria, regulating most aspects 
of permissible conduct towards the enemy during conflict. 
 
1) The discrimination rule, which requires that military 
action ‘must be directed solely against the armed forces of 
the enemy’ (Norman, 1995: 119) and that civilians, or 
‘non-combatants’, are not permissible targets of attack. 
2) The in bello proportionality rule, which requires the 
use of ‘proportionality in judging the means of war’ 
(O’Brien, 1981: 39) – in short, only those means of fighting 
which can be reasonably expected to produce more good 
(in terms of hastening victory and the fulfilment of the just 
cause) than harm are permitted. 
 
   Finally, jus post bellum is a set of criteria which determine how a victorious 
belligerent may justly act at the ending of a conflict and beyond. Since I will 
not be discussing these criteria in my thesis, there is little need for a full 
definition of them here; but at the bare minimum, most definitions of jus post 
bellum agree that there must be limits on the post-conflict actions of the victor, 
prohibiting them from taking malicious or vindictive actions which would 
negate the just cause and any positive consequences of fulfilling it.  
In my thesis, I will be focusing upon the ad bellum criterion of just cause 
and, to a lesser extent, upon the criterion of legitimate authority. I will begin 
by developing my own account of the individual right to self-defence, 
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grounding it upon the individual right to lead a flourishing life, drawing upon 
W.N. Hohfeld, David Rodin and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s rights-based 
accounts of defence.  
I will argue that the right to a flourishing life is a cluster-right, meaning that 
it is composed of a bundle of basic rights to the various aspects of a 
flourishing life such as security, liberty, bodily integrity and continued 
physical existence. I will further argue that the scope of this right is bounded 
by a dual account of liability to attack. I will suggest that attackers can be 
liable in a stronger sense and a weaker sense.  
Weak liability will be a causal account, drawing upon such accounts as 
Thomson’s, and I will argue that those who are weakly liable may retain some 
limited form of defensive right. Strong liability, on the other hand, will be 
based upon moral responsibility for an act of violence, drawing upon 
McMahan’s moral responsibility account of liability, and I will argue that 
those who are strongly liable to attack lose all defensive rights. 
I will next proceed to outline a broadly reductive individualist account of 
just cause, based upon this account of the individual right to defence. I will 
begin by examining the arguments for both collectivist and individualist 
accounts of defence3, and concluding that individualism is more plausible.  
I will then argue that the individual right to defence can ground a form of 
collective defensive right, in that individual defensive rights can be delegated 
to a collective entity, such as a state, resulting in a collective right to exercise 
these individual defensive rights; which has the state or other collective entity 
as its subject, but remains individualist in its object, end and scope. For the 
sake of simplicity in this portion of my argument, I will leave the question of 
                                                 
3 By ‘collectivism’ I am referring to the view that rights to defence, life, etc. may be directly 
possessed by certain distinct collective entities like states or corporations; and by 
‘individualism’ or ‘reductive individualism’ I am referring to the view that such rights are 
primarily individual – that a collective may not possess a right to defend itself, or a right to its 
own continued existence. I should point out that I will be discussing collectivist and 
individualist approaches to rights theory, and defensive rights specifically, rather than any 
other understandings of the terms, such as collectivist and individualist approaches to 
international law (under which collectivist approaches are those which provide a state-centred  
focus to international law, seeing it ‘as a series of agreed obligations between a plurality of 
fundamentally independent polities scattered around our globe’ (Morss, 2013:8), and 
individualist approaches are those which argue international law should be concerned with 
regulating and providing protection to individuals, moving the focus ‘away from abstract 
constructs such as the state and toward the solid ground of individual needs and individual 
liabilities’ (Morss, 2013:9)). 
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what types of collective entity, besides the state, may be the recipients of 
delegated defensive rights until a later chapter. I will go on to explain what 
kinds of just causes for war would exist, based upon this delegated defensive 
right.  
Following this, I will develop an account of the rights and liabilities of 
combatants, focusing on the issue of whether or not just and unjust combatants 
have equal or symmetrical war rights. I will examine the arguments in favour 
of absolute equality or symmetry between just and unjust combatants by such 
theorists as Yitzhak Benbaji, as well as arguments by such theorists as 
McMahan, CAJ Coady and David Rodin that, on the contrary, only unjust 
combatants are liable to attack, meaning that unjust combatants not only lack 
the right to attack their enemies, but may not justifiably defend their own 
lives. I will conclude that both have interesting elements, but neither is fully 
convincing.  
I will then develop an asymmetrical account of the rights of combatants, 
based upon the dual account of liability I mentioned earlier. I will argue for a 
general presumption of symmetrical weak liability, meaning that we can 
assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that unjust combatants do 
possess at least some rights of individual defence, but I will suggest that this 
does not result in symmetrical war rights, because just combatants have 
additional war rights resulting from their part in a wider act of defence – in 
short, the right to wage the war they are contributing to, and all the war rights 
or permissions that derive from this right. Unjust combatants must (unless 
proven otherwise) be considered justified in acting to preserve their own lives 
in battle, but only just combatants have the further right to perform aggressive 
military actions, because these actions are part of their larger act of defence.  
Finally, I will expand upon my earlier argument that individual defensive 
rights may be delegated to a collective entity, by explaining which types of 
collective entity may receive such delegated defensive rights – namely, what 
sorts of collective entities count as legitimate authorities.  
I will begin by defining the legitimate authority criterion in terms of moral 
authority rather than political or legal authority. I will examine and reject the 
more usual definition of legitimate authority as state or political authority, by 
criticising Grotius’ and Rousseau’s arguments for this point as well as David 
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Estlund’s normative consent theory. I will then consider and reject Cecile 
Fabre’s alternative cosmopolitan definition of legitimate authority as moral 
authority, concluding that she does not provide a plausible definition of the 
moral authority to wage war.  
Following this, I will compile a list of criteria that may determine which 
collective entities may be delegated individual lethal defensive rights, and 
thereby attain the moral authority to wage war in defence of the individuals in 
question. Drawing upon the arguments of Peter French and Margaret Gilbert, I 
will identify four essential criteria: the collective entity must a) be a genuinely 
collective subject of intention and action; b) be of sufficient size and stability 
to wage a military campaign; c) contain sufficient organisational structure and 
decision-making procedures to qualify as a conglomerate under French’s 
definition; and d) it (or its leaders) must hold the intention of actually and fully 
exercising the defensive rights that are delegated to that collective. I will argue 
that states which fulfil these four criteria may be delegated defensive rights by 
their own citizens, but in order for non-state collective entities to be 
permissibly delegated defensive rights (or for states to be delegated the 
defensive rights of those who are not their citizens, for instance in an 
interventionist war) they must fulfil the two further conditions of a) 
representative legitimacy and b) effectiveness, in addition to the four essential 
criteria. I will draw upon the arguments of Christopher Finlay and Michael 
Gross to define these two further conditions. 
Finally, I will explain how individual defensive rights are delegated to 
collective entities. I will argue that individuals delegate their defensive rights 
to their own states through tacit consent; but I will develop an account of tacit 
consent which is slightly different from the traditional Lockean definition. I 
will define tacit consent as the conscious or unconscious acceptance of the 
state’s defensive role and the benefits of being defended by the state. I suggest 
that an individual may withdraw her consent at any time, and that, subject to 
certain conditions, individuals may also delegate their defensive right to 
another state or non-state collective entity, but only through actual consent; for 
instance, by requesting the help of that collective entity to defend their lives.  
Overall, then, my thesis aims to develop an individualist account of just 
cause for war, grounded upon a collective entity’s right to exercise the 
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individual defensive rights that have been delegated to it, and to use my 
account of defensive rights to develop an asymmetric account of the rights of 
combatants and an account of moral authority based primarily upon the active 
or tacit act of consent that grounds the delegation of individual defensive 
rights to a collective entity. In this way, I hope to provide a plausible 
reworking of this area of just war theory. 
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Chapter One: A Rights-Based Account of Individual 
Self-Defence 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
One of the most readily accepted conditions for just war is that of just cause. 
In order for a war to be justified, it seems intuitively obvious that there must 
be a reason, or ‘cause’, for the waging of that war, and it must be a reason that 
is sufficient to justify taking such drastic action as war in order to achieve it. 
When one considers the nature of war and the ethical and humanitarian crises 
that war is bound to create, it is clear that such a terrible act cannot be justified 
for an arbitrary or insufficient cause. The cause of a war must be so important 
that even war, if it is necessary in order to achieve that cause, is acceptable. 
But while recognising the need for a just cause is simple enough, determining 
what exactly a just cause for war is, and why a particular cause is just, is far 
more complicated. 
Many just war theorists, as long ago as Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius, 
and as recently as Jeff McMahan, Thomas Hurka and David Rodin, have 
considered how defence, or indeed any hypothesized just cause, can be 
grounded as a just cause for war. McMahan, for instance, claims that ‘there 
can be various just causes for war other than defense against aggression’ 
(2005:1). He writes in 2005 that ‘the just causes for war are limited to the 
prevention or correction of wrongs that are serious enough to make the 
perpetrators liable to be killed or maimed.’ (2005:11), but has more recently 
come to think that a person can be liable to be killed to prevent him from 
committing a large number of smaller wrongs, and hence that the prevention 
of a large number of smaller wrongs could also be a just cause for war4.  
Many other just war theorists have offered a list of possible just causes for 
war. For example, Alex Bellamy asserts that just cause is ‘usually limited to 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Jeff McMahan for this point (personal communication, 03/10/15). 
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self-defence, defence of others, restoration of peace, defence of rights and the 
punishment of wrongdoers’ (2006: 122). Other theorists agree with the 
suggestion that one or more of these causes are just, while disagreeing with 
others.  
Brian Orend, for instance, argues that ‘the only just cause, for resorting to 
war, is in response to aggression’ (2006: 43), which entitles peoples or 
countries ‘to defend themselves with force if they are victimized by an armed 
attack’ and to ‘defend other countries should they be attacked’ (2006: 32). 
Richard Norman agrees, writing that ‘The wrong which war should attempt to 
right is the crime of aggression, and the only justification for going to war is 
therefore as defence against aggression’ (1995: 119-20). AJ Coates writes that 
modern just war thinking tends ‘simply to equate the just war with a war of 
self-defence and the unjust war with a war of aggression’ (1997: 156). 
James Turner Johnson, on the other hand, defines ‘classically’ just cause as 
‘one or more of three conditions: defense against an attack, recovery of 
something wrongly taken, or punishment of evil’ (1991: 21), and added that 
the latter two are not absent from contemporary just war theory as it might 
seem; but rather ‘they have been subsumed within a gradually broadened 
concept of defense that allows retaliation for an attack launched and 
completed (punishment of evil) and defines wrongful occupation of territory 
as a state of “continuing” armed attack’ (Johnson, 1991: 22). 
Finally, Ronald Santoni writes that a just cause is the aim to ‘protect and 
defend innocent life’ (1992: 104) – which would seem to include what Orend 
refers to as ‘self-defence from aggression’ and ‘other-defence from 
aggression’ (2006: 32) but, unlike Orend, would also include Bellamy’s 
category of ‘restoration of peace’ (2006: 122) – in other words, it would 
include the possibility of interventionist wars to improve the situation in 
another country in circumstances of humanitarian crisis. 
Amongst all of these different claims, the most common area of agreement is 
the consensus that defence is a just cause for war. Unlike some pacifist 
theorists such as Cheyney Ryan, I agree that defence is a just cause for war. 
However, unlike McMahan, I intend to argue that defence (albeit in more than 
one guise) is the only just cause for war.  
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However, I first need to show why defence is a just cause for war. In my 
dissertation, I intend to argue that the existence of a just cause for war is based 
upon a right to defence. In order to do this, it is first necessary to discuss the 
possible definitions and derivations of a right to defence, and identify those 
rights upon which a right to defence may be grounded. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I will establish the existence of an individual right to defence, and 
then move on in the next chapter to show how just cause can be based upon 
this individual right, using a broadly reductive individualist strategy.  
Collectivist or ‘state-based accounts’ (Frowe, 2015: 173) of just cause argue 
that states can directly possess defensive rights, and many justify this claim by 
means of an analogy with individual defensive rights. For instance, Grotius 
uses this sort of analogy, moving from an individual right to self-defence to a 
national right of defence. He writes that ‘What has been said by us up to this 
point, concerning the right to defend oneself and one's possessions may be 
made applicable also to public war, if the difference in conditions be taken 
into account’ (Grotius, 1925: 184) (though as Rodin5 notes, he is ‘at times 
sceptical’ about such analogies (Rodin, 2002: 107). Collectivists would 
therefore argue that a just cause for war, such as the defence of a state from 
aggression, is based upon the right of that state to defend itself6.  
However, reductive individualists like McMahan (described by Rodin (2014: 
79) as reductive individualism’s ‘greatest contemporary advocate’) and Helen 
Frowe, ‘reject’ as Frowe puts it, ‘a collectivist approach to the morality of war 
in favour of an individualist view, according to which individuals (rather than 
                                                 
5 Rodin himself specifically argues against this analogy, and also against a reductive 
individualist right of defence. He proposes instead that ‘military action against an aggressive 
state may be justified as a form of law enforcement rather than self-defence’ (Rodin: 2002, 
163). I will consider his criticisms in a later chapter. 
6 I should note that a collectivist view need not take the view that a collective entity’s rights 
cannot be grounded upon individual rights; collectivists such as Walzer, for instance, argue 
that collective rights to life and liberty are grounded upon individual rights, in that these 
collective rights are drawn, by a long ‘process of association and mutuality’, from individual 
rights, to become ‘their collective form’ (1977: 54). What distinguishes collectivists from 
reductive individualists is the collectivist argument that collective entities (most often states), 
like individuals, can directly hold rights such as rights of defence or rights to life; that those 
rights, howsoever derived, are collective in nature, with collective subjects, objects, ends etc., 
and that most collectivists define the rights (of defence, or of life, liberty, territorial integrity, 
etc.) of a collective, rather than an individual, as the primary, and in some cases (though not 
all) the sole justification for a defensive war. I will explain this argument more clearly in the 
second chapter. 
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states) are the proper focus of moral guidance and evaluation’ (Frowe, 2015: 
173).  
They argue that ‘the morality of war is reducible to the morality of ordinary 
life’ (Frowe, 2015: 173), and thus claim that just cause for war can be based 
upon the individual defensive right of each member of a particular group 
(usually a nation or state). The state itself would not have a right to go to war 
to defend its own continued existence, but the individual rights of defence 
possessed by each member of the endangered state would ground their 
collective defence as a just cause for war (assuming of course that individual 
lives were in danger rather than just the existence of their state). Rodin 
describes this approach as the attempt to ‘show that national self-defence is the 
coordinated exercise of individual rights of defence’ (Rodin: 2014, 74).  
My own rights-based definition of just cause can best be described as a 
variant of reductive individualism. I do not intend to ground just cause on a 
national right to defence, as Grotius and other collectivists do. I will attempt 
to ground it on the individual right itself, but instead of defining national 
defence as the ‘coordinated exercise of individual rights of defence’ (Rodin, 
2014: 74), I will argue that these individual rights could be delegated to a 
group or collective of those individuals (probably, but not necessarily, a nation 
or state), producing a ‘collective’ right of defence which is not possessed by 
an abstract entity like a nation, but by all of the individuals comprising that 
collective together. I will explain this position more clearly in Chapter Two. 
So, later in this work, I will explain how individual rights, possessed by each 
member of a group or nation, can ground defence as a just cause for war. First, 
however, I must attempt to explain what I take such an individual right to be, 
and why I believe it is the best grounding for just cause. 
To this end, in this chapter I will first explain the various ways in which 
other theorists have structured an individual right to defence, in order to place 
my definition within the theory as a whole. Then I will explain my definition 
of an individual right, and show how it differs from the other definitions that I 
have outlined. 
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1: Possible Rights-Based Justifications of Individual Defence 
 
 
To begin with, I shall explore how an individual right to defence such as the 
one I propose might be structured. If a person (call her Susan) were the victim 
of an unprovoked attack, then I would want to say that she has a right to 
defend herself from that attack.  
Before we go on to determine precisely what she has a right to defend (what 
Rodin calls ‘the end of the right’ (2002: 99), or how this individual right 
maybe extended to ground a just cause for war, we must first decide such 
things as whether this right is a claim right or a liberty right, when it is 
permissible to exercise this right, whether it is a basic right or grounded upon 
other rights and if so, what rights they might be. In this section, I will discuss 
some ways in which an individual right might be structured, before moving on 
to explain what sort of defensive right I would support.  
Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, argues in favour of a right to ‘preserve 
one’s life against an attack on it’ which is ‘traditionally thought to be a natural 
right, that is, a right a human being has simply by virtue of being a human 
being’ (Thomson, 1986: 44). She derives this concept of a ‘natural right’ from 
H.L.A. Hart’s and Joel Feinberg’s definitions of ‘natural rights’ and ‘human 
rights’ respectively.  
For instance, Hart defines a ‘natural right’ as one which ‘all men have…qua 
men’ and which ‘is not created or conferred by men’s voluntary action’ (1955: 
175), and Feinberg defines ‘human rights’ as ‘generically moral rights of a 
fundamentally important kind held equally by all human beings’ (1973: 85) 
(‘moral rights’ being previously defined by Feinberg as ‘rights that are held to 
exist prior to, or independently of, any legal or institutional rules’ (1973: 84)). 
Thomson also claims we have a ‘right to not be killed’ which may or may not 
also be a natural right (but even if it is, she suggests that it does not follow that 
it is inalienable).  
Since in this way she is suggesting both that Susan has a right to preserve 
her life ‘against an attack on it’ and that the attacker has a right ‘to not be 
killed’ (Thomson, 1986: 44), she must explain how and when a victim of an 
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attack such as Susan is permitted to exercise her defensive right, given that it 
conflicts with a right of her attacker’s. Thus, she considers four possible 
reasons why it may be permissible for Susan to exercise her natural right to 
defend her life when doing so necessarily means violating her attacker’s right 
to not be killed.  
The first is the suggestion that the attacker’s right not to be killed is 
temporarily non-operative whilst he is in the act of attacking Susan, though he 
possesses that right before the attack and after he has ceased (for instance, if 
some recent injury meant he was suddenly unable to continue attacking). The 
second is the possibility that the attacker’s right not to be killed is ‘(at all 
times) less stringent than any innocent person’s is’ (Thomson, 1986: 45), so 
that Susan may kill her attacker because his right not to be killed is ‘at all 
times’ less stringent than her right to preserve her life.  
The next states that the attacker’s right to not be killed was, before his attack 
on Susan, ‘as stringent as any innocent person’s is’ (Thomson, 1986: 46), but 
is at the time of the attack ‘less stringent’ (Thomson, 1986: 46) than Susan’s 
right to preserve her life against the attack. The last possibility is that the 
attacker’s right to not be killed is always equally stringent, but that Susan, as 
the victim of his attack, has a more stringent right to ‘kill a person who is 
currently giving every reason to believe that he will kill [the] Victim unless 
[the] Victim kills him’ (Thomson, 1986: 46). 
Thomson admits that these possibilities have their flaws. She immediately 
dismisses the second, pointing to our intuition that the attacker’s right not to 
killed returns to its previous level of stringency if his attack has been 
somehow (non-fatally) prevented. Then she points to the fact that the first and 
third possibilities ‘are marvellously ad hoc’ (Thomson, 1986: 46) in that there 
seems to be no reason to accept either the attacker’s temporary loss of his 
right, or the change in the stringency of that right ‘other than the fact that if we 
do, we seem to have in have in hand an explanation of why [the] Victim may 
kill [the] Aggressor’.  
Similarly, she indicates that the victim’s right in the last possibility seems 
‘carefully tailored to its purpose’ (Thomson, 1986: 47), and it seems hard to 
think of a reason for accepting this right other than ‘the fact that it is 
permissible’ for the victim to kill someone if she has a reasonable belief that 
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he will otherwise kill her. However, her suggestion that the right to self-
defence is a natural right, which comes into play as and when the actions of an 
‘Aggressor’ (Thomson, 1986: 45) place him in the position that his ‘right to 
not be killed’ (Thomson, 1986: 44) is either forfeited somehow or rendered 
less stringent than the victim’s defensive rights, is accepted by various other 
ethicists. 
 For instance, David Rodin defends an account of individual or ‘personal’ 
(2002: 103) rights to self-defence, based on a Hohfeldian definition of a right. 
In his classic article, W. N. Hohfeld describes rights and duties as sets of 
normative relations, between the subject, object and end of the right or duty. 
He argues that ‘a right in the strictest sense’ (1913: 36) is simply a claim, with 
a duty as its ‘correlative’ (Hohfeld, 1913: 38); however, later theorists like 
Rodin and Thomson interpret this to mean that claims are one ‘subclass of 
rights’ in Thomson’s words (1990: 40), and that liberties or privileges may 
also be described as rights.  
Suzanne Uniacke similarly describes the possibility that individuals might 
have ‘an agent-relative permission’ to defend themselves; namely the 
‘permission to defend oneself in certain ways against particular threats’ (1991: 
73). Rodin (2002: 23) also writes that ‘the right of self-defense and defensive 
rights more generally are simple Hohfeldian relations which do not contain 
claims’ – rather, he argues that the individual right of self-defence is a liberty, 
or permission-right. 
Thus, for Rodin having a right of self-defence means that an individual is ‘at 
liberty to defend a certain good by performing an action which would 
otherwise be impermissible’ (Rodin, 2002: 99). According to Rodin, the 
‘moral justification for this liberty’ (2002: 99) invokes three considerations:  
 
‘(i) an appropriate normative relation exists between the 
subject and the end of the right, consisting either of a right to, 
or a duty of care towards the good protected, (ii) the defensive 
act is a proportionate, necessary response to an imminent threat 
of harm, (iii) the object of defensive force has an appropriate 
degree of normative responsibility for, and the subject is 
innocent of, the harm threatened.’ (Rodin, 2002: 99) 
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Thus, Rodin argues that these three considerations are sufficient to justify 
‘personal’ rights of defence (2002: 103). So, if Susan were to be attacked 
when innocently walking home, and she were to fight and kill her attacker in 
self-defence, her right to do so would be justified by her right to that which 
she is fighting to protect, in this case her own life. Killing the attacker must, 
however, be necessary to save her life, and thus also a proportionate response 
to the attack.  
Daniel Statman argues in favour of a third condition, a ‘success’ condition 
stating that ‘otherwise immoral acts can be justified under the right to self-
defense only if they are likely to achieve defense from the perceived threat’ 
(2008: 659). He claims this condition is ‘implied’ by the accepted conditions 
for self-defence (2008: 659), and that a reasonable chance of success must be 
necessary for individual self-defence since it is generally considered necessary 
for collective defence (being a jus ad bellum condition).  
However, there are other ad bellum conditions (such as right intention) 
which do not have an equivalent position in the individual right to self-
defence. I also consider it intuitively plausible that an individual could have a 
right to attempt self-defence even in the knowledge that she does so hopelessly 
– after all, unlike the leader of a nation or other collective entity, she is risking 
no one’s life but her own (and that of her attacker) in making that decision. 
For this reason, I will not be using Statman’s success condition as a necessary 
condition for the possession of an individual right to defence, but will stick to 
Rodin’s suggestions of necessity and proportionality. 
As I will show later in this chapter, I accept Rodin’s suggestions of the 
appropriate considerations to justify self-defence, but I do not agree with 
Rodin’s assessment of (i) and (iii) (in short, Rodin and I differ concerning the 
appropriate normative relation and the appropriate degree of normative 
responsibility). 
Rodin’s reasoning in this case seems to be that Susan’s attacker, because he 
is culpably responsible for attacking her, has forfeited his right not to be 
fought and killed in response to his actions, if such is the necessary and 
proportionate response in the circumstances. This leaves Susan with the 
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liberty to defend her life (or not to do so if she chooses to waive her right of 
defence).   
Other theorists, namely Michael Walzer and John Rawls, argue that 
defensive killing, both individual and national, is justified in order to preserve 
access to the rights of life and liberty. Insofar as they consider a right to 
defence, they consider it as a part of these two rights (part of having the right 
to life and liberty being the right to preserve them). This results in another 
possible way of grounding a rights-based account of defence. The arguments 
of these two writers are not exactly identical, but they contain sufficient 
similarities to be treated as yielding a coherent account of justified defensive 
killing – in fact, just war theorists such as Rex Martin discuss the arguments 
of Walzer and Rawls together, as, in Martin’s words, ‘constituting something 
like a unified view of the subject’ (2007: 75).  
The rights to life and liberty, Walzer claims, are ‘a palpable feature of our 
moral world’ and are ‘somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to be a 
human being’ (Walzer, 1977: 54) – thus, though he admits he ‘cannot try to 
explain’ (1977: 54) what it is that makes them rights, he argues they are 
necessarily in existence and necessarily belong to every human being, as they 
are part of what it ‘means to be . . . human’ (1977 54).  
Thus, Walzer’s and Rawls’ account bases the justifiability of defence upon 
the rights to life and liberty. According to this account, Susan does not have a 
right to defence in itself; rather she has a right to her life and her liberty, and 
she is justified in defending herself against her attacker because he is 
threatening at least one of these rights.  
My thinking on the right to defence is much closer to Rodin’s and 
Thomson’s, than to Walzer or Rawls. I would argue that there does exist an 
individual right to defence, and that basic rights can ground that right to 
defence without that defensive right collapsing back into a Walzerian right to 
such a thing as life or liberty. I will explain my reasons for rejecting Walzer’s 
and Rawls’ collectivist account of defence in the next chapter. First, however, 
I must outline what an individual right to defence might be, and how it fits in 
with the tradition of individual defensive rights within just war theory, as 
supported by such noted theorists as Judith Jarvis Thomson, David Rodin, 
Cecile Fabre and Jeff McMahan. 
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2: An Individual Right of Defence 
 
 
Defensive rights in the just war tradition have a long and varied history. Of 
course, in order to build a definition of just cause for war, individual rights of 
defence can only go so far, and some kind of liberty right for a group of 
people, such as a nation, to defend themselves as a whole is required. 
However, my task here is to establish the existence of the individual right – in 
Chapter Two, I will move on to show how a group can derive such a right 
from the individual rights of its members, considering both the collectivist and 
reductive strategies, and develop a form of reductive individualism which will 
support my definition of just cause. 
An individual right to defend oneself from unjustified aggression is, as I 
have said, supported by such theorists as Judith Jarvis Thomson, Suzanne 
Uniacke, Cecile Fabre and David Rodin7. Of course, while these theorists 
agree upon the existence of such an individual right of defence, they may 
differ in the details (such as the grounding or scope) of an individual right.  
For instance, Fabre suggests that ‘if an agent lacks an objective justification 
for attacking V [the victim of his attack], the latter has the right to use lethal 
force in self-defence’ (Fabre, 2014: 60) (subject to certain limitations 
concerning the necessity and proportionality of such a response, of course), 
and that ‘For V to have that right means that the target of her self-defensive 
move is under a duty not to defend himself’ (Fabre, 2014: 59), meaning that 
an individual’s right to defend herself is based upon the fact that the attacker 
has made it permissible for her to do so, because he has rendered himself 
liable to that attack through his attack on the victim.  
Being ‘liable’ to attack means, as Seth Lazar puts it, that ‘He loses his claim 
right to life, and the defender therefore has no duty not to kill him’ (2009: 
700). Lazar also states that ‘Moral responsibility for an unjustified threat is, I 
think, required for liability to defensive killing’ (2009: 703).  
                                                 
7 Rodin, of course, argues that this individual right cannot be transformed into a collective 
right, but this is a topic for my next chapter. 
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Thomson, on the other hand, argues that ‘it is permissible for you to kill a 
person in defence of your life’ (1991: 289) (meaning that you have a liberty 
right to do so) even if that person is not ‘morally responsible’ for the attack, as 
Lazar (2009: 703) would have it. She gives the examples of an Innocent 
Aggressor or Attacker8, who actively threatens your life through no fault of 
his own, for instance if ‘some villain had just injected him with a drug that 
made him go temporarily crazy’ (Thomson, 1991: 284), and an Innocent 
Threat, who is passively threatening your life (such as a fat man who has been 
pushed off a cliff and is about to fall on you and crush you).  
In both these cases, Thomson argues, the potential victim has a liberty right 
to defend herself by killing (if necessary) the Innocent Aggressor and 
Innocent Threat, because ‘they will otherwise violate your rights that they not 
kill you, and therefore lack rights that you not kill them’ (Thomson, 1991: 
302). This is closer to Fabre’s definition of liability to attack, since the 
Innocent Aggressor and Innocent Threat both lack any ‘objective justification 
for attacking’ (Fabre, 2014: 60); although Fabre says that while she agrees 
with Thomson’s conclusion that the Victim may kill the Innocent Aggressor 
or Innocent Threat, she does not agree with her argument for this point.  
Fabre argues, instead, that ‘agents generally have a personal prerogative to 
confer greater weight on their own projects and goals than on other agents’ 
similar projects’, and that while this prerogative does not give them the right 
to kill innocent bystanders, it ‘does permit them to kill their attacker if the 
latter, whatever might be said about their lack of moral responsibility for the 
situation of forced choice between lives, nevertheless subjects them to a 
wrongful lethal threat’ (Fabre, 2014: 57). 
Yitzhak Benbaji alternatively suggests that killing an Innocent Threat in 
self-defence might ‘in some cases’ be both ‘morally permitted’ and ‘morally 
unjustified’ (2005: 615); in that ‘the right to kill innocent threats is a right to 
do wrong’ (2005: 615) because ‘by taking advantage of his right to self-
defense, the potential victim treats the innocent threat as if he were a boulder 
rather than a person’ (2005: 619) – namely, she fails to respect him ‘as a 
                                                 
8 The terms ‘Innocent Aggressor’ and Innocent Attacker’ are used interchangeably, by various 
writers, to refer to this same example. I will therefore follow their example, and use both 
terms. 
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person’ (2005: 619), and so acts wrongly even though her action was 
permitted. 
Finally, Rodin suggests that individual defensive rights  
 
‘derive from a complex set of normative relationships 
between four entities: the subject (the holder of the right), the 
content (the defensive act), the object (the party against 
whom the right is held), and the end (the good or value which 
the defensive actions seek to protect or preserve).’ (Rodin, 
2002: 99) 
 
His view is that an individual has the right of defence when she is ‘at liberty to 
defend a certain good by performing an action which would otherwise be 
impermissible.’ (Rodin, 2002: 99) 
What we have here amounts to the suggestion that the individual right to 
lethally defend oneself against a threat to one’s life is a liberty right to self-
defence, grounded upon the existence of a claim right to life, and the fact that 
the attacker has made himself liable to defensive action by attempting to 
violate that claim right. Lazar, on the other hand, suggested that a right should 
be grounded upon the ‘status and interests’ of the rights-holder (Lazar, 2009: 
292) – but I will not be using Lazar’s ‘hybrid’ theory of rights here. I now turn 
to an explanation of what I believe an individual right to defence consists of. 
I will use this definition of the individual defensive right as a permission, or 
liberty right. It cannot be a claim right in the Hohfeldian sense, since (as I will 
argue) in itself it need not be correlated with any specific duty, and it is 
grounded upon the possession of certain basic claim rights.  
Thus, I argue that an individual has the liberty right to use lethal force in 
defence of one’s life. I will now define the kind of individual right I am 
advocating, by first explaining what the ‘end’ of defence is (defined by Rodin 
as ‘the good that the defensive act is intended to protect or preserve’ (2004: 
64), then the scope of this right, and finally I shall define the ‘appropriate 
normative relation…between the subject and the end of the right’ (Rodin, 
2002: 99). 
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2i) The Appropriate End of Individual Self-Defence 
 
When I say that an individual has the right to defend her life, this at first 
looks like a rather narrow definition of the permissible end of self-defence. 
The traditional definition of a life, in this sense, is usually that of the physical 
continuation of existence9, but this, I believe, is an insufficient definition, for 
physical existence need not be a life in any real, deep, meaningful way.  
A real life must also include such things as safety and security, the means to 
carry on living for the foreseeable future, and, of course, the values and 
principles that make life fulfilling and meaningful, because all these are the 
things that make living a life living, not merely existing. I wish to use a 
broader definition of ‘life’, as more than mere continued physical existence.  
I am not alone in thinking that life, in the context of the proper end of self-
defence, must mean something more than the biological definition of ‘living’ 
– that is, continuing to function as a living organism. For instance, Norman 
argues that there is a relevant distinction here between being alive and ‘having 
a life’ (1995: 57), which not everything that is alive does. He suggests 
referring to James Rachels’ distinction between ‘the biological sense of ‘life’’ 
and ‘the biographical sense in which some living things may ‘have a life’’ 
(Norman, 1995: 55). As Rodin puts it, this means ‘a capacity to shape a 
meaningful life as a distinctive ongoing project’ (2002: 156).  
Similarly, Rodin himself argues that if we have a right to kill in defence of 
liberty, it must be because ‘liberty is a necessary condition for the shaping of 
any meaningful life’, as ‘in part we value life because of the liberty that it 
enables us to exercise’ (2002: 47). The defence of one’s life is only 
worthwhile if it defends a meaningful life, and does not, for instance, reduce 
one to a hopeless drudgery of an existence lacking in any quality of life 
whatsoever. However, I think it is important that, before accepting this and 
moving on, we explore more thoroughly what it means to have a right to 
                                                 
9 This is the definition that Walzer uses when he argues that individuals have a right to life, for 
instance. 
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defend a meaningful life. Henceforward, for convenience’s sake, I will refer to 
this concept of a meaningful life as a flourishing life10. 
The primary question that needs to be answered is; what precisely 
constitutes a flourishing life? Theories vary from the purely hedonistic 
argument that ‘what would be best for someone is what would make his life 
happiest’ (Parfit, 1987: 493), or the preference-hedonistic concept that a 
person’s life ‘went better if it went as he preferred’ (Parfit, 1987: 494), to 
more nuanced utilitarian definitions like Mill’s view that a flourishing life is 
one that contains an appropriate balance of higher and lower pleasures, a 
higher pleasure being ‘one to which all or almost all who have experience of 
both [that and a lower pleasure] give a decided preference, irrespective of any 
feeling of moral obligation to prefer it’ (2003: 187), to other theories of well-
being such as Desire-Fulfilment Theories, which suggest that ‘what would be 
best for someone is what, throughout his life, would best fulfil his desires’ 
(Parfit, 1987: 493), and Objective List Theories, which hold that ‘certain 
things are good or bad for people, whether or not these people would want to 
have the good things, or to avoid the bad things’ (Parfit, 1987: 499).  
I do not have the space to consider these conceptions of a good or 
flourishing life in any detail, but briefly, I believe that my definition of a 
flourishing life would be closest to the Objective List Theory. I would argue 
that there are indeed some things which are ‘good’ for a person to have in 
their life whether or not they are preferred11, like security, stability, liberty and 
so on.  
                                                 
10 I should also note that when I refer to a ‘flourishing life’ as the end of self-defence, the 
concept I describe is similar to, but distinct from, the concept of a flourishing life that Fabre 
uses in her arguments. Fabre suggests that individuals have certain rights, such as subsistence 
rights and the right to self-determination, which are human rights precisely because they are 
necessary for individuals to live a flourishing life, and that it is these rights which constitute 
an appropriate end of self-defence. My argument is, rather, that we have a right to the 
flourishing life itself, a right to live such a life, which (as I will explain shortly) is a cluster-
right consisting of rights to all the aspects of a flourishing life. 
11 A tricky situation for Objective List Theories might be presented by the possibility of a 
person who prefers not to have any of the ‘good things’ that constitute a good or flourishing 
life – should he be given these things whether he wants them or not, for his own good? Again, 
I do not have the space to discuss this at any great length, but I would think that most people, 
whether they actively think about wanting, or preferring, these ‘good things’ (most people 
who have them do not, until they lose them), never actually prefer not to have them, unless 
they need to sacrifice one ‘good thing’ in order to preserve another they value more. But, if 
free to choose whether or not to have these ‘good things’ without sacrificing anything else in 
order to get them, I think it is safe to assume that most people would prefer having them to not 
having them. 
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Derek Parfit gives further examples, such as ‘rational activity’ or ‘the 
development of one's abilities’ (1987: 499). He also suggests that avoiding 
certain ‘bad things’ like ‘being betrayed, manipulated, slandered, deceived, 
being deprived of liberty or dignity’ (1987: 499) would contribute to a good 
life. I will refer to these ‘good things’ and the avoidance of certain ‘bad 
things’, therefore, as aspects of a flourishing life. 
I have already outlined some of the aspects which, I believe, go towards 
making up such a life, aspects such as security, the means to sustain life in the 
future, or the freedom to live according to one’s values and principles, but I 
also need to explain what it is that makes them aspects of a flourishing life. 
Living a fulfilled, happy, contented life is, it intuitively seems, better than 
living a life which is not fulfilled or happy but which is, for the most part, 
endurance rather than life. Thus, it seems, we have reason to value those 
things which provide our lives with fulfilment, happiness and meaning. 
However, this does not mean that we thereby invest these things with their 
own value – for one thing, we do not value them for their own sakes. We value 
them solely because of their positive contribution to our lives, and therefore, it 
seems to me that it is really our lives, in this extended sense, that we are 
placing value upon. These things are valuable not in and of themselves, but as 
a part of a fulfilling, happy, contented, whole life – a life, in short, which is 
worth living.  
   Thus, the definition of what constitutes a flourishing life would be that of 
a life which includes all the things which the person in question values 
because they provide her with a fulfilling, contented life, including not only 
the freedom to live according to her most cherished values and principles, but 
also such things as security and stability so that she can live without enduring 
or anticipating chaos or further attack (which is not a situation in which a 
person could manage to live a contented or fulfilling life), and the means to 
carry on living at anything more than basic subsistence level. 
Of course, proportionality will determine what degree of response is 
appropriate in cases where the importance of the aspect of life to the 
meaningfulness of the person’s life may be less than absolutely central. This is 
particularly necessary in this case, as it is highly implausible to suggest that 
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lethal self-defence could be justified in order to protect aspects of a 
meaningful life which are less important, such as privacy. 
Obviously, without continued physical existence, no human life can continue 
to enjoy the other aspects of life that I have outlined here; therefore, the actual, 
physical death of an individual would be the worst possible attack upon a 
person’s flourishing life, and the strongest response would be proportionate.  
However, if that attack were to destroy other aspects of a full and 
meaningful life while stopping short of actually killing the person to whom 
that life belonged, for instance by depriving her of the means to continue 
living in a comfortable manner (e.g. depriving her of her home, or depriving 
her of all but a subsistence level of food), or by destroying the sense of safety 
and security upon which her life was founded, or by destroying or damaging 
her ability to live according to the values or principles which she held most 
dear, this obviously would also be a bad consequence of that attack, though a 
less serious one. This is because the destruction of these aspects of a 
flourishing life, while less serious than actual killing since it does not 
extinguish the entire life of the person in question, nevertheless partially 
destroys it – it destroys important aspects of what it means to lead a life in the 
deeper sense that I have described.  
The harm threatened by an attack upon a person can, in this way, be seen as 
more serious in direct relation to however many aspects of a flourishing life 
are destroyed, and worst of all when people are physically killed, as this would 
destroy all aspects of their lives. The more serious the harm threatened, the 
stronger the proportionate response to that harm would obviously be. 
Obviously, then, a threat to a person’s continued physical existence would 
(if necessary) justify lethal defensive action, as all the aspects of that person’s 
flourishing life are being threatened with destruction. However, there are also 
other aspects, a threat to which would involve a threat to other, necessarily 
connected aspects of flourishing life. For instance, if an attacker was 
threatening to rape his victim, this would involve a threat not only to her 
bodily integrity (another important aspect of flourishing life) but to her safety 
and security, her freedom to choose what happens to her body, possibly her 
health, and so on.  
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Similarly, an attacker who aims not to kill his victim, but to seriously and 
permanently maim them – say, by cutting off both her legs (assuming for the 
sake of argument that she would not bleed to death, but would survive this 
attack) – would by so doing destroy vital aspects of her future quality of life. 
Since these forms of harm all involve a threat to so many aspects of 
flourishing life, lethal defence against the attacker would seem to be 
proportionate in each case. 
Thus, Victim may defend herself against Attacker not only if his attack 
threatens to kill her, but if it threatens to destroy other aspects of her 
flourishing life, for instance if he plans to kidnap her (threatening her liberty), 
rape her, or, though this perhaps might be trickier, maim or blind her. All of 
these threatened harms count as attacks upon Victim’s life, in this wider sense 
of a meaningful, worthwhile life, as opposed to life in the narrower sense of a 
continued physical existence.  
 
2ii) The Scope of an Individual Defensive Right 
 
The scope of an individual’s right to defence is, according to most 
definitions of the right, determined by the question of liability – Victim is only 
permitted to defend herself against the person or persons who are liable to be 
attacked by her. It is also often accepted that Victim’s right to kill in her own 
defence and Attacker’s forfeiture of ‘his claim right to life’ (in Lazar’s words 
(2009: 700)) are two sides of the same coin – Rodin argues that they are 
‘Hohfeldian correlates of one another…the same normative fact described 
from two different perspectives’ (2002: 75).  
In short, Victim only has the right to defend herself against her attackers if, 
in McMahan’s words, they ‘render themselves relevantly noninnocent, 
thereby losing their moral immunity to attack and instead becoming liable, or 
morally vulnerable, to attack’ (1994: 193) – and thereby also, it would seem to 
follow, forfeiting their right to defence.  
Gerald Lang calls this the ‘Forfeiture Account’ of liability, since it explains 
Victim’s gaining a right to kill and Attacker’s loss of his right not to be 
attacked by saying that ‘the Attacker loses his right in virtue of forfeiting his 
right, and he forfeits his right due to wrongdoing’ (2014: 38). Lang 
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compellingly defends the Forfeiture Account, and I believe his defence of it is 
sound. However, as I will shortly explain, the fact that Attacker’s behaviour 
causes him to forfeit his immunity to attack, does not necessarily result in the 
simple correlation that Rodin suggests. 
In the straightforward, paradigmatic example of an Attacker who 
deliberately and maliciously attacks Victim with the intention of killing her, it 
seems fairly clear that Attacker is liable to Victim’s defensive attack. In other, 
less straightforward cases such as Thomson’s Innocent Attacker or Innocent 
Threat, some theorists such as Lazar might disagree with Thomson’s assertion 
that they are liable, because they bear no moral responsibility for the threat 
they pose. I agree that Attacker, Innocent Attacker and Innocent Threat are all 
liable to attack, but it does not seem to me that this necessarily puts each of 
the three under ‘a duty not to defend himself’, as Fabre (2014: 59) would have 
it.  
Basically, I do not see that Victim’s right to defend herself and Attacker’s 
forfeiture of his right to defend himself have to be correlates just because 
Victim’s right of defence and Attacker’s loss of his right to life are correlates 
according to the Hohfeldian definition.  
McMahan, for instance, argues that ‘Even if the IA [innocent attacker] loses 
his immunity to attack, he retains a right to self-defense’ (1994: 283). Even 
though McMahan concludes his paper by rejecting ‘the view that the self-
defensive killing of an IA is wrong’ but saying that he is also ‘unable to find a 
fully convincing justification for the view that it is permissible’ (1994: 288) 
(meaning that he could not prove either way whether the Innocent Attacker 
does become liable to attack), he seems here to recognise the possibility that 
some form of liability to attack may co-exist with a permission to defend 
oneself. 
More recently, McMahan points out that while it seems impermissible for a 
liable person to defend herself (because if the harm to which she is liable does 
not go to her it will go to someone else, which would be a less just distribution 
of harm that is unavoidable), this claim about liability is limited to a certain 
context – that of the immediate conflict. He then suggests that there may in 
fact be a lesser-evil justification for a person who is liable to be harmed to 
defend himself from harm – for example if the only person who could disarm 
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a bomb (which would otherwise kill a thousand people) were planning to 
commit murder before disarming it, then it might be permissible for the 
murderer to defend himself from his victim’s defensive attacks (because 
otherwise no one would be able to disarm the bomb). He also suggests that a 
murderer who changes his mind (mid-attack) about committing the murder, 
but is now about to be killed by his intended victim, might be permitted to use 
a lesser form of self-defence (such as striking the victim), provided that he 
does not inflict too much harm by this action, and that he will not cause 
further harm afterwards12. 
Frowe, on the other hand, argues that it is permissible for the victim to kill 
an Apparent Threat, someone she mistakenly believes is about to kill her, but 
that ‘different, objective factors determine whether Victim’s target is liable to 
such force’ (2010: 247). While I also disagree with her argument13, this seems 
to be another example of divergence between Victim’s right of defence and 
the Attacker’s liability. However, Frowe’s view is, as she states in another 
paper, that ‘a person who is liable to a harm is not permitted to defend herself 
against that harm’ (2011: 174), so I may have misunderstood her point here. 
Thomas Hurka also suggests that we may distinguish between a stronger 
form of liability – permanent liability – and a weaker, temporary form. For 
instance, he argues that conscripts are not as liable to attack as volunteer 
soldiers. The difference is not that conscripts strictly speaking have a different 
form of liability than volunteer soldiers, but that they are ‘only sometimes 
liable to attack and at other times immune’ (2007: 215), which would seem to 
suggest that when conscripts are liable, they are fully liable, not permitted to 
defend themselves. I will explain my reasons for disagreeing with this view 
later in my dissertation.  
However, even disagreeing with the main thrust of his argument, I think 
Hurka’s suggestion (2007: 215) that conscripted soldiers may become 
‘legitimate military targets… just because they are a danger’ to the enemy 
soldiers they are trying to kill, but are not as liable as the volunteer soldiers 
                                                 
12 I am indebted to Jeff McMahan for this argument (personal communication, 03/10/15). 
13 I would say that Victim’s defensive actions against an Apparent Threat are excusable, 
though not justified, though I have no time to go into this here. 
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who might be said to bear greater responsible for their actions (because they 
chose to be there, and the conscripts did not), is a compelling one.  
Uwe Steinhoff gives an equally interesting definition of liability to attack, 
which follows Thomson in many respects, but differs from her in arguing that 
the Innocent Threat is liable to attack not because he is causally responsible 
for violating the victim’s rights, but because ‘people have a general right to 
defend themselves against unjust threats of all sorts… not only to threats 
posed by persons, but to all threats, including to those posed by inanimate 
objects (2012: 347). Since the victim’s rights to life and to self-defence and 
the Innocent Threat’s rights to life and to self-defence are incompatible, 
Steinhoff suggests that ‘in this case both parties have lost their claim-rights to 
life and to self-defense but retained their liberty-rights to life and self-defense’ 
(2012: 347).  
They each still have the liberty to defend themselves, as in Steinhoff’s words 
‘a liberty (-right) held against a certain person only implies that I am not duty-
bound towards that person not to exercise this liberty and thus implies that by 
exercising it I would not wrong her’ (2012: 347) (so both can hold these 
liberty-rights simultaneously), but their claim rights to self-defence cannot be 
held simultaneously, since, as Steinhoff puts it, a claim right ‘implies that the 
person I hold the right against cannot interfere in my exercise of it without 
wronging me’ (2012: 347). 
Steinhoff’s account of liability relies upon the suggestion that we have both 
a claim right to defence and a liberty right to defence, whereas I have defined 
the right to defence as a liberty right alone. As I shall explain shortly, I believe 
that there are some cases in which an A may permissibly engage in counter-
defence (i.e. interfere in the exercise of B’s right of defence) and some cases 
in which A may not, and this depends not upon whether B has an additional 
claim right to defence, but upon whether A retains her liberty right of defence. 
This additional claim right is simply not necessary. However, Steinhoff’s 
argument also has its interesting points, in that it illustrates that symmetrical 
rights of defence are not as counter-intuitive as they might at first have 
seemed. 
In short, it seems to me that Victim’s right of defence and Attacker’s loss of 
his right of defence can diverge – you can sometimes have one without the 
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other. The Innocent Attacker and Innocent Threat are in this situation (and, as 
I will argue in Chapter Three, so are most soldiers on the battlefield).  
While Victim’s right to defend herself against Innocent Attacker and 
Innocent Threat means that they have lost their claim rights to life (meaning 
that they may permissibly be the targets of Victim’s attack), it does not 
necessarily mean that they have lost the right of self-defence. There may seem 
to be a simple Hohfeldian relation between these two things – that if I have a 
liberty right to defend something, then you cannot have a claim right that 
permits you to stop me from defending it. However, I do not think that in this 
case, Victim’s liberty right and Attacker’s claim right, as previously 
described, are rights to exactly the same thing.  
It is also possible that the liberty-right of defence can exist without a claim 
right to life, because life (in the narrow sense) is what this right refers to, and 
as I argued in 3i), the ultimate end of defence is not life in a narrow sense but 
in a wider sense, a flourishing life, and I would argue that one can lose a claim 
right to life in the narrow sense while retaining a claim right to flourishing 
life. I will give an argument for this point later, but first I must explain what 
this means for liability.  
It means, essentially, that losing one’s claim right to life need not mean that 
one loses the right to defence as well. Losing the right of defence means, as I 
will explain at greater length in 3iii), losing a larger number of claim rights to 
the various aspects of a flourishing life, and in order to lose all of these claim 
rights together one must, to put it crudely, have done something to deserve it. 
Losing just the claim right to life in the narrower sense, however, can perhaps 
happen in a Walzerian sense, because one poses an immediate threat to 
another human being.  
In short, the Innocent Attacker loses the claim right to life in the narrow 
sense, simply because her unwitting actions are about to violate another 
person’s claim rights to flourishing life. She thereby becomes liable to 
defensive attack by Victim. However, she does not at the same time lose her 
right to defend herself. In order to do so, she must be more than merely 
causally responsible for the violation of Victim’s rights. She must deserve to 
lose her right of defence, by, for instance, possessing ‘an appropriate degree 
of normative responsibility for…the harm threatened.’ (Rodin, 2002: 99).  
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In this way, we can distinguish a stronger form of liability, and a weaker 
form14. Becoming strongly liable to attack would mean both losing one’s right 
not to be attacked, and losing one’s right of defence. So, a strongly liable 
attacker may legitimately be attacked by his victim, and that he ‘is not entitled 
to engage in counterdefense’, as Jonathan Quong (2012: 46) puts it. Weaker 
liability to attack would mean only losing one’s right not to be attacked, whilst 
retaining one’s right of defence. A weakly liable person is therefore the 
legitimate target of defensive action, because of the threat he poses to 
Victim’s continued meaningful life, but he may be such a legitimate target 
without being subject to a duty not to defend himself against attack. 
Many accounts of liability only use the stronger form, such as McMahan’s 
moral responsibility account (which states that ‘the criterion of liability to 
defensive killing is moral responsibility, through action that lacks objective 
justification, for a threat of unjust harm to others’ (McMahan, 2005: 394), or 
the culpability account (which means that ‘a person only becomes liable to 
defensive harm when he is culpable for an unjust threat of harm against 
others’ (Quong, 2012: 47).  
Other examples include the causal account supported by Thomson (which 
argues, as McMahan (2005: 389) put it, that ‘the violation of a right is a matter 
of what one person causes to happen to another’ – in other words, a person is 
liable if they are the immediate cause of the threat of harm) and Quong’s own 
moral status account, in which he argues that you are liable to attack if you 
‘behave either as if other people are liable to the harms you might impose, or 
as if others do not have the sort of stringent moral claims that each person 
normally possesses’ (Quong, 2012: 47) (because when you act in this way, 
you treat others as if they lack the moral claims necessary to protect them from 
the harms you might impose, and so it is only fair that you bear special 
liability for your actions’ (Quong, 2012: 47-8)).  
Because these accounts only consider the stronger form of liability (meaning 
that, in their view, either the victim of an attack is liable and may not defend 
himself, or he is not liable and he may do so), I believe they all suffer from 
                                                 
14 I do not have the space here to thrash out a complete account of liability, nor to outline and 
examine Quong’s objections to the culpability account and McMahan’s account, so I must 
simply note that they exist and leave responding to them for another time. Here, I will include 
only a shorter definition of my account of liability. 
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one of two problems. Either, as with the causal account, too few rights are 
granted to certain attackers, or, as with the others, the scope of the defensive 
right itself seems to be too narrow.  
According to the causal account, the Innocent Attacker or Innocent Threat 
are liable to attack, and therefore may not defend themselves. Thomson allows 
that ‘some people’ would find this a counter-intuitive conclusion, or at least 
would ‘feel uncomfortable’ with the suggestion that the Innocent Attacker is 
liable to be killed (1991: 286), but she attempts to account for it by suggesting 
that such Innocent Attackers or Threats are about to ‘violate your rights that 
they not kill you, and therefore lack rights that you not kill them’ (Thomson, 
1991: 302).  
Uniacke argues, similarly, that there are two kinds of justifications for 
killing, and the second form ‘is based on the information that is available to 
the agent at the time’ (2000: 631) – so that ‘putative self-defense based on 
reasonable beliefs’ (2000: 633) may not only be excused, but actually justified.  
However, to base an entire account of liability upon ideas like this seems 
rather too stringent. Granted, the fact that the Innocent Attacker is about to kill 
you counts for something, and even the fact that you believe he is about to kill 
you may, as Uniacke claims, also count for something; but does it really mean 
not only that it is morally permissible for you to kill them, but that they may 
not try to prevent you from doing so, despite their lack of responsibility for the 
situation that they are in? Instead, I would agree with McMahan that in order 
for an attacker to surrender his own right of defence, that attacker must be 
responsible for the attack in some sense more meaningful than merely having, 
wittingly or unwittingly, physically instigated it.  
In addition, Rodin provides a cogent objection to this argument, pointing out 
that 
 
‘Something can only violate rights if it is the subject of a 
duty… But something can be the subject of a duty only if it 
has certain minimal capacities, including the capacities of 
acting, deliberating, choosing and intending.’ (Rodin, 2002: 
86) 
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In short, since Innocent Attacker and Innocent Threat neither intend, choose, 
nor willingly act to threaten Victim, they cannot be said to have violated 
Victim’s rights – they are only puppets or tools, and hence do not have the 
duty not to attack their victims.  
Similarly, Michael Otsuka argues that Innocent Threats, for instance, no 
more violate your rights than does ‘a (faultless, agency-lacking) stone [which] 
will kill you if it falls on you’ (1994: 80). He points out that suggestions, such 
as Frances Kamm’s, that an Innocent Threat at the very least causes the rights-
violation of the Victim because an Innocent Threat is ‘a person who should 
not be in an inappropriate position relative to others’ (Kamm, 1992: 47) are 
problematic, since they imply that the person is ‘capable of taking precautions 
to avoid being in that inappropriate location’ (Otsuka, 1994: 81), which 
obviously an Innocent Threat or an Innocent Attacker is not. They are in no 
relevant sense different from the stone, as they had no more choice about the 
matter than the stone had, and so if a stone cannot violate the rights of the 
person it lands on, neither can an Innocent Threat.  
Otsuka goes on to argue that both Innocent Aggressors and Innocent Threats 
are like Bystanders in this sense. They do not ‘violate, or cause the violation 
of, your right not to be killed’ (1994: 84) even when their presence is plays a 
causal role in your death (as even a Bystander’s presence may do, when for 
instance she stands unwittingly blocking your only escape route). He 
furthermore suggests that ‘Threats and Bystanders share an important morally 
relevant property…that of being a “bystander”, qua responsible agent, to the 
object that poses a danger to life’ (1994: 84).  
We may not kill a Bystander, he argues, because of ‘her lack of responsible 
lethal agency, and not the absence of her body from the sequence of events 
that results in death’ (1994: 84). Innocent Threats (and, he adds later, Innocent 
Aggressors) also lack responsible lethal agency, and so, in his view, ‘The 
killing of a Threat and the Killing of a Bystander are, other thing equal, on a 
par as far as permissibility of concerned’ (1994: 76) – they are both morally 
prohibited, in short. Otsuka calls this the ‘Moral Equivalence thesis’ (1994: 
76). 
However, Otsuka’s Moral Equivalence Thesis goes too far the other way, as 
do accounts of liability such as McMahan’s moral responsibility account or 
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Quong’s moral status account. The Innocent Attacker or the Innocent Threat 
are neither morally responsible for their actions nor deliberately ‘treat others 
as if they lack the moral claims necessary to protect them from the harms you 
might impose’ (2012: 47), and thus, according to such accounts, they are not 
liable to attack at all.  
Proponents of such accounts could respond by biting the bullet, and 
accepting that morally, the victims of such attackers do not have the right to 
defend themselves (an unacceptably counter-intuitive response, in my view). 
Alternatively, they could argue that if their victims kill an Innocent Attacker 
or Threat in self-defence, then the victims’ actions are not justified (in the 
sense that they have done something that they did not have a right to do), but 
these actions were nevertheless excusable, since their actions were necessary 
to defend their lives against an immediate threat.  
I agree with Thomson that this is not an acceptable response, since it would 
mean that the victims, although their actions were excusable, were still acting 
wrongly or impermissibly. As McMahan points out, ‘common intuitions about 
the justifiability of self-defense’ (1994: 264) include the intuition that ‘self-
defense seems justified…against an Innocent Attacker’ (1994: 263) – justified, 
not merely excusable. 
Any account of liability which leaves innocent victims of an attack 
(innocent in the sense that they bear no responsibility for said attack) in a 
situation where any action they take to prevent their own death is in some way 
wrong, however excusable it might be, is problematic. It is far too harsh on 
such innocent victims of attack (who are, let us not forget, innocent victims) 
that they should bear any share of the moral blame. The paradigm subjects of 
an individual right of self-defence are innocent victims of attack – if an 
account of such a right includes some such victims but not all, then it has 
failed somewhere.  
This problem also cannot be answered by arguing that once the victim of 
this attack defends themselves, they also become liable to attack, so that the 
Innocent Attacker or Innocent Threat are permitted to defend themselves 
against their victims because the victims have just become liable, and so 
forfeited their own rights of defence.  
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Liability, in the stronger sense in which the liable person forfeits their own 
right of defence as well as becoming the legitimate target of defensive action, 
can only result from an unjustified threat of harm, and so to say that the 
Victim renders herself liable to attack would mean that her original defensive 
action was unjustified – which of course brings the whole edifice of a 
defensive right crumbling down. 
In addition, Frowe criticises Otsuka’s argument that Innocent Threats and 
Innocent Attackers are not liable to attack, arguing that even though they 
‘lack…responsible lethal agency’ (Otsuka, 1994: 84), the ‘innocent person…is 
part of what is going to kill Victim, and is thus, unlike [a Bystander], a proper 
object of self-defence’ (2008: 284). In addition, she argues that Otsuka fails to 
prove that killing a Bystander and killing an Innocent Threat are morally 
equivalent, since a Bystander is either killed as a side-effect or treated as a 
means to the end of defending one’s life, but ‘it is the killing of an innocent 
threat that is a means, not the innocent threat herself’ (2008: 288).  
She claims, therefore, that ‘neither of the two kinds of bystander killing that 
Otsuka discusses’, namely killing as a side-effect or treating as a means, 
‘apply to the killing of innocent threats’ (2008: 288). This, Frowe admits, does 
not necessarily mean that killing innocent threats in self-defence is in fact 
permissible, but, in her words, ‘it does show that Otsuka’s argument for the 
impermissibility of killing threats — namely that such killings are akin to 
bystander killings — is incorrect’ (2008: 282). 
The problem with the cases of the Innocent Attacker and Innocent Threat is 
that, as the name applies, there are innocent victims of attack on both sides. 
The attacker or threat, not being responsible for the threat of harm itself 
(although they are its immediate cause), has done nothing to warrant the loss 
of their right of defence, and yet nor has their victim. This can best be 
accounted for by the conclusion that both are liable to attack in the weaker 
sense, meaning that both are legitimate targets of the victim’s defensive 
action, whilst retaining their own rights to self-defence. 
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So, where does this leave us? Liability in the weaker sense would appear to 
be closest to the causal account. All those who are the direct15 causes of unjust 
threats of harm to innocent victims become weakly liable to the defensive 
actions of said victims.16 I do not have the space here to thoroughly explore an 
account of strong liability, but I accept McMahan’s account of ‘moral 
responsibility for an unjust threat’ (2008: 22) as a plausible criterion for strong 
liability. 
When someone chooses to attack a defenceless stranger, foreseeing the 
threat to this person’s life, he becomes a legitimate target for that person’s 
defensive actions, and forfeits his own right of defence – or, in Fabre’s words, 
has ‘a duty not to defend himself’ (Fabre, 2014: 59) (which is the same thing 
as having his liberty right revoked). In short, the scope of a right of defence is 
this: all those who directly cause an unjust threat of harm, and all those who 
are morally responsible for such an unjust threat, are liable, but only the latter 
forfeit their own right of defence. 
 
2iii) The Grounding of an Individual Right to Self-Defence 
 
Finally, I will explain what it is that grounds the existence of an individual 
right to defence. As I mentioned earlier, Rodin mentions three things that are 
necessary for a right of defence. The second, that the act of defence must be ‘a 
proportionate, necessary response to an imminent threat of harm’ (Rodin, 
2002: 99), and the third, which concerns liability, have already been 
discussed. It is the first of the three which concerns us here; namely, the 
requirement that ‘an appropriate normative relation exists between the subject 
and the end of the right’ (Rodin, 2002: 99). 
                                                 
15 To include cases of indirect causation, where no criterion of moral responsibility is 
included, would spread the net too wide. We are all the indirect causes of a multitude of 
occurrences, no doubt including harms, which we are not responsible for and may never even 
know about; if we were weakly liable for all of them, this would lead to chaos. Strong 
liability, on the other hand, may include some cases of indirect causation (the man who 
drugged the Innocent Attacker, for example). 
16 This may seem counter-intuitive in some cases where the attacker is not morally responsible 
because of a lack of ability to understand their actions, for instance in my earlier example of a 
child soldier. Yet I think, hard as it might be, we must bite the bullet here and say that even a 
child who is thus threatening another with harm is weakly liable to attack, and that his victim 
may defend herself. The only alternative would be to say that if she cannot defend herself by 
non-lethal means then she must, morally, submit to being killed; and this is even more 
counter-intuitive. 
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 Rodin suggests that there are ‘three different relationships which may serve 
as a grounding for a defensive right’ (2002: 37), the first of which is ‘that in 
which the subject has a right to the good whose protection is the end of the 
defensive action’ (2002: 37), the second is ‘an established duty of care 
towards a certain person or object’ (2002: 37-8)17 and the third is ‘a duty to 
protect or preserve a person or thing even though one has no established 
obligation of trust or care’; namely, a duty ‘of rescue’ (2002: 38). I will follow 
this line of reasoning. 
From this, I take it that there must be some other, basic rights or duties 
towards the end of defence, namely the victim’s ability to lead a flourishing 
life; and the existence of a right to defence is grounded upon such rights or 
duties. Duties of care and of rescue are, I believe, more relevant to the 
grounding of a right to defend others, which I will not be considering in this 
chapter, as we are here attempting to ground a right of individual self-defence.  
An individual right of other-defence, as Rodin suggests may also involve 
duties of care or rescue towards the other people who need defending – for 
instance a duty of care towards your family might justify defending them 
against an attacker. A duty of care or rescue may not be the only justification 
for other-defence – for instance a stranger, in the act of simply asking for your 
protection, gives you the right to join in his defence, but you do not 
necessarily have a duty to defend him. However, the issue of other-defence is 
more interestingly discussed in terms of collective defence, which is the 
subject of the next chapter. So, I will focus here upon the question of which 
basic rights might ground a right to self-defence. 
It might seem that since the end of defence in this case is the victim’s life, 
then the obvious answer is, a right to life. However, things are not quite that 
simple. If we accept a claim right to life (in the narrow sense, meaning 
continued physical existence) as the only such ‘appropriate normative 
relation’ between the subject and end of a right of self-defence, then we run 
into difficulty for both my definition of the proper understanding of life (in the 
                                                 
17 Rodin suggested that this duty could also be a duty towards objects you might be obliged to 
protect, such as the duty of ‘museum curators to protect the artefacts entrusted to their 
custody’ (2002: 38). However, I do not think duties to objects could be important enough to 
pass the proportionality requirement for a right of defence, so I will only consider duties to 
people, when I consider this point. 
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context of the end of the right to self-defence), and for my concept of weaker 
liability to attack, since if a claim right to life (in the narrow sense) grounds 
the right to self-defence, then it would be difficult to see how an Innocent 
Attacker could retain their right to self-defence when their claim right to life 
(in the narrow sense) had been lost.  
Therefore, I suggest that, since the end of a right of defence is life in the 
wider sense that I have outlined, flourishing life, then this defensive right must 
be grounded upon more than just a basic claim right to life in the narrow 
sense, as mere physical existence. The appropriate right upon which to ground 
the liberty right to defence of a flourishing life would be a claim right to a 
flourishing life. 
However, as I have explained, a flourishing life is composed of a large 
number of aspects of a meaningful life. The claim right which we have to a 
flourishing life is, therefore, also made up out of the rights to all of these 
aspects that constitute a flourishing life, such as a right to security, to liberty, 
to physical integrity, and, of course, to continued physical existence. It is not, 
strictly speaking, a single right in itself, but what Thomson calls a ‘cluster-
right’ (Thomson, 1990: 56); a right containing a bundle of other rights which 
comprise a right to one single thing, which in this case is a full and 
meaningful life. Thomson argued that these cluster-rights are not ‘correlative 
with a duty’ (Thomson, 1990: 56) in the Hohfeldian way, and thus cannot be 
rights ‘in the strictest sense’ (Hohfeld, 1913: 36)).  
However, she also points out that ‘Liberties are clusters of rights, and are 
themselves rights’ (Thomson, 1990: 56) – in other words, lacking a correlative 
duty does not mean that a cluster-right cannot be a right in some sense. I will 
for the most part follow Thomson’s definition of a cluster-right here, although 
I must distinguish between her definition of a cluster-right in itself and her 
definition of the rights which go together to make up the cluster-right to life, 
which is in many ways different from my own – and understandably so, since 
mine is based upon the definition of a flourishing life, while Thomson’s is 
based upon the traditional, narrower understanding of life, so she considers 
mainly such claim-rights as ‘claims...against other people that they not 
deprive us of life’ and ‘privileges…of preserving our lives against (human and 
nonhuman threats to them’ (Thomson, 1990: 285).  
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These all concern the right to life in the narrow sense: so, if we accept that 
this and the rights to some of the other things I have identified as aspects of a 
meaningful life (such as liberty and privacy) are also cluster-rights, then it 
would seem that the right to a flourishing life is a cluster-right which contains 
other cluster-rights as well as simple rights. 
It also seems that the component-rights that make up a cluster-right are 
neither necessary nor sufficient; indeed, a right to an aspect of a flourishing 
life may be lost or forfeited without the person in question losing the right to a 
flourishing life.  
Thomson argues similarly that ‘the contents of the various different cluster-
rights can vary across time and person’ (1990: 287)18. For instance, a criminal 
who is arrested and sentenced to prison has thus forfeited his right to liberty, 
but it intuitively seems that he retains his right to a full and meaningful life, 
despite not having the right to this one aspect of it – because he retains his 
right to other aspects, such as security.  
However, a prisoner on death row (arguably) also loses his right to a 
continued physical existence (or, at least, continued past a certain point), but, 
up until the moment of his death, he still possesses the rights to other aspects 
of a flourishing life, such as bodily integrity and security – and the possession 
of these rights is sufficient to ensure that he still possesses the right to a 
flourishing life. Thus, it may perhaps, under certain circumstances, be possible 
to have a right to a meaningful life even when you lack the right to continued 
physical existence.  
Of course, just as some of the aspects of a flourishing life are more 
important, so also the rights to these particular aspects of life are more 
important than the rights to other aspects. This is because violating a person’s 
right to continued physical existence necessarily involves violating all the 
other rights that constitute the cluster-right to a flourishing life (that person’s 
                                                 
18 Thomson also argued that some of the rights contained within a right to life, the ‘most 
central rights protective of life’ (1990: 287) must be maintained in order for the person in 
question to retain his right to life. However, as I have said, this refers specifically to the right 
to life in a narrow sense. Since the rights contained within a right to flourishing life are 
specifically rights to aspects of that life, none of them can be described as ‘rights protective of 
life’, except perhaps those contained within the right to continued physical existence. This 
would, then, seem to be the only component-right which cannot be forfeited while still 
retaining the right to a flourishing life. However, as I will soon explain, there may be reasons 
for doubting this. 
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rights to continued liberty, security and so on will all be violated if he is 
killed), and violating a person’s right to bodily integrity also involves 
violating others (though not all) of her rights, such as her right to safety and 
security.  
However (and crucially), although this means that the potential violation of 
the rights to these aspects of a flourishing life count for more in a 
proportionality calculation, it does not mean that the loss or forfeiture of any 
one of these rights will result in the loss or forfeiture of the cluster-right to a 
flourishing life – even these aspects are neither necessary nor sufficient.  
The violation of these rights may involve the violation of other rights, but it 
seems possible for a person to continue to possess rights to some aspects of 
flourishing life even when they have forfeited the rights to others. And, as I 
have said, the cluster-right to a flourishing life is essentially a bundle of rights, 
not dependent upon the possession of any particular one of those rights, but 
upon the existence of a non-specific number of them. 
What does this mean for my account of liability? Well, when a theorist (such 
as Lazar (2009)) asserts that a person becomes liable to attack through losing 
his claim right to life, they use life in the narrower sense; not flourishing life 
but the claim right to continued physical existence. I have no quarrel with this 
as a definition of liability in the weaker sense.  
But stronger liability requires something more, something like McMahan’s 
‘moral responsibility…for a threat of unjust harm to others’ (2005: 394), and 
this alone imposes on the attacker a duty not to engage in counterdefence, 
meaning that this alone causes him to forfeit all of the bundle of rights which 
constitute the cluster-right to flourishing life.  
As long as a person has the claim rights to some aspects of a flourishing life, 
then he retains the cluster-right itself. A person can, however, surrender his 
whole right to a flourishing life, at once, by willingly choosing to act in a way 
that will foreseeably violate another person’s rights to various aspects of a 
flourishing life, as I argued in 3i) and 3ii).  
He forfeits his whole right in this case because of the responsibility he bears 
for acting in this way – because of his deliberate unjustifiable attack on an 
innocent victim, he forfeits the right to defend himself against their attack, and 
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in order to do this, he must at least temporarily, forfeit his right to a 
flourishing life.  
In short, the reason why the Innocent Attacker and Innocent Threat are only 
weakly liable is because, through their causal responsibility for the threat of 
harm, they forfeit the claim right to a continued physical existence, (but only 
that, and no more). Thus, they are legitimate targets for Victim’s defensive 
action, but, since they still possess the cluster-right to a flourishing life, they 
still have a right of defence19. The strongly liable attacker, however, has 
forfeited his entire cluster-right to a flourishing life, because he is morally 
responsible for the threat of harm – he therefore has neither the right not to be 
attacked nor the right to defend himself against his victim’s actions. 
The distinction between strong and weak liability is therefore grounded 
upon the difference in forfeited rights – a strongly liable attacker is strongly 
liable precisely because he has forfeited his entire cluster-right to a flourishing 
life, and a weakly liable attacker is only weakly liable because she has only 
forfeited her right to life in the narrow sense, but retains the cluster-right to a 
flourishing life – and this is what allows her to retain the right of defence, 
which is dependent upon the possession of the wider right to a flourishing life. 
It might be objected that even when an attacker is liable in the stronger 
sense, this does not mean that they have forfeited all these claim rights 
involved in the right to a flourishing life. For example, when a police officer is 
forced to kill an armed suspect in self-defence (a suspect who is, let us 
presume, fully competent and responsible for his actions), she is not permitted 
to kill him with the most painful means at her disposal.  
For instance, she may not deliberately shoot him so that he dies an 
extremely slow and painful death, if she is an expert sharpshooter and knows 
that she can hit him in the head and kill him instantly. She is similarly not 
permitted, for instance, to mutilate his corpse. This might suggest that the 
                                                 
19 This may appear to suggest that a death row inmate, who has lost only his right to continued 
physical existence, has the right to defend himself from being executed. I would say that he 
does, but only through legitimate channels, such as submitting appeals. The necessity 
limitation on the right of individual self-defence rules out physical violence as a means here 
(but not in cases of an Innocent Attacker or Innocent Threat, as only through attacking the 
other person can the victim defend herself). Also, the right to a flourishing life only gives us 
the right to defend ourselves against unjustified harm, and legal execution is (arguably, or at 
least legally) justified harm.  
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suspect still has certain of the claim rights that comprise a right to flourishing 
life – such as the right not to have unnecessary pain inflicted upon them, and 
the right to bodily integrity (assuming for the sake of argument that certain 
rights could still be possessed after death). 
However, I would argue that this is not the case. Rather, the right of defence 
does not permit its subject to do whatever she wants provided it is in defence 
of her own life20. This is pointed out, for instance, by Rodin’s statement that a 
defensive action must be ‘a proportionate, necessary response to an imminent 
threat of harm’ (2002: 99) – the additional harm inflicted upon the suspect by 
the police officer was not necessary to stop him from killing her, as she had 
other options (the quicker and presumably less painful head shot). Thus, her 
permission right does not extend to this (or to mutilating the corpse, as this 
also is not necessary to defend herself).  
The reason why the right of defence, even when the attacker is strongly 
liable, does not extend to unnecessary or disproportionate actions is not 
because that attacker still has a claim right to such things as bodily integrity 
whilst the attack is in progress, but because even a right of defence only gives 
us permission to do certain things to our attackers, even when they are totally 
lacking in rights.  
A person’s loss of the right to continued physical existence does not 
necessarily give just anyone the permission to kill them, as in the case of the 
condemned prisoner – a stranger is not permitted to wander in off the street 
and perform the execution. The permission granted by his loss of rights is 
limited; as also is the permission granted by a right of defence – in the 
prisoner’s case, it is limited to certain, qualified professionals; in the 
attacker’s case, it is limited to the use of the minimal necessary force in 
defending yourself. 
Therefore, I would argue that there exists an individual right of self-defence 
which is grounded upon the right to a flourishing life. 
 
                                                 
20 Also, the police officer may have additional duties contingent upon her position as a police 
officer, which have nothing to do with the rights of the suspect, such as the duty not to behave 
in a manner unbefitting her position as a representative of the police force. However, this is a 
less interesting response to this objection, as it would not apply to other victims of attack who 
do not happen to be police officers, so I will focus upon the more generally applicable 
response. 
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3: Conclusion 
 
 
In conclusion, I have argued in favour of a liberty right of individual self-
defence, including a wider understanding of a life, a meaningful life, as the 
appropriate end of a self-defensive right, and a dual conception of liability, 
with both a stronger and a weaker form.  
I have argued that this individual right to self-defence is grounded upon a 
right to flourishing life, which is a cluster-right composed of a bundle of basic 
rights to the various aspects of a flourishing life such as security, liberty, 
bodily integrity and continued physical existence. But what does this mean for 
just war theory? 
The individual right of self-defence which I have developed in this chapter 
will, I hope, form the basis for a definition of just cause for war. In the next 
chapter, I therefore hope to demonstrate that the best definition of a just cause 
for war is a definition grounded upon this individual right of defence, as 
delegated to a state or non-state collective entity. 
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Chapter Two: A Rights-Based Account of Just Cause 
for War 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Having developed an account of an individual right to defence, I now intend 
to explain how this right to defence can help to ground a just cause for war. 
As I mentioned earlier, the existence of an individual right of self-defence has 
been used to ground a definition of a just cause for war in two ways: the 
collectivist or analogical strategy, as advocated by Walzer, and Noam Zohar, 
and the reductive individualist strategy, used by Frowe, McMahan and Fabre.  
The collectivist strategy suggests that just as individuals can have defensive 
rights, so too can certain kinds of collective entities, most usually defined as 
nations or states. They often use an analogy with individual defence to justify 
the existence of this right of national defence, saying that a nation or state, 
being a collective entity and thus analogous to an individual entity, has a right 
to defend itself when its existence is threatened by the unjustified aggression 
of another state in the same way that an individual person has the right to 
defend herself from the unjustified aggression of another individual.  
As Rodin puts it, collectivists ‘take the notion of state rights seriously and 
try to give moral content to them as independent from, yet analogous to, the 
rights of personal self-defense’ (2002: 123). Hence, according to collectivists 
the defence of a country from invasion, a form of attack analogous to the 
physical attacks of Attacker upon Victim, is a just cause for war, because just 
like an individual, that country has a right to necessary and proportionate 
defence against attack. 
Of course, different theorists give different answers to the question of 
exactly what these ‘state rights’ (Rodin, 2002: 123) are. Some, for instance, 
such as Yoram Dinstein, see the ‘right of self-defence’ to be purely ‘an 
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international legal right’, rather than a moral right or one inherent in ‘the 
principle of State sovereignty’ (Dinstein, 1988: 170).  
He inclines to the view that when it was written in Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations that ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’21 (my 
italics), the expression ‘inherent right’ was merely ‘a reference to customary 
international law’ (Dinstein, 1988: 171). The existence of this right to self-
defence as a legal right is hardly in doubt, but other just war thinkers argue 
that it exists as a human right, a ‘natural right’ (1988: 169) as Dinstein would 
call it.  
For example, Nigel Dower describes collectivism as the argument that ‘the 
right of self-defence in warding off an aggressor’ (2009: 82) is a just cause for 
war, and that ‘a country has a right to defend itself against an attack by 
another country, just as a person has a right of self-defence against attack’ 
(2009: 86). Similarly, Guthrie and Quinlan write that the ‘most obvious’ just 
cause for war is ‘A country’s right to defend itself against aggression’ (2007: 
17). This would seem to suggest a Hohfeldian permission right, like those we 
have already discussed, but possessed by countries rather than individuals. 
The reductive individualist strategy, on the other hand, does not base the 
justifiability of defensive war upon the rights of states, but upon the rights of 
the individuals within those states. Reductive individualists such as Frowe or 
McMahan argue, in McMahan’s words, that ‘national defense is reducible to 
the defense of individuals’ (2004: 75). Rodin recognized two ways in which 
reductive individualists can do this.  
Firstly, they can argue that a national right of defence is ‘simply an 
application, en masse, of the familiar right of individuals to protect themselves 
and others from unjust lethal attack’ (Rodin, 2002: 127) – in short, the country 
does not have a right to defend itself, but when it comes under attack, if the 
lives of its citizens are threatened then they may exercise their individual 
rights of defence, all together, and carry out a joint act of defence – namely, a 
                                                 
21 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 51, on 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. 
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defensive war. In Rodin’s words, this means that justified national self-
defence is defined as ‘a lot of people exercising the right of self-defense at the 
same time and in an organized fashion’ (2002: 140).  
Alternatively, reductive individualists might argue that ‘the state has an 
obligation (and therefore a right) to defend its citizens in much the same way 
that a parent has the right to defend his or her child’ (Rodin, 2002: 129). It 
would suggest that, rather than the joint implementation of a lot of individuals’ 
rights of defence, national defence is ‘the state exercising the right of defense 
on behalf of its citizens’ (Rodin, 2002: 140). This does not mean that the state 
itself is the holder of this right; but rather that the state is obligated to act upon 
its citizens’ rights of defence in the case of war, because the collective nature 
of the violence offered to these citizens by war is such that they cannot defend 
themselves from it on an individual basis. This is perhaps closest to the line I 
intend to take, though not identical, as I do not ground any defensive rights the 
collective possesses upon parental obligations, but upon the individuals’ 
delegation of their defensive rights to the collective. 
In this chapter, therefore, I will first briefly explore the collectivist and 
reductive individualist strategies for deriving just cause from rights of defence, 
and the basic problems with each, such as those which are convincingly 
identified by Rodin. Then, I will go on to suggest that rights may be delegated 
from individuals to collectives (such as nations or states) – a primarily 
individualist method of grounding collective rights upon individual rights. I 
will show why this strategy for grounding collective defensive rights does not 
suffer from the same problems as the two main strategies, and I will explain 
what kinds of causes for war count as just causes under this definition and 
why.  
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1: Strategies for Grounding Collective Rights of Defence 
 
 
1i) The collectivist strategy 
 
I will begin by analysing the collectivist or analogical strategy, most 
famously identified with such theorists as Walzer and Rousseau. Their 
argument is that states can themselves possess defensive rights, grounded on 
state rights which are, in Norman’s words, ‘analogous to the rights of 
individuals, which should not be violated’ (2006: 196).  
The first task for collectivists, then, is to show how it is that states, which are 
after all artificial entities, neither physically alive nor in any way capable of 
feeling the losses they may undergo, can have a right which is often accepted 
to be grounded upon other rights, such as the rights to life and personal 
integrity. How can a state have a right to life upon which to ground the right to 
defend itself, when it is not a living being? 
Rodin identifies the strongest argument which collectivists can give in 
answer to this question, as follows. He writes that collectivists might claim 
that ‘the proper end of national-defense is the defense of what we might call 
the ‘common life’ of a community’ (2002: 127). In other words, where the 
appropriate end of individual defence is an individual’s flourishing life, the 
analogous end of a state right of defence is the ‘common life’ enjoyed by the 
members of that state.  
Rodin describes this analogy between individual defence and state defence 
as the claim that since ‘persons are constituted by their existence as organic 
entities and they have the claim-right against other persons not to destroy their 
life or interfere in their bodily integrity’, and ‘States are constituted by their 
existence as sovereign entities and they have the claim-right against other 
states not to destroy their political independence or interfere in their territorial 
integrity’, then in the same way that ‘individuals have the right to defend, with 
lethal force, their existence as organic entities, so states have the right to 
defend with military force their existence as sovereign entities’ (2002: 110). 
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Similarly, Steven Lee described this as a ‘domestic analogy…between 
individual autonomy and state sovereignty’ (2012: 113). 
The collectivist thinker Noam Zohar also argues that in wartime ‘it is a 
collective that defends itself against attack from another collective rather than 
simply many individuals protecting their lives in a set of individual 
confrontations’ (1993: 615). His view is that ‘the individual and the collective 
are both…facets of human existence’, and that ‘this dual reality properly 
yields a dual morality’ – that is, ‘individual morality’, and ‘collective 
morality’ (1993: 618). Thus, while wars are roughly analogous to individual 
conflicts, Zohar would argue that they are not the same thing, that collectives 
have a separate, and different, set of rights and obligations according to which 
they ‘relate to each other’ (1993: 618). 
Rodin suggests that there are ‘three viable interpretations of the common life 
as a potential end of national-defense’ (2002: 142): the first being ‘an account 
of state legitimacy’ as the source of the value of the common life22, the second 
being ‘the common life as the embodiment of a particular cultural and 
historical heritage’, and the third being ‘the common life as the arena of 
collective self-determination and autonomy’ (Rodin, 2002: 142). 
                                                 
22 Rodin mentions Thomas Hobbes as advocating a collectivist strategy grounded upon this 
definition of the common life, since Hobbes writes that a ‘Commonwealth’ exists ‘to the end 
he [the Sovereign or state] may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think 
expedient, for their peace and common defence’ (2005: 121). In Rodin’s words, the ‘essence 
of Hobbes’ argument is that the moral authority of the sovereign state derives from its ability 
to provide order in human affairs’ (2002: 145). The fact that Rodin describes Hobbes’ 
argument as collectivist may seem contradictory when you consider that Hobbes is concerned 
primarily with individual rights – indeed, Samuel Freeman described him as positing that 
‘persons are…fundamentally self-centered and individualistic’ (1990: 126). However, this is 
not the case. Many collectivists, including Walzer, ground their arguments for collective rights 
in individual rights. The main point of collectivism is not that individual defensive rights do 
not exist, but rather that collectives also have rights to defend themselves, that cannot be 
reduced to individual defensive rights exercised collectively or on behalf of individuals. The 
reason that Hobbes’ argument is described as collectivist is that he advocates a state, or 
sovereign, with basic rights of its own, a sovereign which, in the words of one political 
theorist, ‘has no obligations to [its] subjects, whose power is unlimited and undivided, and 
whose rule is permanent’ (Sreedhar, 2008: 785), and although the standard interpretation of 
Hobbes often takes individual subjects to retain the liberty-right of self-defence themselves, 
they do not retain the claim-right that they had in the state of nature, so that while they are 
under no obligations to permit the state to, for instance, execute them if they have the power to 
resist, the state is still within its rights to kill them – to use Susanne Sreedhar’s example, ‘the 
Athenian state had a right to order Socrates to drink the hemlock even though Socrates had a 
right to disobey’ (2008: 785). This claim that the state has its own rights which exist 
independently of the rights of individuals, and which can indeed clash with them, is a 
fundamental tenet of collectivism.  
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So, the collectivist concept of a national right of defence would seem to 
define that right as follows. The subject of that right, which Rodin describes 
as ‘the right's bearer’, would be the state itself, rather than the individual 
citizens within that state. As Walzer puts it, ‘states…possess rights more or 
less as individuals do’ (1977: 58).  
The object of the defensive right would also be a state, the state which 
committed the act of aggression that makes defence necessary. As this right is 
a right held by states, it is also a right held against states. And the end of that 
right would be the ‘common life’ of the citizens of that state. 
So, what does this mean for just war theory, and specifically for the 
definition of a just cause for war? Well, it would mean that a state is permitted 
to engage in whatever defensive actions are necessary and proportionate when 
its common life, the appropriate end of its defensive right, is threatened, in the 
same way that individuals are permitted to do when their analogous right to 
life is threatened.  
For instance, McMahan (although himself not a collectivist) describes the 
most common collectivist ‘way of thinking about war’ as ‘to think of states 
themselves as sovereign individuals whose relations with one another are 
governed morally by principles that are analogues of the principles governing 
relations among persons’ (2009: 79). 
This would mean that what might be termed ‘national self-defence’– a 
nation’s defence of its ‘common life’ from unjust aggression – would be a just 
cause for war, when war is a proportionate response to the act of aggression in 
question, and is necessary to successfully achieve defence against that 
aggression.  
As Tadros puts it, when ‘one country attacks another country it is 
permissible for the second country to defend itself against the attack by the 
first’ (2014: 18). Walzer defines aggression in this context as ‘Every violation 
of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent state’ 
(1977: 52) – the integrity and sovereignty of a state being considered to be 
either elements of, or necessary to the survival of, the collective life and 
liberty of that state. 
Walzer, Zohar and other collectivist just war theorists also define other-
defence as a just cause for war. For instance, Walzer writes that ‘Other states 
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can rightfully join the victim’s resistance; their war has the same character as 
his own’ (1977: 59). This means that in addition to a permission right to the 
defence of its own common life, a state may have the permission right to 
defend the common life of other states, when their integrity or sovereignty is 
similarly threatened by aggression.  
If, for instance, Country A is unjustifiably attacked by Country B, but lacks 
the military resources to successfully defend themselves, Country C may 
permissibly choose to aid Country A in its national defence, and may if 
necessary (and proportionate) permissibly declare war on Country B to defend 
Country A from its aggressive actions.  
It is perhaps a trickier matter to decide whether Country C may do this if 
Country A has sufficient resources to win the war alone. But since, as Uniacke 
put it, it is ‘widely accepted that the use of force in self-defence against an 
unjust threat is justified only if the force is necessary and proportionate’ 
(2014: 62), we can perhaps assume that the same can be said for other-
defence. In this case, there might be reason to question the necessity for 
Country C to declare war on Country B in Country A’s defence when Country 
A effectively does not need their help. 
Finally, some collectivists have accepted a third just cause for war, that of 
humanitarian intervention. Such interventionist wars are, in Norman’s words, 
‘held to be justifiable if waged against countries which fail to uphold the 
human rights of their own citizens’ (2006: 191). For instance, Walzer claims 
that humanitarian intervention ‘is justified when it is a response (with 
reasonable expectations of success) to acts “that shock the moral conscience 
of mankind”’ (1977: 107).  
Therefore, collectivists such as Zohar and Rousseau use an analogy with the 
individual right of defence to propose a national right of defence, with states 
as the subject and object of the right, and the appropriate end of defence as, in 
Rodin’s words, ‘the ‘common life’ of a community’ (2002: 127).  
As I mentioned in Chapter One, Walzer and Rawls ground the national right 
of defence not just upon this analogy but upon the individual rights to life (in 
the narrow sense) and liberty of the citizens of the nation in question. Walzer 
and Rawls do use the aforementioned analogy, however, this does not commit 
them to the argument that national rights come into existence independently of 
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individual rights – even if they currently exist separately. The main collectivist 
claims are that collectives are the subjects of rights in the same way that 
individuals are, and that the rights they possess are collective rights, differing 
from individual rights in that their subjects, objects and ends are collective in 
nature. But collectivists may nevertheless posit that collective rights can be 
derived from other rights, including individual rights.  
Walzer writes that ‘Individual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the most 
important judgements we make about war’ (1977: 54). He suggests that these 
individual rights undergo a ‘process of collectivization’ – through a long, 
ongoing ‘process of association and mutuality’, a nation’s ‘common life’ is 
shaped, and from this common life derives the nation’s rights of ‘territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty’, which Walzer argues ‘can be defended in 
exactly the same way as individual life and liberty’ (1977: 54). For instance, 
he suggests that a nation or people’s right of territorial integrity ‘derives from 
the common life its members have made on this piece of land’ (1977: 55). 
But make no mistake; these are collective rights. The fact that a nation’s 
common life is derived from the individual rights to life and liberty of all its 
members, somehow invested in or surrendered to the community through ‘a 
long period of…shared experiences and cooperative activity’ (1977: 54), does 
not change the fact that the rights derived from this common life are now 
rights held by nations alone; and that just cause for war, as Walzer would 
define it, is the defence of this collective good, this common life – at best, 
simultaneously with individual lives, and at worst, instead of them. For 
instance, he also describes this common life as a people’s ‘shared life and 
liberty, the independent community they have made, for which individuals are 
sometimes sacrificed’ (1977: 54, my italics). 
For Walzer, the defence of individual lives alone cannot justify war, the 
defence of a nation’s common life is necessary – as he puts it, ‘If no common 
life exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the common life that does exist, its 
own defense may have no moral justification’ (1977: 54). Hence, a state is not 
morally permitted to defend its own citizens’ lives from the external 
aggression of another state if it is in such inner turmoil as to have no sense of a 
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shared ‘independent community’ (1977: 54)23 – for instance, if it consists of 
several smaller, mutually antagonistic tribes. This is a controversial 
consequence of many collectivist arguments concerning just cause for war. 
Similarly, Rawls argues that ‘Well-ordered peoples’ (1999: 90) (by which, 
briefly, he means both liberal, democratic societies and ‘decent peoples’, 
which, while nonliberal, have ‘basic institutions’ that ‘meet certain specified 
conditions of political right and justice’ (1999: 58), ‘respect and honor human 
rights’ and ‘accept and abide by a (reasonable) Law of Peoples’ (1999: 92)) 
have just cause for going to war ‘only when they sincerely and reasonably 
believe that their safety and security are seriously endangered’ (1999: 90) by 
the actions of other societies. He adds that societies have a ‘right to fight a 
war’ to ‘protect and preserve the basic freedoms of its citizens and its 
constitutionally democratic political institutions’ (1999: 91).  
In the same way, then, Rawls seems to be arguing that there exists a 
collective right to defence, possessed by well-ordered peoples (and some 
benevolent absolutist states), and that the target of this right is collective, 
being the aggressive society against which a well-ordered people must defend 
itself, and the ends are collective as well as individual, being the safety and 
security of the well-ordered society in question, and the freedoms of its 
political institutions in addition to the freedoms of the individual citizens – but 
that ‘outlaw states’ which do not have a history of respecting human rights, 
lack this right even if the individual lives of their citizens are endangered.  
So, Rawls and Walzer both appear to argue that a just cause for war is, in 
Walzer’s words, ‘to protect against external encroachment’ on states’ ‘rights 
(to [shared] life and liberty)’ (1977: 54), and in Rawls’ words, ‘self-defense’ 
(1999: 91), which he defines as the defence of the ‘safety and security’ (1999: 
90) and ‘basic freedoms’ (1999: 91) of well-ordered societies. Walzer’s ‘right 
to life’ roughly corresponds to Rawls’ right to defend ‘safety and security’, 
and Walzer’s ‘right to liberty’ similarly corresponds to Rawls’ right to 
‘preserve the basic freedoms’ (1999: 91).  
Walzer and Rawls’ account of justified defence as the defence of the human 
rights to collective ‘life and liberty’ marks out three kinds of war as potentially 
                                                 
23 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that despite its turmoil it is capable of defence. 
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possessing just cause: self-defensive war, collective or other-defensive war, 
and wars of humanitarian intervention. Each of these types of war aims at 
protecting or restoring the right (to life and liberty) of a certain group or 
nation, whether against the aggression of an external enemy, or against the 
abuses of those within the nation of the threatened group. 
Only in the case of humanitarian intervention, which Walzer suggested is 
only justified ‘when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) 
to acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind”’ (1977: 107), acts 
shocking enough to override a ‘presumption against intervention’ that arises 
from the collectivist ‘commitment to [national] self-determination’ (2004: 68), 
does he appear to define individual lives rather than the preservation of a 
sovereign nation as the primary aim of a just war. However, Walzer 
considered that acts heinous enough to justify overriding this presumption 
would be very rare, and that ‘the norm is not to intervene in other people’s 
countries’ (Walzer, 2004: 81). In addition, Walzer writes that humanitarian 
intervention ‘uphold[s] the values of individual life and communal liberty’ 
(1977: 108, my italics). So, the defence of the collectivized rights of the 
‘peoples’ who are referred to as the subjects of humanitarian intervention 
would also seem to be part of the aim of a Walzerian humanitarian 
intervention. Hence, this argument would seem to be compatible with 
Walzer’s overall collectivist strategy. 
However, there are both flaws in the general collectivist strategy of 
grounding collective defence in an analogy with individual defence, as 
pointed out by theorists such as Rodin, and problems with Walzer’s and 
Rawls’ account of defence as a just cause based primarily upon a collective 
right to shared life and liberty. I will now explain what these problems are. 
 
1ii) A problem with Walzer’s and Rawls’ account 
 
The main problem arises when we consider how Walzer and Rawls could 
argue that the defence of human rights can be justified by fighting a war. Such 
a war will inevitably violate the rights to life and liberty of some individuals, 
whether or not these individuals would have been harmed in this way had the 
war gone unfought. If these rights are sovereign and indisputable, then their 
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violation is always wrong, for whatever reason it might be undertaken – and it 
may be assumed that Walzer and Rawls are not of this opinion, since the 
acceptance of absolute and inviolate human rights would lead inevitably to 
pacifism. Even if these rights may be overridden, however, this cannot happen 
without good reason – unless, for instance, the individuals in question were 
liable to attack. 
The problem, of course, is that war inevitably involves the violation or 
infringement of some people’s rights to life and liberty – and sometimes, 
certainly in the case of non-combatants killed in enemy bombing strikes, they 
would seem to be killed unjustifiably. Any country fighting according to the 
principle of jus in bello will, naturally, aim to avoid violations of the rights of 
enemy non-combatants (and, if the war is one of humanitarian intervention, 
even aim to put a stop to such violations), but any war which is fought by the 
means of armed forces will involve the violation of some soldiers’ rights to 
life or liberty.  
Not only will the belligerent country send its own soldiers into mortal 
danger, into situations where it is likely that some will either be killed or 
captured, which may not necessarily be infringement of their rights if these 
soldiers have willingly consented to expose themselves to risks by joining the 
army; but the belligerent country will also pursue military strategies aimed at 
killing or capturing as many enemy combatants as possible – which, unless the 
enemy combatants in question are liable to attack (an argument I will consider 
later) will at least infringe the individual rights of this particular group of 
human beings.  
Also, many countries use or have used conscription to recruit large numbers 
of combatants when they are at war and need to increase the size of its armed 
forces – for instance, during the First World War, Britain conscripted men into 
the armed forces between 1916 and 1918.  
Many ‘absolutists’, who refused either to fight or perform non-combat 
service such as working as stretcher-bearers, were nevertheless drafted into 
military service and court-martialled if they refused to obey orders. Forty-one 
of them were even sent to France on active duty, where they could be shot for 
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refusing an order24. The practice of conscription legally forces the conscripts 
to join the army and by so doing risk their lives and freedoms, thus ensuring 
that many of the combatants who risk their lives and freedom on the battlefield 
may not be doing so voluntarily.  
Martin argues that the ‘soldiers themselves have, by [Walzer and Rawls’] 
hypothesis, a right to life…It seems paradoxical to say that one can protect 
human rights from violation by violating rights’ (2007: 78) – yet, given the 
definition of human rights under Rawls and Walzer’s arguments, this is 
precisely what any normal combat situation entails. 
Using the defence of human rights as a just cause for war has this 
paradoxical appearance because defending these rights in battle involves 
violating them, by killing, wounding and imprisoning enemy soldiers. It also 
(even more troublingly) may involve violating the rights of civilians, those 
non-combatants who are inevitably caught in the crossfire as a regrettable 
though generally accepted consequence of modern warfare.  
In Rodin’s words, ‘The most profound objection to the traditional 
[collectivist] conception of national self-defence is that it permits, and often 
mandates, the mass wastage of individual rights in order to support the formal 
rights and status of political entities’ (2014: 88) – which, to my mind, is 
especially troubling when these ‘formal’ rights have been derived from the 
individual rights themselves. 
There are various options open to Walzer and Rawls here. They could deny 
that those who are killed or imprisoned as a result of the war have their rights 
violated or infringed in any meaningful way, if they are killed as a 
proportionate side effect of military action aimed at bringing the war to an 
end. However, this seems like an obvious example of misuse of the Doctrine 
of Double Effect – if the act in question is shooting an enemy soldier, to say 
that our aim was to hasten the end of the war by depriving the enemy of a 
fighter, and the soldier’s death is a side effect of this aim which we would 
have avoided if we could (by permanently crippling him instead, say) smacks 
of mental quibbling (and is, in any case, not a claim that many modern just 
                                                 
24 http://spartacus-educational.com/FWWconscription.htm 
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war theorists would make). The soldier’s death cannot be so easily detached 
from the aim of our action here.  
Alternatively, they can deny that their argument requires these individual 
rights to be absolute and inalienable, but merely universal: meaning that 
although we all possess them as part of our sense of what it means to be a 
human being’ (Walzer, 1977: 54), we can surrender them or forfeit them.  
In other words, some people, such as soldiers, may willingly forfeit their 
rights; and others, such as conscripts or criminals, may legally and justifiably 
lose them against their will. Rodin writes that the suggestion that ‘the 
possession of the right [to life] would be conditional on non-engagement in 
certain kinds of conduct’, rather than ‘‘inalienable’ and possessed 
‘unconditionally’’, may be counter-intuitive, but ‘should not be seen as a fatal 
objection, for many other important rights, such as the right to privacy and the 
right to liberty, are seen as conditional in this way’ (Rodin, 2002: 71), and the 
right to life, in principle, need not be different. 
However, it seems to me that Walzer’s definition of these rights still makes 
that response troubling. If these rights are part of ‘our sense of what it means 
to be a human being’ (Walzer, 1977: 54), then how can they be forfeited 
against our will? Perhaps a person could willingly give up or sacrifice part of 
his or her humanity (though even this I find worrying), but how can we be said 
to lose part of what makes us human against our will and, in the case of 
conscripts, without having done anything to deserve that loss? Is a conscript 
any less human than a soldier who willingly enlisted, or a civilian?  
Nevertheless, Walzer opts for the second of these possibilities. His 
argument, as Martin neatly summarizes it, is the ‘idea that combatants 
temporarily forfeit their human rights to life and liberty and take on, in their 
place, certain “war rights”’ (2007: 76).  For instance, Walzer writes that, 
 
‘the soldiers who do the fighting, though they can rarely be 
said to have chosen to fight, lose the rights they are supposedly 
defending . . . Simply by fighting, whatever their private hopes 
and intentions, they have lost their title to life and liberty . . . 
even though, unlike aggressor states, they have committed no 
crime’ (1977: 136). 
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   So, the rights to life and liberty that an individual possesses as a civilian are 
somehow lost when he becomes a soldier. Hurka expands this point 
somewhat, suggesting that ‘by voluntarily entering military service, soldiers 
on both sides… freely accepted that they may permissibly be killed in the 
course of war’, and thus ‘freely gave up their right not to be killed in certain 
circumstances’ (Hurka, 2007: 210). This means that killing them would no 
longer be unjust. 
Thomson also suggests that ‘consent’ may be a viable way for an alienable 
right to be lost, which means that if by enlisting in the army a soldier may be 
understood to have given his consent that enemy soldiers may attempt to kill 
him, then he ‘has ceased to have a claim’ (1990: 348) (the claim in question 
being a claim right to life). 
Instead of these rights, which they lay aside for as long as they serve as 
combatants, soldiers ‘gain war rights as combatants and potential prisoners, 
but they can now be attacked and killed at will by their enemies’ (Walzer, 
1977: 136). In short, these war rights chiefly consist of the right to ‘attack and 
kill’ those combatants in the service of your (or rather your country’s) enemy, 
to the same degree that those enemy combatants have the right to kill you. 
Non-combatants, in Walzer’s view, do not have this right – civilians cannot 
choose to kill enemy soldiers with impunity, because they have not 
surrendered their right to life – the right to kill cannot exist without the 
liability to be killed.  
This approach is echoed in modern military law: legally, when a person joins 
the armed forces and is sent into a combat zone, as long as they are on active 
duty they surrender the human rights they have as an ordinary civilian. A 
campaign by the family of Pte Jason Smith, who died of heatstroke while on 
active duty in Iraq in 2003, to make human rights law apply to soldiers in 
combat situations was defeated at the Supreme Court in June 2010 – the BBC 
reported leaders of the armed forces as saying that it was ‘impractical to allow 
troops in combat zones to be protected by human rights law’25. 
                                                 
25 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10450556 
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All very well for soldiers: but what of civilians? The possible collateral 
deaths of civilians in wartime is often accepted as an unfortunate but 
unavoidable consequence of fighting a war, and factored into proportionality 
calculations on this basis. Can Walzer justify war to defend individual rights 
to life and liberty in the knowledge that the same rights, belonging to those 
who cannot be said to have either surrendered or forfeited them, will almost 
certainly be violated by that war? 
Well, combatants are not only soldiers: Walzer defines the category of 
‘combatants’ as containing both soldiers and ‘those who make what soldiers 
need to fight...when they are actually engaged in activities threatening and 
harmful to their enemies’ (1977: 146) – for instance, workers in a munitions 
factory become combatants only while they are actually making munitions; 
during that time period, they forfeit their rights to life and liberty in exchange 
for the ‘war rights’ of attacking the enemy (indirectly, by making munitions). 
Thus, Walzer argues, such temporary combatants ‘can be attacked only in 
their factory (not in their homes)’ (1977: 146) when attack is the only way for 
their enemy to force them to cease their activities. 
However, this still leaves those civilians who are not engaged in such 
activities, but may still easily become victims of military action – for instance, 
workers in a munitions factory whose homes are very near that factory may be 
killed by a military strike on that factory even when they are not engaged in 
making munitions. Indeed, how are the fighter pilots to tell whether all the 
workers in a factory are ‘combatants’ at any one time? Say a group of them 
have just signed off work, and stand smoking cigarettes in the car park. Are 
they still legitimate targets? 
It seems to me that they are not; and, indeed, Walzer argues, as I have said, 
that workers who thus contribute to the war effort are only ‘combatants’ ‘when 
they are actually engaged in activities threatening and harmful to their 
enemies’ (1977: 146)26. The off-duty workers in the car park are thus non-
combatants again. However, this still seems troubling. Non-combatants are 
                                                 
26 However, our intuitions might be somewhat different in the (admittedly unlikely) scenario 
in which the factory workers in question are the only people in their country who are, or could 
become, capable of working the machines in the factory. In this case, they might perhaps 
continue to be liable to attack even when they are not actually working the machines, as they 
would continue to be necessary for the success of the war. I am indebted to Jeff McMahan for 
this point (personal communication, 03/10/15). 
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likely to be killed in an attack in a munitions factory, whether they are off-
duty workers or people living in the houses around the factory, and the fact 
that Walzer’s argument allows their rights to be outweighed by the necessity 
for that all-important national right of self-defence is, as Rodin pointed out, a 
serious problem with this ‘conception of national self-defence’ (2014: 88).  
Seth Lazar similarly made this point, arguing that from an individualist 
viewpoint the analogy between individual and national rights of defence is 
‘very troubling’ since ‘when states fight each other, individuals die, 
and…individuals, not states, are the fundamental unit of moral concern’ 
(Lazar, 2010: 182). I will return to this point later.  
First, however, I must outline another problem with Walzer’s argument, 
most significantly with his account of the ‘war rights’ (Martin, 2007: 76) of 
combatants. There is an important aspect of Walzer’s argument for 
combatants’ forfeiture of the rights to life and liberty that makes me 
uncomfortable. It begins with Walzer’s calm statement that ‘the soldiers who 
do the fighting, though they can rarely be said to have chosen to fight, lose the 
rights they are supposedly defending’ (1977: 136, my italics).  
Walzer acknowledges here that the soldiers, and indeed all the combatants 
in a combat situation, may not have freely and willingly chosen to become 
combatants. They may, of course, be citizens of a brutal dictatorship that 
compels all the people it possibly can to join the armed forces for the glory of 
Hitler, Mussolini or whoever it happens to be; but even if they are not, 
societies that respect the human rights of their citizens, which Rawls refers to 
as ‘well-ordered societies’ (1999: 92), when they are in desperate straits, may 
conscript people, willing and unwilling, into the armed forces (and have done 
so – as in my previous example of British conscription during the First World 
War).  
Conscription, then, according to Walzer’s argument, is a legal requirement 
for young men and women to give up their supposedly unassailable rights to 
life and liberty; it is to have these rights done away with, perhaps against 
one’s wishes. Yet Walzer appears say that this is permissible, that we can lose 
these rights without having ‘chosen’ (1977: 136) to give them up, that our 
governments can simply take them away from us by the one simple act of 
introducing conscription.  
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Indeed, Walzer argues that it is not only conscripts whose freedom of choice 
becomes constricted in wartime – he writes that a state during wartime 
‘decrees that an army of a certain size be raised’ and uses ‘all the techniques 
of coercion and persuasion at its disposal’ (1977: 28) to raise that army. 
McMahan pointed out that this effectively means that all potential combatants 
‘are subject to a variety of forces that compel their will—manipulation, 
deception, coercion, their own sense of the moral authority of the government 
that commands them to fight, uncertainty about the conditions of justice in the 
resort to war, and so on’ (2004: 699-700).  
Indeed this, Walzer claims, is the very reason why combatants fighting 
without a just cause are not to be held responsible for the unjustness of the 
war, because they are constrained to fight by necessity, exactly as just 
combatants are, and thus have exactly the same war rights as just combatants – 
a thesis he refers to as the ‘Moral Equality of Soldiers’ (Walzer, 1977: 34). 
This concept of human rights that can be forfeited against one’s will seems 
to me to be problematic. In Cheyney Ryan’s words, it gives rise to a 
‘conscription paradox’ (2004: 71). He points out that while voluntary 
enlistment might seem more in line with suggestions (like Hurka’s) that 
soldiers surrender their rights to life and in exchange are permitted to kill and 
permit themselves to be killed (in the sense that they agree that it does not 
violate their rights to be killed by enemy combatants), conscription is not a 
voluntary act of surrendering one’s rights.  
The existence of conscription means that citizens are ‘obligated to engage in 
killing, should the state so decide’ (2004: 70), and are similarly subject to the 
obligation to die—that is, the obligation to sacrifice one’s life in war’ (2004: 
71). The paradox is that this obligation seemingly arises from the very rights 
that we are obligated to violate, if the state’s justification for defending itself 
arises from the gradual ‘collectivization’ of individual people’s rights to life 
(Walzer, 1977: 54), or from an analogy with the individual right of defence. 
Also, while it might be possible for people who wish to be soldiers to agree, 
on a voluntary basis, to temporarily surrender certain of their human rights in 
order to fight as combatants and defend the rights of others, the idea that 
rights which are ‘entailed by our sense of what it means to be human’ 
(Walzer, 1977: 54) can be forcibly confiscated by one’s own government 
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through conscription is rather troubling – surely, even if our rights can be 
forfeited by our own actions, forcible removal of these rights should be 
beyond the capability of any social contract.  
Thomson makes the point that governments do appear to be capable, 
through legislation for instance, of ‘tak[ing] natural rights away from the 
rights holder’ (1990: 354), as when a government takes action to outlaw a 
previously legal activity that had caused offence to some citizens (her 
example is having sex in public).  
However, she also adds that there are two clauses to this governmental 
power – a government (or ‘lawmaker’) only has the power to ‘deprive of 
rights’ (1990: 354) if ‘the lawmaker is legitimately the lawmaker of the 
society’, and if ‘the lawmaker acts permissibly in depriving’ people of the 
rights in question (1990: 356). The second clause, I believe, has an immediate 
bearing on this issue.  
Does a government act permissibly in depriving its citizens of their rights to 
life? It is certainly a more serious issue than depriving them of their rights to 
have sex in public places. Intuitively, it seems that the power of life and death 
over its citizens is not a power which we want even a legitimate government 
to have. But it is still a difficult question as to whether this makes it 
impermissible for them to deprive us of the right to life. 
It may seem controversial to argue that conscription, a practice common to 
so many different countries especially in times of crisis, is based upon an 
impermissible action, but it would be equally uncomfortable to say that it is 
permissible for governments to deprive us of this right – after all, there are so 
many ways that that permission could go wrong! Perhaps one solution might 
be to grant that it is permissible, but only under certain circumstances – say, in 
cases where the right-holder would have consented to surrender his right 
anyway, had they been given the informed choice.  
However, this leaves us with the same problem: if a conscript would never 
have chosen to surrender his right to life in order to fight (say he was a total 
pacifist, or even secretly sympathised with the enemy), then the government 
may not force him to surrender that right. They may, in short, only conscript 
soldiers who would have voluntarily enlisted anyway – which, one might say, 
rather defeats the point of conscription.  
 67 
An alternative possibility might be to say that forcing an individual to 
surrender their right to life is permissible if fighting a particular war is morally 
obligatory for a group of people, (assuming that such a thing is possible), and 
if conscription is the fairest way of ensuring that there are enough fighters to 
win the war. But who decides when a particular war is morally obligatory? 
The government, or whichever authority is in charge of deciding when to go to 
war? This would seem to be equally open to misuse. Each individual? The 
pacifist would never agree that a war was morally obligatory, and 
conscription, as a means of raising sufficient soldiers to win a war, would 
thereby be hamstrung. A majority of the people? Possibly, but the minority 
who disagree would be in an extremely uncomfortable position – forced not 
only to surrender their rights against their will if they are candidates for 
conscription, but also forced to submit to a moral obligation which they do not 
agree with. There would seem to be no obvious solution to this problem – at 
least for Walzer’s argument. 
McMahan also criticises Walzer’s argument, though from a different angle. 
He argues that the various forms of coercion a state may bring to bear upon 
potential soldiers, such as legal coercion (threatening them with arrest and 
prison if they do not submit to joining the army, for instance), the physical 
coercion that a violent or dictatorial government might use, or more subtle 
manipulation through means of propaganda, are not justifications for an 
individual soldier to fight in an unjust war, but ‘are at best excuses’ 
(McMahan, 2004: 700). This means that, in McMahan’s words, ‘It is false that 
unjust combatants do no wrong to fight provided they respect the rules of 
engagement’ (2004: 700). 
Hence, he argues that just as individuals who defend themselves against an 
unjust threat of harm from an attacker do not lose their rights through posing a 
threat to their attacker, because the attacker’s actions constitute an unjust 
threat of harm to which the victim is entitled to respond, so the just 
combatants in a conflict do not lose their rights, because the attack by the 
unjust combatants is unjustified. Even Walzer (1977: 128) admits that in an 
individual case when someone poses an unjust threat of harm, his victims do 
not lose the rights to life and liberty if they attempt to defend themselves, and 
thus pose a threat of harm to the original attacker. Their threat was justified, 
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and his was not – so he does not have the right to kill them in his own 
defence.  
If unjust combatants’ attacks on just combatants are thus unjustified, it 
seems that Walzer has no grounds to argue that just combatants lose their 
rights to life and liberty, or that unjust ones gain any corresponding rights to 
attack them. Although, as I will explain in Chapter Three, I do not agree with 
McMahan’s argument that all things being equal, no unjust combatants may 
permissibly defend themselves against just ones, I nevertheless think that this 
is a convincing demonstration of a flaw in Walzer’s argument concerning the 
rights of combatants. 
Henry Shue, however, responds to McMahan’s argument by calling it a ‘bad 
argument by analogy’ (2008: 100). He contends that McMahan assumes ‘war 
is not sufficiently different from ordinary life that it must employ a different 
kind of criteria to specify who and what may properly be attacked’ (2008: 
100) – in other words, that McMahan asserts that if in ordinary life Person A 
is morally prohibited from defending himself against Person B if Person B’s 
attack is justified, then the same must be true in wartime, when A and B are 
combatants.  
However, Shue suggests that this is not necessarily the case, that there are 
relevant differences between war and ordinary life which may, at least, mean 
that the moral rules that govern our conduct in war are different from those 
which govern our conduct outside of war. For instance, he points out that ‘the 
moral rules for ordinary life’ do not and cannot regulate the specific conduct 
of combatants, because ‘ordinary life contains no combatants’ (2008: 100).  
This might suggest, as Shue claims it does, that there must be ‘specific 
standards that apply to ordinary life and specific standards that apply to war’ 
(2008: 90), and that, for this reason, Walzer’s position that combatants have 
rights in war which non-combatants do not possess (since they are presumably 
not involved in fighting the war) is more plausible than McMahan would have 
us believe. An unjust combatant’s attack on a just combatant is simply not 
analogous to a mugger’s attack on his victim, or a criminal’s attack on the 
police officer sent to apprehend him, so it cannot be governed by the same 
rules – the unjust combatant may indeed have a different set of rights to the 
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mugger or criminal, which permit him to defend himself where they may not 
do so. 
Hurka also responds to McMahan, objecting specifically to McMahan’s 
claims that liability should be applied ‘not just to the resort to war as a whole 
but to each individual goal of war’, and also ‘not just to an enemy group X as 
a whole but to each individual member of X’ (2007: 200), so that ‘one is 
permitted to use force against a given person only if he himself shares in the 
responsibility for the relevant wrong.’ (2007: 200). The first claim that Hurka 
discusses is not immediately relevant to the counter-argument to Walzer that I 
wish to consider here, so I will move on to the second. 
Hurka argues that McMahan ignores the ‘surrender-of-rights justification’ 
(2007: 211) which he has outlined and which is, he argues, implicit in 
Walzer’s argument – for instance, he claims that Walzer’s statement that an 
enemy combatant may be attacked because ‘he has allowed himself to be 
made into a dangerous man’ (Walzer, 1977: 145), this statement ‘suggests a 
voluntary assumption of status like that central to the surrender view (Hurka, 
2007: 211).  
Of course, this response hits a snag when it comes to the issue of 
conscription, as conscripts may not be said to have voluntarily assumed the 
status of a soldier or ‘dangerous man’ (Walzer, 1977: 145). Hurka suggests a 
‘hard-line reply’ (2007: 213) which he claims is implicit in Walzer’s 
argument, namely the reply that even where a soldier is conscripted into the 
army, this ‘was to some degree voluntary, because it involved a choice’ – the 
soldier decided to join the army rather than go to prison. Hurka continues that 
‘its being voluntary even to that limited degree was sufficient for it to involve 
a full surrender of rights’ (2007: 213).  
This seems a distinctly unpalatable reply to me – it still involves the 
enforced surrender of rights which, even though they are not inalienable, are 
nevertheless meant to be central human rights. Hurka mentions that ‘A 
contract between A and B is no less binding on B if he was ‘‘forced’’ into it 
by unfavorable circumstances or even by hard dealing by A’ (2007: 213), and 
that the legal ramifications of conscription do not count as undue duress if 
‘conscription is not in itself forbidden’ (2007: 214).  
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As Suzanne Uniacke points out, even duress ‘by threats’ or ‘duress of 
circumstances’ are not accepted as ‘defences to murder or attempted murder’ 
(1994: 54). Although this is a matter of law and may not necessarily be correct 
as a claim about morality, it highlights a presumption that even where 
circumstances or the threats of a person or organization are forcing a person 
into doing X, there is still a point at which that person chooses to give in to the 
threats or the circumstances, chooses to do X, and is to some degree 
responsible for his actions. 
However, although the contract in Hurka’s example may be legally binding, 
the act of using ‘hard dealing’ (2007: 213) (presumably analogous to the threat 
to send the unwilling conscript to prison if he does not agree to surrender his 
rights) does not seem morally permissible. Are we then to say that such a 
contract is morally binding? If B could find a legal loophole to wriggle out of 
the contract, surely we would not condemn him in the way that we might if he 
had entered the contract willingly.  
Similarly, Uniacke argues that duress should in fact be at least an excuse for 
committing wrongful actions like murder, showing that (despite the law) 
someone who was forced into wrongdoing in this way is not morally judged as 
harshly as someone who did the same thing, but willingly and without being 
forced into it.  
In the same way, then, since a conscript has been forced into agreeing to join 
the army, that agreement, the supposed surrender of his rights, might not seem 
as morally binding as that undergone by a soldier who has voluntarily enlisted. 
However, Hurka also offers another possible reply to the problem of 
conscription for his and Walzer’s ‘surrender-of-rights justification’ (2007: 
211), a ‘soft-line reply’ (2007: 213). He suggests that the answer is to give 
greater weight under the proportionality criterion to the lives of conscripted 
soldiers (or those forced into military service by ‘economic hardship’ (2007: 
214)) over the lives of volunteer soldiers.  
Thus, conscripts would not seem to lose their rights of life and liberty to the 
same degree that volunteer soldiers would, because they have not voluntarily 
surrendered them; though they would be liable to attack they would not be as 
liable. In Hurka’s words, this would mean that ‘volunteer soldiers may be 
attacked at any place and time during a war’, but ‘conscripts have higher 
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moral standing because they are only sometimes liable to attack and at other 
times immune’ (2007: 215).  
While I find a dual concept of liability a compelling one (as I have 
explained), I do not think that it necessarily proves what Hurka wants it to 
prove – namely, that McMahan’s criticism of Walzer does not work. His 
argument is that conscripts ‘have not surrendered or forfeited any rights’, but 
‘may be attacked just because they are a danger’ (2007: 215). But a soldier 
cannot be a legitimate target of attack without having lost any of the rights that 
once made him immune – if this is Hurka’s point, it would be nonsensical.  
If his point is, rather, that conscripts lose at least some of their rights without 
surrendering or forfeiting them, then we are back to where we started. A 
conscript becomes ‘a danger’ (2007: 215) to the enemy because he has been 
coerced or forced into the position where he must stand on the front lines and 
shoot at them, so his rights are still in some sense being forcibly removed. It 
seems to me that this is still problematic. 
McMahan responds most interestingly to Hurka, by pointing out that 
conscripts and volunteer soldiers are not the only types of soldier; there is a 
third relevant type, which might be called a temporary volunteer. These might 
be people who ‘voluntarily enlist only when their country has already been 
unjustly attacked, intending not to become professional soldiers but to fight in 
this one just war only’ (2008: 26).  
Such temporary volunteers are, McMahan argues, ‘very much like’ the 
individual victim of an unjust attack who must defend himself against that 
attacker (2008: 26). There is enough similarity for us to be able to say that, 
like the individual defending himself, the temporary combatant ‘has no reason 
to waive his right not to be killed and there is no reason to suppose that he 
does so’ (2008: 26). This also provides something of a response to Shue’s 
argument, in that the comparison between domestic and wartime killing may 
still hold true in the cases of temporary volunteers.  
If this is the case, then whether or not Hurka has solved the conscription 
problem, he has not successfully shown that all combatants necessarily 
surrender their rights in exchange for war rights’ or ‘a global permission to 
engage in attack’ (McMahan, 2008: 26) – some just combatants, albeit not all, 
may still be illegitimate targets of attack. 
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However, Cheyney Ryan also criticises McMahan’s argument, suggesting 
that by giving ‘insufficient weight’ to what he terms ‘the institutional claims 
on soldiers in a democratic society’ (2011: 12), his view creates a ‘moral 
dilemma’ (2011: 13) for soldiers, which cannot be resolved by simply 
allowing them to conscientiously object from any war they feel to be unjust.  
In short, by arguing that soldiers are only morally permitted to fight in just 
wars, meaning that only unjust combatants lose their rights and thus become 
legitimate targets of military action, McMahan makes it every soldier’s moral 
responsibility to determine whether the war his country is about to engage in is 
just or unjust, and to refrain from fighting in it if it is unjust. 
Ryan’s point is that soldiers may feel that they have a ‘democratic duty’ to 
serve in the armed forces, even in a particular war, whether or not they believe 
that that war is unjust. They may feel this way because in such democracies as 
the US and UK, serving as a soldier is seen as fulfilling a ‘general duty to 
support democracy’s protective institutions’ (2011: 22) – because their actions 
as soldiers are ‘protecting the protection of our democratic society’ (2011: 22). 
Ryan ultimately argues that soldiers of a democratic country do not have 
such a duty, and that belief in this duty is based upon false empirical 
assumptions, such as the assumption ‘that a democratic government will 
generally go to war for legitimate reasons; more specifically, it will generally 
go to war for reasons of self-defense’ (2011: 23).  
However, even though belief in this duty is erroneous, the impact of this 
kind of belief upon soldiers’ attitudes to their jobs and their duties to perform 
them should not be underestimated, and Ryan argues that McMahan does just 
that. McMahan’s argument is, as Ryan summarizes it, that ‘our institutional 
obligations can never override our personal obligation not to participate in an 
unjust war’ (2011: 30). However, Ryan suggests that anyone who believes that 
participating in whatever wars he is commanded to participate in is part of the 
larger task of protecting the democracy he lives in and, by extension, all his 
loved ones who live inside it and enjoy its protection, would find this a ‘real 
dilemma’, since ‘The duty not to kill unjustly comes into conflict with the duty 
to protect one’s loved ones’ (2011: 31).  
Lazar, for instance, points out that ‘associative duties’ (2009: 91), which are 
‘non-contractual duties owed in virtue of a valuable relationship’ (2009: 90) 
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such as that between ‘lovers, family members, friends, and perhaps 
compatriots’ (2009: 91), can ‘clash with, and sometimes override, our general 
duties’ (2009: 91) – general duties being duties ‘owed to people simply in 
virtue of their humanity’ (2009: 90), such as McMahan’s proposed duty ‘not 
to participate in an unjust war’ (Ryan, 2011: 30).  
In short, Lazar argues, it is not the case that such general duties always 
override associative duties, and so when a soldier has what he feels is a duty 
towards his family and loved ones to serve unquestioningly in the armed 
forces, there is at least the possibility of a genuine dilemma caused by the 
clash of duties here. 
Not only does McMahan’s account of war rights impose this dilemma upon 
soldiers, but it imposes an additional ‘unfair burden’ by imposing an 
‘obligation to resist’ fighting in an unjust war, even when doing so would 
mean that they faced ‘harsh sanctions…like a long prison sentence’ (Ryan, 
2011: 32). 
However, this does not necessarily disprove McMahan’s arguments. Ryan’s 
argument seems to suggest not that the ‘democratic duty’ that he thinks 
motivates soldiers is a valid duty (as a pacifist, this would indeed be a 
contradictory position for him), but that its motivational force means that 
soldiers are in a ‘real dilemma’ (Ryan, 2011: 31) and that the obligation 
McMahan’s argument places upon them is therefore an unfair one. But surely 
it would be equally valid to conclude that the cause of this dilemma, the 
problem which we need to address and correct, is not the obligation, but the 
motivational force of the ‘democratic duty’? 
McMahan points out that as things stand it is ‘highly doubtful that many 
[soldiers] do take seriously their moral duty to examine the reasons for and 
against their participation in the war’ (2009: 150). His argument is that this 
needs to change, and an obligation not to take part in unjust wars means that 
combatants must begin to look at the morality of the wars they are about to 
fight in, rather than accepting, for instance, that being a soldier of a democratic 
nation means that one may fight without first examining whether or not the 
war is just, or that fighting is somehow justified even when the war is not.  
In short, the unfair dilemma that Ryan claims McMahan creates for soldiers 
does not necessarily stem from the unfairness of McMahan’s suggestion that it 
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is ‘wrong to fight in a war that lacks a just cause’ (2009: 6) and that therefore 
(in Ryan’s words) we have an ‘obligation not to participate in an unjust war’ 
(2011: 30). It is, rather, a result of the general acceptance of arguments such as 
the argument from democratic duty, and perhaps this is what we need to 
challenge in order to solve McMahan’s dilemma.  
Victor Tadros also argues that combatants may not be wronged by 
conscription. His view is that ‘It may be permissible to coerce me to enter a 
co-operative scheme that interferes with my interests in some way if the 
scheme also benefits me’ (2012: 269). So, conscription is permissible (and 
‘the conscript has a duty to serve’ (2012: 269)) if, had conscription not been 
enforced, she would have been in a worse position than she is as a conscript.  
In Tadros’ words, we should ‘compare the costs that she now bears with the 
costs that she would bear were there no system of conscription’ (2012: 269), 
and if, for instance, she would most probably have been killed in the 
bloodbath that would have resulted if there had been no conscripted army to 
defend the country (and if ‘there is no fairer method of selecting whom to 
defend us than conscription’ (2012: 269)), then she is not wronged by being 
forced to give up her rights and serve as a soldier. 
Of course, this is most usually not the case, and Tadros himself admits that 
where it is not, where for instance ‘sufficient numbers consent to serve' (2012: 
270), then conscription is not justified. But he maintains that conscription is 
still ‘permissible under the strict conditions specified’ (2012: 270). However, I 
do not think that this practical criticism can successfully defeat moral concerns 
about the problem of conscription. People can surely be wronged by such 
things as the enforced removal of their human rights even if it benefits them in 
a practical sense.  
For instance, if someone objected to having a blood transfusion for religious 
reasons, and a hospital overrode his wishes, gave him a blood transfusion and 
saved his life, then that person has undeniably benefited from the doctor’s 
actions, and yet it does not seem a mistake to say that he has also in some 
sense been wronged. In a similar way, if a total pacifist was conscripted, 
surely even if he would have died had he not fought in that war, the fact that it 
was done against his wishes, that he was completely opposed to fighting, 
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surely means that he too is wronged by that action, even though it had more 
benefits than costs for him.  
For these reasons, I believe Walzer’s argument that people can ‘temporarily 
forfeit their human rights to life and liberty’, in Martin’s words (2007: 76), 
even if they have not chosen voluntarily to do so, is not only problematic for 
Walzer’s definition of ‘human rights’, but is also a morally worrying 
suggestion, which one can only hope few people – and fewer governments – 
have come to accept. 
Rawls also opts for the second possibility, arguing that combatants can 
forfeit or surrender their rights for a limited time. However, he has a different 
answer to the question of how to justify sacrificing or denying the individual 
rights of combatants in wartime.  
He argues, as Martin puts it, that combatants have an entitlement to ‘mutual 
self-defense against attack’; meaning that, since ‘soldiers on each side are 
protecting themselves, in combat, from attacks by soldiers on the other side; 
and since the attacks from either side can be deadly, each side may use lethal 
force in self-defense’ (2007: 76). Rawls writes, for instance, that ‘the reason 
why they [soldiers of the state being justly attacked] may be attacked directly 
is not that they are responsible for the war, but that well-ordered peoples have 
no other choice. They cannot defend themselves in any other way, and defend 
themselves they must’ (1999: 95-6). 
In short, although Rawls believes that one must ‘respect, so far as possible, 
the human rights of the members of the other side, both civilians and soldiers’ 
(1999: 96), the soldiers’ right to life cannot in most circumstances be 
respected if one’s own combatants are to defend themselves; and the necessity 
of defence (in an individual case which is a smaller part of a campaign of 
national or collective defence) outweighs the necessity of consistently 
respecting the human rights of the enemy combatants, who are after all a 
group whose profession (whether freely chosen or not) compels them to fight 
enemy combatants, and therefore carries with it the accepted risk of being 
attacked in defence. This is why Rawls states that one ‘must respect . . . the 
human rights of the members of the other side’ only ‘so far as possible’ 
(1999: 96, my italics). 
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Rawls’ argument means that combatants only become vulnerable to attack – 
only surrender their rights to life and liberty – when it is necessary for the 
‘other side’ (1999: 96) to defend themselves by using lethal military force. 
This differs from Walzer’s argument that all combatants ‘forfeit’ (Martin, 
2007: 76) their rights to life and liberty for the duration of the war in one 
important way. Rawls’ argument would, in Martin’s words, ‘restrict the extent 
of vulnerability considerably’, so that ‘the range of acceptable vulnerability 
might be restricted, under the standards of self-defense, to active deployment 
or readiness for combat on the field of battle or actual fighting’ (2007: 77).  
However, as Martin pointed out, it is not entirely clear that Rawls’ argument 
succeeds in proving that all combatants have an equal right to attack. Just 
combatants may have a right to attack unjust combatants because ‘They [the 
justly fighting state] cannot defend themselves in any other way, and defend 
themselves they must’ (1999: 96). But Rawls does not explain why unjust 
combatants should have the right to defend themselves against just 
combatants.  
It is less clear that an unjustly fighting state must defend itself – indeed, if its 
war is aggressive and its opponents are fighting to defend their rights and 
freedoms against its oppression, then McMahan, for instance, might argue that 
the aggressive state’s soldiers have no justification for defending themselves 
against the just combatants at all. The just combatants, in Martin’s words, are 
‘defending human rights, not violating them, and…acting properly in doing 
so’ (2007: 78), and Rawls gives no reason why there should be a moral 
necessity for unjust combatants to defend themselves against the justified 
actions of their opponents. 
Therefore, I believe that Walzer and Rawls do not successfully prove that all 
combatants must surrender or forfeit their rights to life and liberty by the 
simple act of becoming combatants during wartime. This is a serious problem 
for Walzer’s and Rawls’ arguments that the rights to ‘life and liberty’ 
(Walzer, 1977: 54) ground just cause for war.  
This problem, it seems to me, can best be answered by abandoning a 
definition of just cause grounded upon these rights of life and liberty, and 
turning to a definition grounded upon the individual right to defence, as I 
intend to. 
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1iii) Further issues with the collectivist strategy 
 
Now, I turn to the problems with the collectivist strategy as a whole. Firstly, 
Rodin attacks the collectivist argument that the appropriate end of a right of 
national defence is ‘the ‘common life of a community’ (2002: 127). He 
criticises all three of the concepts of ‘common life’ that he identified – firstly, 
he argues that a definition of common life based upon state legitimacy cannot 
successfully ground a right of national defence, for two reasons.  
The first is that there is ‘a prima facie universalist argument implicit in 
the…account which is in deep tension with the notion of a right of national-
defense for individual nation states’ (2002: 146) – in that according to this 
account the very justification of the state’s existence derives from ‘its ability 
to provide order in human affairs’ (Rodin, 2002: 145), but by according states 
a right of national defence, we create a state of nature at the national level. 
This means that the state’s ‘ability to provide order’ (2002: 145) is, in Rodin’s 
words, ‘incomplete, because individuals remain insecure, their life and 
projects liable to disruption at any time from the outbreak of hostilities 
between states’ (2002: 146).  
Rodin’s second reason is that, even if we accept the basic premise of the 
account of ‘common life’ based upon state legitimacy, ‘it is difficult to see 
how there could be a right to defend against aggressors who seek to conquer 
and rule’ (2002: 147). This is because such aggressors do not threaten 
‘political association as such, but…the particular form of a given political 
association, and we as yet have no account of why one form of stable political 
life should be preferred over any other’ (2002: 147), as long as it ultimately 
provides us with the same (or a better) degree of order. 
Next, Rodin criticises a second possible collectivist interpretation of the 
common life, that common life can be defined as ‘the embodiment of a 
particular cultural and historical heritage’ (Rodin, 2002: 142), on the grounds 
that it ‘brings us perilously close to a relativism of value’ (Rodin, 2002: 150), 
when objective values are necessary both in order for the proportionality 
requirement embedded in a right of defence to have any real use or meaning, 
and also for the right of national defence itself, which, in Rodin’s words, ‘is, 
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by its very nature, asserted across national boundaries by one state against 
another’ (2002: 151).  
Finally, he criticises Walzer’s particular interpretation of the common life, 
arguing that when Walzer holds ‘the particular character of a community…to 
underlie the right of national-defense’, he ignores the fact that ‘‘human 
communities do not coincide with the boundaries of states’. In fact, as he goes 
on to say, ‘No community is ever fully integrated within a particular state and 
no territory ever nurtures but a single community’ (Rodin, 2002: 158).  
For instance, multiple nations exist within the United Kingdom, and even 
within one nation each of us may simultaneously belong to a number of 
distinct communities – Rodin suggests that ‘communal affiliations’ may be 
‘defined by my family, my neighbourhood, my city, my national region, my 
country, my international region, and perhaps also the global community’ 
(2002: 159). I think that Rodin makes coherent points against all three 
collectivist interpretations of the common life, and in particular against 
Walzer’s argument. 
Another objection to the collectivist strategy (targeted particularly at 
Walzer’s collectivist argument, but applicable to the collectivist approach as a 
whole) may be seen in the arguments of Richard Wasserstrom, Gerald 
Doppelt, Charles Beitz and David Luban. Their point is that Walzer, and the 
collectivist strategy in general, focuses too much upon the rights of states, and 
in so doing, ignores the rights of individuals, which leads to some unpleasant 
and counter-intuitive conclusions. Wasserstrom, for instance, writes that under 
a collectivist account, ‘The rights of states, and not the rights of individuals, 
come in the end to enjoy an exalted, primary status within the moral critique 
of aggression’ (1978: 544).  
Doppelt similarly writes that it ‘places the rights of de facto states above 
those of individuals’ (1978: 26), Beitz added that Walzer’s argument ‘belongs 
to the morality of states’ (1979: 412) (presumably rather than that of 
individuals), and Luban also distinguished between nations and states, arguing 
that a ‘nation’ or ‘political community’ (1980: 168) is ‘the more-or-less 
permanent social basis of any state that governs it’ (1980: 169), and that 
Walzer confuses a nation with a state, according even an illegitimate state 
(defined as ‘one governing without the consent of the governed’) the ‘right 
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against aggression’ (Luban, 1980: 169) which rightfully belongs to the nation, 
not the state, being grounded in the consent of individuals which binds 
together communities rather than states.  
They therefore argue that a collectivist’s focus upon state rights, which gives 
the right of a state an importance that can trump the individual rights of 
citizens of that state, is implausible. This is because, in their view, the 
‘‘statist’…character’ (Walzer, 1980: 209) of collectivists like Walzer’s 
theories leads to ‘granting illegitimate states a right to which they are not 
entitled’ (Luban, 1980: 169), namely, the right to defend themselves against 
aggression.  
In Walzer’s words, their argument is that Walzer’s view ‘conserves…the 
authority or sovereignty of illegitimate, that is tyrannical, regimes’ (1980: 
210), whereas such thinkers as Luban emphasize that individual rights are 
more important than the rights of states, and would thus be ‘more open, given 
certain qualifications about proportionality, to an activist and interventionist 
politics aimed at overthrowing such regimes and maximizing the enjoyment of 
individual rights’ (1980: 210). 
Walzer responds that the subject of his argument is in fact ‘not the state at all 
but the political community that (usually) underlies it’ (1980: 210), suggesting 
that Beitz and Luban (at the least) have misunderstood his point here. He 
argues, briefly, that ‘The state is constituted by the union of people and 
government, and…Foreigners are in no position to deny the reality of that 
union’, because they cannot, from an outsider’s perspective, know enough 
about ‘the conflicts and harmonies, the historical choices and cultural 
affinities, the loyalties and resentments, that underlie it’ (1980: 212). For this 
reason, they should abide by ‘a morally necessary presumption: that there 
exists a certain "fit" between the community and its government and that the 
state is "legitimate."’ (1980: 212). 
Walzer suggests that citizens of tyrannical states are not obligated to defend 
their states, that they are ‘as free not to fight as they are free to rebel’, but that 
‘that freedom does not easily delegate to foreign states or armies and become a 
right of invasion or intervention’ (1980: 214). This may be a convincing 
argument that a concern with individual rights does not necessarily mandate us 
to intervene and attempt to protect the rights of others (at least not without 
 80 
other conditions being fulfilled), but I do not feel that it reaches the heart of 
the ‘statist’ objection here. 
Even if we accept Walzer’s argument against ‘interventionist politics’ (1980: 
210), we are still left with the issue that the collectivist view prioritizes the 
rights of states over the rights of individuals, and even if this prioritization 
does not have the specific consequences that Beitz, Luban and the others 
attribute to it, it still has counter-intuitive implications.  
Basically, it suggests that the individual rights upon which the state’s rights 
are grounded are less important than those state rights, since an individual’s 
rights may be forfeited much more easily than a state’s. It seems to me that a 
theory which ‘places the rights of…states above those of individuals’ 
(Doppelt, 1978: 26) essentially gets its priorities backwards. 
If state rights are of fundamental or primary importance here, meaning that a 
just cause for war is the defence of a state, then (presuming the fulfilment of 
the right intention criterion) that is the aim of that war; the lives of the citizens 
themselves are of secondary importance, and if it becomes necessary for some 
to be sacrificed in order to preserve the ‘political community’ –for instance, by 
allowing the enemy to eliminate some section of the population in order to 
mount a successful defence of the whole territory, rather than surrendering 
some of that territory in order to save lives – then if such a sacrifice were a 
‘foreseen but unintended’ consequence of that country’s military tactics, a 
case could be made for its permissibility. This seems to me to be not only very 
troubling, but a hollow victory; the continued existence of a political entity is 
fruitless without the continued existence of the individual people who make up 
its population. 
The continued existence of a specific political entity, by contrast, is not 
absolutely essential for the existence of its citizens – they could in most cases 
exist just as well (and in some cases better) as citizens of another polity. If the 
just cause is the defence of the individual lives of a country’s citizens, and a 
successful defence meant that the ‘political community’ would be altered so 
substantially that it could be said to have ceased to exist – say, if a formerly 
unified country was split up into three or four smaller countries – then this 
might seem to be an acceptable consequence of the successful defence of the 
lives of the people who lived in the former country.  
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Rawls’ argument that only some nation-states, and not others, are morally 
permitted to wage war in self-defence seems vulnerable to the same criticism. 
He argues that ‘well-ordered peoples’ (1999: 4), meaning ‘liberal democratic 
societies’ (1999: 5) and ‘decent peoples’ (1999: 4) (i.e. ‘nonliberal societies 
whose basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and 
justice (including the right of citizens to play a substantial role…in making 
political decisions) and lead their citizens to honor a reasonably just law’ 
(1999: 3)) are morally permitted to go to war in self-defence, as are 
benevolent absolutist states which ‘honor human rights’ but deny their 
members ‘a meaningful role in making political decisions’ (1999: 4). 
However, Rawls suggests that states which ‘think a sufficient reason to 
engage in war is because war advances, or might advance, the regime’s 
rational…interests’, or ‘have a state policy that violates the human rights of 
certain minorities among them’, are ‘outlaw states’ (1999: 90) and do not have 
the right to go to war in self-defence27. 
The result is that dictatorships like North Korea which curtail some or many 
of their citizens’ liberties, like their rights to freedom of movement, for 
instance, have no right to defend their people from attack, even if the war they 
are fighting is wholly defensive; no well-ordered state is able or prepared to 
step in and defend the citizens; and North Korea’s hypothetical enemy, which 
has an even worse record of human rights, plans to slaughter every inhabitant 
of that country. While the dictatorship may not itself respect many human 
rights, it may be (and probably is) possible for its citizens to live a minimally 
satisfying life under its rule, and they are likely to prefer that life to being 
indiscriminately slaughtered.  
                                                 
27 Rawls also identifies a fifth category, that of ‘burdened societies’ which exist under 
‘unfavorable conditions…historical, social and economic circumstances [that] make their 
achieving a well-ordered regime…difficult if not impossible’ (1999: 90). Burdened societies 
also lack the ‘right to war in self-defence’ (1999: 92). However, Rawls goes on to say that 
well-ordered peoples have a ‘duty of assistance’ (1999: 108) towards burdened societies, 
although he defines this as a duty to ‘bring burdened societies…into the Society of well-
ordered Peoples’ (1999: 106), by for instance ‘help[ing] a burdened society to change its 
political and social culture’ (1999: 108). Leaving aside the slightly paternalistic air of this 
‘duty’, it might be extended into a moral duty for well-ordered societies to assist burdened 
societies should their citizens require defence against an aggressive outlaw state. After all, it 
would be hard to bring a society into the great family of well-ordered peoples if its citizens are 
all dead. Therefore, I have focused on outlaw states.  
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This argument seems unfair to the people living in outlaw states – their state 
lacks the right to defend them not because the war they are fighting is 
aggressive, but because of the nature of their state. It has the result that their 
lives are less protected by Rawls’ theory, because they are not part of a ‘well-
ordered’ people. Thus Rawls’ argument can also ride roughshod over 
individual rights in favour of state rights, in that it may result in denying some 
individuals the right to have their individual lives defended.  
For these reasons, I do not think that a collectivist strategy can explain how 
defence as a just cause can be grounded upon a right of defence. Besides the 
problems with defining what the common life is, and how state rights can be 
formulated to defend such a concept, it seems to me that collectivism unfairly 
prioritises state rights over individual rights – if state rights are derived from 
an analogy with individual rights of life and liberty, the collectivist can give 
no adequate explanation of why state rights should be more important than 
those individual rights – rather, since individuals are ontologically prior to 
states, should individual rights not be prioritized over those of states?  
Reductive individualists would agree that they should. However, the 
argument that defence of a nation or state can be grounded in the defence of 
the individual lives of its members is also subject to some criticism.  
 
1iv) The reductive individualist strategy 
 
Reductive individualists such as Frowe, McMahan, Fabre, Henry Shue, and 
C. A. J. Coady ‘seek’, as Nicholas Rengger puts it, ‘to untie the close links 
that have bound the [just war] tradition to the state’ (Rengger, 2013: 96). They 
have developed various different ways to ground the justifiability of fighting a 
defensive war in the individual defensive rights of the citizens of the 
belligerent nation. 
The most central argument is, in Frowe’s words, that ‘What a state may do 
to protect itself is just an extension of what individuals can do to protect 
themselves’ (2011: 34). In short, instead of using an analogy from individual 
or ‘domestic’ life to collective or political life, a reductive individualist ‘takes 
war to be a continuation of domestic life’ (Frowe, 2011: 34) (in what might 
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appear to be an echo of Clausewitz’s suggestion that ‘war is a mere 
continuation of policy [politics] by other means’ (1997: 22)). 
For instance, McMahan argues that ‘justified warfare just is the collective 
exercise of individual rights of self and other-defense in a coordinated manner 
against a common threat’ (2004: 717). His view is that ‘conditions of war 
change nothing at all’, but rather, the morality of war should ‘reflect as closely 
as possible the same principles of justice and liability that govern conduct 
outside of war’ (2006: 47). This would seem to suggest the first of the two 
kinds of reductive individualism that Rodin identifies – the suggestion that 
war is reducible to a large number of individual people ‘exercising the right of 
self-defense at the same time and in an organized fashion’ (2004: 140).  
This is at the heart of McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of 
soldiers; an individual aggressor who is liable to be attacked by his victim (in 
the stronger sense, at least) is not permitted to engage in counterdefence 
against his victim, and since war is ‘the collective exercise of individual rights 
of self and other-defense’ (McMahan, 2004: 717), the unjust combatants, each 
of whom is an unjust aggressor, are similarly not permitted to engage in 
counterdefense against the victims of their collective act of unjustified 
aggression (namely, the combatants fighting against them).  
Frowe agrees with McMahan that war is ‘part of ordinary life, to be judged 
by ordinary moral rules’ (Frowe, 2014: 124), and that ‘moral responsibility in 
war attaches to individuals, not collectives’ (2014: 124). Thus, she argues in 
favour of ‘a reductive individualist view of war’ which ‘denies that collectives 
enjoy a privileged moral status when it comes to inflicting harm’, meaning 
that states and nations do not themselves have rights, nor can they confer 
rights upon combatants (such as Walzer’s ‘war rights’) which they would not 
have had ‘in a relevantly similar domestic context’ (2014: 125). 
On this view, the subject of the right of defence grounding just cause for war 
would be the ‘individual citizens within the state’ (Rodin, 2002: 123), 
collectively; the object would be the individual citizens of the enemy state 
who are acting aggressively towards the citizens of the first state, and the end 
is, similarly, the lives of the individual citizens of that first state.  
However, as Rodin points out, reductive individualists might also argue that 
the state can be the appropriate subject and ‘perhaps also the object’ (2002: 
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129) of a defensive right, so long as the end of the right is still seen in terms of 
the individual lives of citizens. The traditional version of this argument 
suggests that the state would have a right ‘to defend its citizens in much the 
same way that a parent has the right to defend his or her child’ (Rodin, 2002: 
129), whether it could properly be said to be the enemy state or the citizens of 
the enemy state that it was defending them from. For instance, Fernando 
Teson defines a defensive war as ‘governmental action to defend the rights of 
its subjects, that is, the rights of individuals’ (1997: 113). This is the line I 
intend to take, although I hope to define the method by which the state derives 
this right in a slightly different way, in order to avoid Rodin’s criticisms of 
this argument. 
This would mean, ultimately, that a definition of just cause for war would be 
the defence of the lives of individual citizens of a state. Thus, that state could 
justify defence against the violent and aggressive invasion of another state, as 
that invasion would threaten the lives of citizens of the invaded state – or, as 
Hurka suggests, ‘there can also be a just cause when one state sponsors or 
allows deadly attacks on another's citizens without threatening the other's 
territory’ (2005: 35). 
An alternative method of reducing collective defence to the defensive rights 
of individuals was developed by cosmopolitan thinkers such as Fabre, who 
writes that an account of war ‘in which the individual, as a moral and rational 
agent, is the fundamental focus for concern and respect’ is best served by the 
‘political morality’ known as cosmopolitanism, under which ‘the individual, 
rather than the nation-state, is central’ (Fabre, 2014: 2).  
Cosmopolitanism, as another leading cosmopolitan, Nigel Dower, defines it; 
is ‘the claim that all human beings are in some sense ‘citizens of the world’’ 
(2009: 60). In defining the ‘general goal’ of cosmopolitanism, he suggested 
that a cosmopolitan ‘has a set of values and norms which he or she thinks 
should be universally adopted and seeks ways to promote these’ (2009: 67).  
The central claim of cosmopolitanism, for our purposes, is the rejection of 
what Dower calls ‘internationalism’ (2009: 67) or ‘the morality of states’ 
(2009: 71) – the collectivist approach which assigns duties and rights to states 
and which assumes that, in Dower’s words, individuals are ‘objects, not 
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subjects, of international law and do not have rights against any states except 
perhaps their own’ (2009: 59). 
Hence, both a cosmopolitan and reductive individualist approach to just 
cause for war argue that, in Frowe’s words, ‘there is one morality, 
and…everything falls under its remit’ (2014: 123). For this reason, they argue 
that ‘War is not a special moral sphere with special moral rules. Rather, it is a 
particular aspect of ordinary life to which we apply our ordinary moral rules’ 
(Frowe, 2014: 123). 
 
1v) Issues with the reductive individualist approach 
 
Reductive individualism is criticized most notably by Rodin. Firstly, he 
argues that the first kind of reductive individualism that he had identified, the 
view that collective defence is simply the collective application of the 
individual defensive rights of a large number of people, is ‘incapable of 
providing an adequate moral justification for the right of national-defense’ 
(2002: 127), for three reasons:  
 
1) Firstly, there is the fact that ‘the liberties enjoyed by soldiers of a 
defending state in the national-defense paradigm extend well 
beyond what could be justified in terms of the personal right of 
self-defense alone’ (2002: 127). Combatants (presumably) have 
the right, for instance, to attack enemy combatants who are not 
an immediate lethal threat to anyone, being asleep or otherwise 
unprepared. 
2) Secondly, as Rodin writes, ‘the requirement of necessity which is 
implicit in the right of self-defense generates a requirement for 
threatened persons to retreat if it is possible to avoid harm 
without resort to force by so doing…But the right of national-
defense is not normally thought to entail a duty to appease 
aggression’ (2002: 128). 
3) Finally, he argues that a reason to reject the reductive 
individualist view is that it overlooks the fact that ‘within the Just 
War Theory the rights of war, including the right to kill enemy 
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soldiers, are held equally by soldiers on both sides of a defensive 
war’ (2002: 128). 
 
I think, as I have already shown, that McMahan’s arguments in favour of the 
moral inequality of combatants give us a plausible reason to reject Rodin’s 
first and third objections to reductive individualism – the equality of 
combatants thesis that Rodin outlines here does not by any means constitute 
the only or the whole of just war theory in this area, and an inequality thesis 
would account for just combatants’ right to attack unprepared enemy 
combatants, as this is part of a larger justified act of defence. However, this 
still leaves the second criticism unanswered, and Rodin has not yet done.  
He adds that the second form of reductive individualism, the view that ‘the 
state has an obligation (and therefore a right) to defend its citizens in much the 
same way that a parent has the right to defend his or her child’ (Rodin, 2002: 
129), has two problems. The first, which he terms ‘the argument from 
humanitarian intervention’, states that this argument justifies wars of 
humanitarian intervention on the same grounds as wars of national defence.  
For instance, if war can be justified to defend the citizens of state A from 
state B’s aggression, and it can be justified either on the part of state A or a 
third state C on A’s behalf, then ‘if a particular military action of state C is 
justified by the fact that it defends the endangered lives of the citizens of A, 
then it should make no difference to the morality of C's action whether the 
citizens of A are threatened by their own state or a third party’ (2002: 131).  
This, Rodin argues, is the wrong conclusion, because, in his words,  
 
‘Common sense tells us that humanitarian intervention is a very 
different creature to national-defense. They are different and 
indeed antagonistic because one is directed towards the 
maintenance of state sovereignty while the other involves an 
explicit permission to violate it’ (2002: 130). 
 
Secondly, Rodin criticises this form of reductive individualism using his 
‘argument from bloodless invasion’ (2002: 130), which Frowe referred to as 
‘the Conditional Force Argument’ (2014: 124). This is the argument that it 
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should (according to ‘international law and in the just war tradition’) be the 
case that ‘the right of national-defense…can be effective in the face of acts of 
aggression which threaten the lives of no citizens of the victim state’ (Rodin, 
2002: 131-2).  
Rodin gives the examples of a state which violates another’s ‘territorial 
integrity and political independence’ (2002: 132) by invading or annexing a 
totally uninhabited and economically useless piece of land belonging to the 
second state; or an invasion which demonstrates ‘such an overwhelming show 
of force that the victim state declines to resist and the intervention is 
accomplished with no loss of life’ (2002: 132).  
In the case of such invasions as these, where no lives will be threatened 
unless the victim state resists the invasion, Rodin suggests that reductive 
individualists cannot justify war in defence of the invaded state. The reason 
for this is that, as Frowe summarizes it, ‘lethal force is a proportionate 
response only to threats to what Rodin calls vital interests’ (2014: 125) – such 
as one’s life.  
Fighting to protect a non-vital lesser interest like property rights to an 
uninhabited piece of land, or resisting a threat which is not currently lethal but 
will foreseeably become so if one resists it28, would be disproportionate, since 
it would constitute, as Lazar suggests, ‘seek[ing] out a fight, to protect 
something other than human life, which could often be conceded without any 
blood being spilt’29.  
Thus, if the flourishing lives of the citizens are not under threat by the 
invasion, then there can be no justification for war. And, Rodin says, this too 
is a counter-intuitive conclusion, as any defensive right needs to permit a state 
to defend itself in these cases. If it did not, any state could successfully invade 
another simply by stating truthfully that they will harm none of the invaded 
state’s citizens so long as no resistance is offered them. 
However, this does not seem a particularly compelling objection to the 
reductive individualist view. If a burglar enters your house and tells you that 
                                                 
28 Rodin argues that if it is known (to a reasonable degree of certainty) that resisting a non-
lethal threat will result in that threat becoming lethal, then, as Frowe puts it, ‘any calculation 
about the proportionality of this…resistance must take into account the harms that the victim 
state foresees will be inflicted by the aggressor in response’ (2014: 127). 
29 This quote is from Seth Lazar, ‘The Moral Importance of Winning’, which is an 
unpublished manuscript cited in Frowe, Defensive Killing, p125.  
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he intends to take some of your belongings, if not the most valuable then 
perhaps the most treasured, but that he will not harm you in any way unless 
you attempt to stop him, in which case he will try to kill you and your family, 
then are you thereby obligated to let him take whatever he wants, and 
forbidden from trying to prevent him? It does not seem to me that you are.  
In the same way, while the lethal indirect consequences of your resistance 
must undoubtedly be taken into consideration in the proportionality 
calculation, it does not seem to me that they should prohibit the possibility of 
resistance, even if they are proportionally greater than the good achieved. 
Rodin admits that such indirect consequences or ‘mediated harms’ do not, in 
Frowe’s words, ‘weigh as heavily in the proportionality calculation as harms 
that Victim will inflict himself’ (2014: 127) – perhaps they are more heavily 
discounted against than even Rodin wishes to allow. 
In addition, Frowe responds to Rodin’s objection by arguing that Rodin’s 
argument (which she refers to as the ‘Defence Account’ (2014: 129)) does not 
plausibly accommodate cases where vital interests are at stake. She gives the 
example of a woman (Alice) who is about to be raped by a man who will go 
on to rape two other women if and only if Alice attempts to resist his attempt 
to rape her (and whose friend will do so if Alice manages to kill the rapist 
himself).  
In this case, one of Alice’s vital interests, that of bodily integrity, is being 
threatened, but if her proportionality calculations must take account of the 
harm which her rapist or his friend will inflict upon others ‘as if she would be 
inflicting the…harm herself’ (Frowe, 2014: 130), then (since two women will 
be raped if she resists, and she is only one), she would seem to be morally 
prohibited from defending herself, because to do so would be disproportionate. 
Frowe rightly points out that this is a highly counter-intuitive result, 
precisely because a vital interest is threatened. But if the proportionality 
calculation would make defence of a lesser interest disproportionate if such 
defence would result in the infliction of greater harm than would be prevented, 
why should it not do so where the defence of a vital interest would do the 
same? As Frowe observes, it is simply ‘not clear’ why Rodin’s argument 
‘should be sensitive to this distinction between lesser and vital interests’ 
(2014: 131).  
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Thus, Rodin’s account of defence, which he claims shows a serious problem 
for reductive individualism, has itself an equally serious problem, which 
would seem to make it untenable as it stands.  
Even if we accept that defence of lesser interests is made disproportionate 
and, thus, prohibited by the inclusion of ‘mediated harms’ (Frowe, 2014: 129), 
the inclusion of ‘mediated harms’ in our proportionality calculations will often 
make it impermissible for us to defend our vital interests as well, which is 
patently ridiculous. 
Frowe suggests that we may either completely reject Rodin’s argument as a 
result of this problem, or we may modify his argument to take account of it. 
Her suggestion is that we modify it. She proposes a ‘Revised Defence 
Account’ (2014: 135), according to which ‘bringing about the objectively less 
harmful state of affairs’ is required only if doing so does not impose ‘more 
cost than Alice can be required to bear to bring that state of affairs about’ 
(2014: 137).  
Victims like Alice are, under Frowe’s view, only ‘required to bear roughly 
the same amount of cost to prevent mediated harm to others as [s]he would be 
to rescue others from harm’ (2014: 136) – which would be some cost, 
presumably, but not the cost of such things as her life or bodily integrity.  
This is because requiring Alice to bear such a cost would be to require her 
‘to treat herself as a means’, and ‘there are limits to how much cost we can be 
required to bear to such ends’ (2014: 135). Thus, Frowe claims, the only way 
to retain Rodin’s mediated harms in the proportionality calculation is to 
modify it in this way, which would also be to preserve reductive individualism 
from Rodin’s criticism.  
In Rodin’s ‘bloodless invasion’ example (2002: 130), Frowe suggests that 
under her Revised Defence Account, it would be possible for a reductive 
individualist to justify the rights of the members of the victim-state to defend 
themselves against this threat, because if the victims resist the invasion and the 
aggressors do retaliate with violence, then for the reasons just stated, ‘the 
members of the victim state need not proceed as if they are themselves 
inflicting these harms’ (2014: 137).  
If, as Frowe thinks, they would not be required to sacrifice such things as the 
land being annexed, or the freedoms being taken away, in order to rescue 
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others from harm, then they are not required to do so to prevent the harms that 
the aggressor state will inflict should they resist. They may, therefore, 
permissibly defend themselves against such invasions – unless, of course, 
‘they predicted that doing so would result in sufficiently graver harm to a 
sufficient number of innocent people’ (Frowe, 2014: 137), which, Frowe 
argues, is ‘not generally’ the case (2014: 138). 
However, I have one problem with this response. It suggests that people are 
not required to make such sacrifices in order to rescue others from harm. It 
may be the case, as Frowe suggests, that we need to be ‘generally sceptical of 
the role that Rodin attributes to a duty of care’ (2014: 138) but we must have 
some duties to rescue others from harm (especially if, as Frowe’s acceptance 
of the ‘mediated harms’ doctrine would suggest, we are responsible for the 
harm that those others will suffer). How much cost would be too great to 
require us to bear for such a duty?  
In the example of an aggressive state which intends to conquer another 
nation, but will only harm its citizens if they resist, this does seem to be a 
clear-cut case of a too-high cost – no one is required to sacrifice their own or 
another person’s liberty in order to rescue others from harm.  
But the first case, the annexation of an uninhabited piece of land, is a bit 
more complicated. Is the loss of what is presumably useless real estate, really 
a cost too high to require someone to bear in order to rescue other people? On 
an individual level, if the only thing that would save the lives of a number of 
people would be for me to give up a small portion of my back garden which I 
was not using and did not need for anything essential (say I was using it as a 
place to store my compost bin) would I be morally permitted to say ‘No, I’m 
sorry these people are going to die, but I like my bin where it is, and I can’t be 
bothered to move it’? 
Intuitively, I don’t think I am. If we have any duties to rescue others from 
harm, then those duties should hold in cases where the only sacrifices to us are 
this lesser kind. If they only hold in cases where the sacrifice to the rescuer is 
trivial or non-existent, then they are themselves trivial duties.  
I have not the space here to develop a full account of such duties of rescue, 
but if they do exist, then they need to be robust enough to remain duties unless 
the act of rescue would force the rescuer to undergo serious sacrifices – and 
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the loss of land that is neither necessary for survival nor highly valued does 
not seem to me to be a serious enough sacrifice. 
For this reason, I would question how far Frowe’s Revised Defence Account 
answers Rodin. She could perhaps justify a right to defence against a 
‘conditionally violent’ invasion which will ultimately deprive the victims of 
their autonomy, their freedom to govern themselves, as this would 
undoubtedly be a cost too great for a rescuer to be required to bear, but I 
believe that the loss of an uninhabited piece of land would not be too great a 
cost, and so her account would not always justify a people in defending their 
territorial borders. 
Therefore, reductive individualism, while a stronger move from individual to 
collective defence than collectivism, also has its weaknesses. I hope to at least 
somewhat resolve some of these problems, by proposing a slightly different 
individualist account of just cause for war. 
 
 
2: An Alternative Individualist Justification for the Right of 
Collective Defence. 
 
 
Thus, one of the main difficulties with the collectivist view lies in the fact 
that, in positing a separate right of defence for individuals and for collective 
entities like states, it can sometimes unfairly prioritise these state rights over 
the rights of individuals; and one of the main difficulties with the reductive 
individualist view is that it cannot always seem to explain why a group should 
have a right of defence against aggressive threats that do not necessarily 
threaten members’ individual lives.  
Some versions, like Fabre’s cosmopolitanism, go so far as to argue that 
collective entities have no rights at all (which I do not agree with), but even 
those versions which argue that some collectives have rights to defend 
individual members, nevertheless depict these rights as implausibly narrow. I 
here attempt to construct a reductive individualist account which does not 
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suffer from this problem, nor from the collectivist tendency to prioritise 
collective rights over individual rights.  
I will begin, as reductive individualists do, with the individual rights of 
defence belonging to each person within a collective entity. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, there is good reason to believe that these individuals all 
possess a right of self-defence.  
The question, then, is how do we get from a right, held by each individual, to 
defend her own flourishing life, to a right which can justify the actions taken 
by collectives to defend their shared interests and goals, which may appear to 
go beyond simply defending the flourishing lives of each member of that 
collective, as in the bloodless invasion example. I believe that a state can be 
justified in at least some defensive action against a bloodless invasion, and any 
account I give will have to take note of this.  
It seems to me that the issue of grounding a definition of just cause for war 
upon defensive rights need not involve such a problematic move from 
individual to collective defence as many reductive individualists use. Rodin’s 
summary of the reductive individualist position is that states or other 
collectives can have rights to protect their citizens or members as parents have 
the rights to protect their children, because they have duties of care or rescue 
towards them. I would suggest that these duties (along with all the problems 
Rodin identifies with using duties of care and rescue in this way) are not 
necessary; that states can derive rights from the individual rights of their 
citizens in another way.  
My account of the derivation of state or collective rights begins with the idea 
that since individuals possess individual rights of self-defence, they can 
delegate those rights to others – both to individuals and, more importantly, to 
collectives. This is not quite the same as the extension of defensive rights to 
others that occurs in a case of other-defence. Let us consider the 
straightforward other-defensive case that I will call Assisted Defence: Victim 
is being attacked by Aggressor, Bystander observes this and jumps in to 
repulse Aggressor, either in conjunction with Victim or alone if Victim is (for 
instance) too badly injured to continue defending herself.  
If liberty-rights of other-defence exist (and I will assume that they do) then 
Bystander has the liberty-right to defend Victim (whether that right is 
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grounded upon a duty of care or of rescue, or upon something else, which is 
unimportant for our purposes). But Victim retains her own liberty-right to 
defend herself as well (although if a duty of rescue has been invoked, she may 
lack the power to do so). In short, Victim’s right to defend herself from 
Aggressor and Bystander’s right to defend Victim from Aggressor co-exist 
simultaneously. This is not the case with the delegation of a right of defence. 
This can be demonstrated with the following example. Let us say that Victim 
is being unjustifiably attacked by Aggressor. In most examples of this kind, it 
is assumed that Victim is alone with Aggressor, or observed by other non-
official Bystanders, and thus Victim must defend herself against Aggressor or 
die.  
But if there are members of the official police force present, as 
representatives of the state to which Victim has delegated her defensive right, 
then it seems clear that Victim may not defend herself against Aggressor; that 
she must allow the police to defend her instead. If the police arrive whilst she 
is in the process of defending herself, she may not continue to attack 
Aggressor, even if he continues to attack her – she must allow the police to 
stop his attack once they have begun to do so. Let us call this Police Defence. 
The reason for this at first seems simple. Once the police have arrived and 
are in the process of defending Victim from Aggressor, then there is no longer 
any need for Victim to defend herself. As Rodin has said, and I accept, any 
justified defensive action must be ‘a proportionate, necessary response to an 
imminent threat of harm’ (2002: 99). The intervention of the police means 
Victim’s defensive actions are unnecessary.  
If Aggressor is running towards Victim intending to kill her, with Policeman 
present, and both Victim and Policeman have guns, then Victim may not shoot 
Aggressor to save her life unless she has good reason to believe that 
Policeman cannot or does not intend to do the same, as only then is her 
defensive action necessary. If Policeman is going to save her, then she does 
not need to save herself. 
But there must be something else at work here. In Assisted Defence, I said 
that if Bystander leaps to Victim’s defence, Victim still retains her liberty-
right to self-defence, and may fight alongside Bystander to help subdue 
Aggressor. Intuitively, it does seem that Victim’s right has to be robust in this 
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way, that Bystander’s defence of Victim should not render her powerless to 
defend herself. 
But in this case, just as in Police Defence, Bystander’s actions, means that 
Victim’s defensive actions may not be necessary to save her life. Let us 
assume that both Victim and Aggressor are unarmed and under-sized, while 
Bystander is big, strong and armed with a large gun (which he knows how to 
use). It is reasonable to assume, under these circumstances, that Bystander will 
be able to defend Victim even without Victim’s help. Does this mean that, 
once Bystander arrives, Victim no longer has a right to defend herself but must 
allow Bystander to defend her (presuming she has good reason to believe he 
will)?  
It does not, for a simple reason. The action itself is necessary, although it 
may not be necessary that Victim herself perform it. Some defensive action 
has to be taken, and if it is within Victim’s power to perform at least a portion 
of that action in conjunction with Bystander, then it is at least permissible for 
Victim to do so. If the defensive action itself is a necessary and proportionate 
one, both Victim and Bystander have a right to perform it, and these rights do 
not cancel each other out – either may perform it or both together. 
Why, then, is this not the case in Police Defence? What makes the right of 
the police, as state representatives, to defend Victim appear to supersede 
Victim’s liberty-right of defence, when it does not do so in Assisted Defence? 
The most plausible answer to this question, to my mind, is that Victim 
delegates her right of defence to the state, appointing it to act on her behalf in 
this case and agreeing that she will let it act defensively for her.  
I have given the example of the police force as a collective that exercises 
delegated individual defensive rights. However, these defensive rights are 
obviously not delegated to the police force as an autonomous institution; for 
indeed the police force is not such an institution. It is, rather, the internal law 
enforcement arm of the state, and it is as agents of the state that the police are 
obliged to exercise delegated individual rights. When defensive rights are 
delegated to the state, although the state is a collective entity composed of all 
its members, each member does not have the duty to perform the defensive 
rights delegated to that entity – the duty devolves upon those people who have 
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accepted the positions as agents of the state, such as members of the police 
force or armed forces.  
What this means is that Victim allows the state, through these agents, to 
exercise her right of defence on her behalf, just so long as they are in a 
position to do so. This necessary clause means that she does not permanently 
surrender that right, but stipulates that while she always possesses it, the state 
must exercise it for her when its agents are in a position to (and intend to) do 
so. In addition, this defensive right is stronger for the entity it is delegated to; a 
duty rather than a right. The state may not avoid exercising the defensive 
rights entrusted to them.  
The issue of how and why such rights are delegated to collective entities or 
organisations is very complex, and I do not have the space to fully explore it in 
this chapter. I will therefore explain it in greater detail in Chapter Four. In this 
chapter, it is my task to show how the move from individual to collective 
defence which is essential to a rights-based account of just cause can be 
grounded upon this delegation of rights. 
The question first arises: are the defensive rights which are delegated to a 
collective entity collective rights, possessed by the collective itself, or do they 
remain individual rights? I believe that they remain individual rights, but their 
delegation to a collective entity results in a collective right to exercise these 
defensive rights on behalf of the rights-holders, which may, for brevity’s sake, 
be referred to as a collective right of defence. Therefore, I intend to use an 
individualist grounding for collective rights of defence, in which such rights 
can and do exist, but they are rights to defend a collective’s individual 
members rather than rights to defend the collective itself, and they are based 
directly upon the rights of these individual members through delegation. When 
I argue that some collectives possess a collective right of defence, therefore, it 
is a shorthand term for the collective right to exercise individual defensive 
rights delegated to that collective. 
This grounding of collective rights is similar in some ways to the Lockean 
social contract view; according to which, in Michael Lessnoff’s words, in 
order to become a member of any ‘particular Political Society’ (Locke, 1988: 
352) each individual ‘must give up’ certain individual rights to the state (such 
as the right to punish ‘breaches in the law of nature for himself’ (1986: 61)) 
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through express or tacit consent, which amounts to ‘a transfer of individual 
rights’ to that society (Lessnoff, 1986: 62). My view draws upon elements of 
Locke’s social contract theory, and is similar in that I also ground the 
delegation of defensive rights upon the express or tacit consent of individuals 
to that delegation, and in that I follow Locke in rejecting the Hobbesian notion 
that individuals ‘are under any obligation to transfer any rights to the political 
community’, instead attempting to prove that individuals ‘have good reason’ 
to delegate their defensive rights, and ‘have done so in the overwhelming 
majority of cases’ (Lessnoff, 1986: 62).  
However, there are differences between the social contract view and my 
own. For one thing, my focus is solely upon individual defensive rights, and I 
make no claim that other individual rights are delegated in the same way. 
Also, I do not limit the delegation of individual defensive rights to states 
alone, but will accept that we may also delegate our individual defensive 
rights to some non-state collective entities. But most importantly, I argue that 
this process is a delegation, rather than a transfer or surrender of rights to a 
particular authority; unlike traditional social contract theory, which would 
follow Locke in suggesting that an individual ‘gives up to be regulated by 
Laws made by the Society’ the rights to ‘do whatsoever he thinks fit for the 
preservation of himself and others within the permission of the Law of Nature’ 
and to ‘punish the Crimes committed against that Law’ (1988: 352)30. 
One important difference this makes between my account and the 
collectivist account (or the traditional social contract view) is a difference in 
the end of such a collective right. It is not the right of a state (or other 
collective) to defend its collective life and liberty, but the right of a collective 
to defend the individual flourishing lives of its members. Many collectivists 
argue that a collective right must have at least one collective end, such as 
Walzer’s suggestion of a people’s ‘common life’; but under my account, the 
rights possessed by collective entities, if they can be said to be collective 
rights in this sense, are rights to exercise all the individual defensive rights 
delegated to the collective.  
                                                 
30 I will give an account of why this delegation of individual defensive rights to a collective 
entity is grounded upon active or tacit consent in Chapter Four. 
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Being still individual rights, these have individual ends – the ends, in fact, 
do not change with the delegation. What, indeed, would be the point of 
delegating your right to defend yourself to (for instance) a state if, when you 
did so, it ceased to be a right to defend you and became a right to defend 
something else entirely, such as the continued integrity or liberty of the state, 
in which you might (and justifiably) feel that you had a less important interest 
than in your own life?  
In short, while the collectivist account of a right to ‘national defence’, as 
stated by Dower, for instance, claims that a country has the right to defend 
‘itself’, that is, its existence as a country or ‘political community’ (2009: 86), I 
wish to argue instead that collectives have the right to defend the flourishing 
lives of their citizens. The two are inevitably intertwined; for the defence of a 
country’s existence as a political community undoubtedly involves the defence 
or protection of the lives of its citizens (as it could not exist without them) and 
the defence of citizens’ flourishing lives from aggression in most cases 
requires the defence of their particular political community. However, the fact 
that the end of this right is an individual one does make some difference to the 
account of just cause based upon this right. This will become clear later. 
Thus, I would argue that the end of a delegated defensive right remains the 
flourishing lives of the individual people whose rights were delegated. It 
remains for me to outline the rest of the details of the resulting collective right, 
before moving on to explore what kinds of just cause for war would result 
from this kind of collective right. 
As I have said, the primary subjects of the right would be the individual 
rights-holders, but the collective entity itself would be the subject of a 
collective right (and obligation) to exercise the defensive rights delegated to it. 
Because all the members of a collective entity have an individual right to self-
defence, such countries or groups have a right to defend their lives 
collectively; from attack, from starvation, from disease, from anything that 
might threaten them (though obviously many of these would not require 
military action as a means of defence). 
One issue with this account is that when an individual delegates her 
defensive right to a collective, she is not necessarily delegating that right to 
some external entity, as she would if she delegated it to another individual; but 
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she is delegating it to a collective of which she may be part. This may seem 
counter-intuitive – how can a person delegate a right to herself? However, this 
is not what is meant. One individual person is not identical with the collective 
of which she is part, and it can usefully be said that she delegates the right to 
defend her to that collective as a whole, resulting in an active duty for those 
agents whose job it is to fulfil their collective’s defensive obligations. 
The object of the collective right, or ‘the party against whom the right is 
held’ (Rodin, 2002: 99), is a little trickier to identify. Individual defensive 
rights are generally held against the individual or group threatening the 
individual subject of the right, but the objects of rights held by collectives 
(under the collectivist account), are usually thought to be other collective 
entities, most often states.  
For instance, Rousseau argues that war is not only impermissible but 
generally impossible except between two states, as between private individuals 
there is ‘never or very rarely extended enmities or war’ (2004b: 166), and that 
‘‘War is…not a relationship between one man and another, but a relationship 
between one State and another, in which individuals are enemies only by 
accident…as soldiers’ (2004a: 46-7). I will consider his argument in greater 
detail later, but here I need only say that I disagree – McMahan, Fabre and 
Frowe give sufficient arguments as to why war need not be perceived as a 
relationship between two states qua collective entities.  
My view is that, in the same way that the end of individual defensive rights 
does not change when they are delegated to the state or other collective entity, 
the object of those rights does not change. The object of the individual right is 
the individual or group of individuals who are threatening the end of that right, 
and so the object of a delegated right (and the target of the collective right to 
exercise it) remains the group of individuals threatening that end.  
This group may be large or small; but in cases where the proportionality 
requirement permits a collective entity to wage war, one may safely assume 
the group to be very large; for instance the group of individuals comprising the 
threat posed by an aggressive state. This may include the combatants who are 
physically responsible for the threat, the government, leaders or authorities 
who are causally responsible in that they deliberately choose to bring about 
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that threat, and perhaps some auxiliary combatants who choose to directly 
contribute to it, such as munitions workers.  
The account of individual liability that I developed in Chapter One is, I 
believe, equally applicable to this kind of collective right to exercise delegated 
rights, because the objects of the rights are also individuals. I will explain in 
greater detail what it means for my account of just cause, in Chapter Three, 
when I consider how my account deals with the issue of whether just and 
unjust combatants are equally liable to attack. 
Thus, while I take the view that states and some non-state collective entities 
may hold defensive rights, because I believe that these rights are derived in an 
individualist way, that they are in fact rights to exercise the individual 
defensive rights which individuals delegate to their state or to a non-state 
entity, they are not the same as collectivist state rights. Rather, they are 
individual rights which are exercised by states or non-state collective entities31 
instead of by the individuals themselves.  
It is worth noting that while my account of collective defence views a just 
defensive war as a war waged by some collective entity in order to defend the 
flourishing lives of individuals, some individual people might take the 
opposite view – if the existence of the country or church they belonged to 
were threatened by the aggressive actions of another collective, they might 
view their actions, in waging a defensive war, as (at least partially) defending 
a collective entity to which they felt loyalty or love, rather than the other way 
around.  
However, in my opinion this is due to a misapprehension. The end of 
defence in such situations is not the collective entity itself, but the aspects of 
its members’ flourishing lives that depend upon the continued existence of that 
entity. The feelings of loyalty and love felt by these members show that 
membership of that collective enhances their lives and plays an important role 
in their identities. If no aspects of the members’ flourishing lives depended 
upon citizenship of this country or membership of that church, then they 
would feel no loyalty, no urge to defend (as they see it) that collective entity. 
Thus, it is my contention that what they defend is the aspects of their 
                                                 
31 I will explain more clearly what sorts of non-state collective entities may possess delegated 
collective rights in Chapter Four. 
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flourishing lives that depend upon that collective entity, even though they may 
perceive it differently. 
Hence, whilst the recipient of such delegated individual rights is a collective, 
and in practice will be either a nation-state or an appropriate kind of non-state 
collective entity, such as a revolutionary movement, the object, end and scope 
of these rights remains individualist, because they are still individual rights 
(and an individual is still the holder of each right) – the collective only 
possesses the right to act upon them.  
I would, therefore, argue that it is possible for someone to delegate the right 
to defend themselves to a collective, whilst remaining the right-holder. One 
can delegate the ‘expression’ of a right and desist from exercising it oneself 
(in certain cases) but remain the holder of that right. For instance, in some 
companies a shareholder may delegate her right to vote in shareholders’ 
meetings to another individual or to the Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
The shareholder does not give or transfer her right to this other party, and may 
revoke a previously agreed delegation if she wishes32. Although it is possible 
for a shareholder to specify how her vote must be cast, it is also common, 
particularly in the US, to give the one to whom she delegates her right the 
discretion to decide how to cast her vote, just as individuals give the recipients 
of their delegated defensive rights the discretion to decide how that defence 
shall be undertaken. Delegating the right to vote may not be quite the same as 
delegating a defensive right to a collective entity; but I believe it helps to 
illustrate the process by which a right can be delegated, and still be held by its 
original subject. 
Therefore, I argue that collective defence, as a just cause for war, is not 
justified by defensive rights held directly by collectives, with the primary goal 
of defending the existence or distinct identity of the threatened collective 
entity, as collectivists like Walzer or Rawls might suggest; but rather by 
individual defensive rights, which individuals delegate to collective entities, 
authorizing those entities to exercise them on their behalf, resulting in a 
collective right to exercise these individual rights.  
                                                 
32
https://www.mapfre.com/corporate/images/delegation-of-vote-instructions_tcm885-
140005.pdf 
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This is an individualist account of collective defence, in that it ‘attempt[s] to 
show that national-defense can be derived from, or analysed in terms of, the 
personal defensive rights of citizens’ (Rodin, 2002: 123). Some of the 
reductive individualist arguments I have considered in this chapter, such as 
Fabre’s, have taken the route of analysing collective defence in terms of 
individual defensive rights, of taking it to be individual defence on a collective 
scale, for instance.  
My account instead derives a collective right of defence from individual 
rights, and does so differently to Rodin’s example of individualist collective 
rights. Because of this difference, my view escapes the two criticisms that 
Rodin levels at collective rights with the defence of individuals as their ends. I 
will show how in the course of the next section, in which I give an account of 
just cause for war based upon my account of a collective right of defence.  
 
 
3: A New Individualist Account of Just Cause  
 
 
3i) Collective self and other defence 
 
To begin with, a collective entity’s possession of the right to exercise 
delegated individual defensive rights gives rise to just cause for war when war 
is necessary to prevent the aggressive actions of the people of another state or 
group from destroying the flourishing lives of the first collective’s citizens. 
This would mean that what can be roughly described as collective or national 
‘self-defence’, namely a nation or collective entity’s defence of its own people 
against external aggression, would under this account be a just cause for war. 
For instance, defence against outright military aggression by another 
collective through invasion, such as Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland, 
would be considered a just cause (as indeed it would under most accounts, this 
being the paradigmatic example of defence). The flourishing lives of the 
individual citizens of an invaded country are threatened by the aggression of 
the invading country, so the state to which they have delegated their individual 
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defensive rights has the right to exercise them, and may permissibly do so by 
war, assuming fulfilment of the other ad bellum requirements.  
Straightforward joint defence (defined as the common defence, by a group 
of collective entities, of one or more of their number) can be similarly 
justified. There is, I believe, no need to introduce additional elements like 
duties of care to one’s allies or liberty rights of rescue, as Rodin might – 
rather, by a previous alliance or recent agreement to assist in the defence, the 
other collective entities have been given permission to share in the threatened 
collective’s right to exercise its members’ defensive rights. Similarly, when an 
individual victim of attack says ‘Help me!’ to another individual, the victim 
extends her liberty-right of defence to that bystander, giving that bystander at 
least the permission to act in her defence.  
Hence, for instance, a group of nations engaged in joint defence may all be 
justified in doing so in order to defend the same group of endangered citizens, 
those belonging to the originally threatened country or countries – unless, 
naturally, the war results in a threat to the lives of citizens of these other 
countries, in which case these countries will have an additional just cause, that 
of the defence of their own citizens. 
Thus, these paradigmatic cases of collective ‘self’ or ‘joint’ defence are just 
causes for war under my account of the collective right of defence. But what 
of those cases of defence which are not so straightforward? 
One difference between my account and both collectivist accounts, and 
many reductive individualist accounts, is that since, under my account, the 
object of a collective right of defence is the individual people who threaten the 
flourishing lives of individual members of the threatened collective entity, qua 
individuals and only incidentally as members of a particular collective, an 
account of just cause based upon this right would accept that war may also be 
justified against groups of threatening individuals who belong to no state, or 
have no legitimate authority.  
I believe that cases in which a non-state group of individuals is a sufficient 
threat to justify war as a defensive action, given the proportionality constraint 
on the right of defence (and in just war theory as a whole), are likely to be 
comparatively rare. However, there could be a defensive war against a non-
state group if that group was a serious enough threat – Iraq, for instance, might 
 103 
have a just cause for waging war against IS forces within their country that are 
killing and terrorising their citizens, without acknowledging IS to be either an 
actual state or a legitimate authority. Most aggressive non-state groups are 
unlikely to have the resources necessary to make war a proportionate response 
to their aggression. However, when a non-state group does have such 
resources, it seems far more implausible to deny that fighting a defensive war 
against such a group is possible, than to admit it.  
As I will explain in Chapter Four, I consider that some non-state collective 
entities may have just cause and legitimate authority, based upon the fact that 
individual defensive rights may be delegated to some non-state organisations 
as well as to states. It seems plausible, therefore, that if war may possibly be 
justified by non-state organisations, then it may in some circumstances also be 
justified against non-state organisations. 
I must also consider how my individualist account copes with the difficult 
case of humanitarian intervention as a cause for war. I have not the space in 
this dissertation to treat this issue as fully as I would like, but I will attempt to 
sketch, roughly, what stance my account takes upon the issue of when 
interventionist wars are justified.  
 
3ii) Humanitarian intervention 
 
A war of humanitarian intervention is defined, according to Roberts, as 
‘Military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and 
with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the 
inhabitants’ (1993: 429). Fisher argues that intervention is justified ‘when a 
people is being massively oppressed by its own government,…or, if the 
government, while not itself the oppressor, fails to protect its people from 
slaughter...being undertaken by others within the boundaries of the state’ 
(2011: 221)33.  
                                                 
33 Walzer suggests that there are two other forms of justifiable intervention: intervention 
‘when what is at issue is secession or “national liberation”’ (1977: 90) (in other words, 
intervention to aid one of the sides in an internal ‘military struggle for independence’ (1977: 
90)) and counter-intervention (intervention by Country A to halt or oppose the military 
intervention of Country B in Country C). I will not be considering those here, since I would 
consider the former to be a case of collective defence where the object is a non-state group of 
individuals (and thus will reserve discussion of cases like these for Chapter Four), and the 
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Gillian Brock suggests (with certain qualifications) that debate about the 
justifiability of humanitarian intervention should ‘be resolved in favour of 
protecting the individuals who suffer in…humanitarian crises’ (2007: 35), 
meaning that intervention would be in general a permissible form of defence, 
except where ‘safeguards against abuse’ (2007: 35) apply. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, collectivists and reductive individualists are far from agreed 
about this. 
Many collectivists take their cue from Walzer, who (as I have said) argues 
for a ‘presumption against intervention’, based upon the ‘opposition to 
imperial politics and…commitment to self-determination’ (2004: 68). His 
position is that humanitarian intervention is not justified in all cases where it 
would be necessary to save the endangered citizens of the country that is a 
subject of intervention, but only in very extreme cases.  
In his words, while ‘nonintervention is not an absolute moral rule’, 
intervention can only be justified in order to ‘put a stop to actions that, to use 
an old-fashioned but accurate phrase, “shock the conscience” of humankind’ 
(2004: 69)34.  
The presumption is that such cases will be relatively uncommon, and thus 
that ‘the norm is not to intervene in other people’s countries; the norm is self-
determination’ (Walzer, 2004: 81). Except where such egregious 
circumstances overwhelm it, the collectivist is therefore bound by his 
argument that states have their own directly-held rights, including ‘self-
determination’ (2004: 81). 
Reductive individualists often justify humanitarian intervention on a much 
wider scale, since a reductive individualist account of collective defence holds 
that it has the end of individual defence, and thus it could be expected to 
prioritise the defence of the people under threat by the humanitarian crisis in 
question over any commitment to state ‘self-determination’ (Walzer, 2004: 
                                                                                                                                            
latter to be a fairly straightforward case of collective defence – Country A may only fight 
Country B if Country C asks for A’s help in defending its citizens against B. Besides which, 
as McMahan points out, the first two examples are not cases where Walzer’s ‘ideal of self-
determination’ (McMahan, 1996: 13) is overridden by concerns about human rights, but cases 
where that ideal has already broken down. However, this is not an issue I have time to debate 
here. 
34 Walzer gives examples such as ‘enslavement or massacre’ (1977: 90). 
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81), even in cases where the threat is not so great as to ‘shock the conscience’ 
of mankind. What matters is whether that threat is proportionate.  
For instance, McMahan rejects what he calls ‘the common assumption that 
respect for self-determination requires an almost exceptionless doctrine of 
nonintervention’ (1996:2-3), and argues that, at the very least, ‘the cases that 
fall under Walzer’s three exceptions are not the only ones in which 
intervention is not ruled out by respect for self-determination’ (1996: 24)35.  
Fabre goes further, and writes that (according to the cosmopolitan view) not 
only is humanitarian intervention justified in order to halt ‘shocking’ acts such 
as enslavement or mass murder, but that ‘violations of civil and political rights 
can be part of a justification for intervention…[and] so can violations of 
socioeconomic rights’ (2014: 173). This expands the cases of justified 
humanitarian intervention still further; especially since Fabre goes on to argue 
that not only a right, but a ‘duty to intervene’ exists, and ‘ought to be borne by 
all other countries in proportion to their means when it comes to funding the 
war, and by the most effective army, which may well mean a multilateral 
international force’ (2014: 191).  
Gerhard Overland argues, similarly, that ‘assistance force’, meaning force 
used to compel unwilling people to fulfil a duty of assistance, can be 
permissible ‘against culpable bystanders’ and ‘against innocent contributors’ 
(2009: 231). This, presumably, would not go quite as far as Fabre’s account of 
the duty to assist, since he argues that ‘negligent bystanders’, for instance, 
may not be forced to assist. However, this may equally depend upon how we 
determine whether a nation or group is considered a culpable bystander to a 
particular threat (or, for that matter, an innocent contributor). 
Rodin, however, argues that reductive individualism cannot justify a right, 
much less a duty, to intervene. He writes that ‘having the end of defending the 
                                                 
35 McMahan also criticizes Walzer on the grounds that his ‘conception of the right of 
collective self-determination—which protects domestic action up to the point of atrocity—is 
in tension with our understanding of the right of self-determination at the individual level’ 
(1996: 17). In other words, he thinks that Walzer’s view of collective self-determination is far 
more unrestricted than his notions of individual self-determination – for instance, if a parent 
‘inflicts an excessive or disproportionate punishment on her child’, then even is she is within 
her legal rights to do so, ‘if the harshness of the punishment exceeds certain limits, others may 
intervene’ (1996: 17). In short, the individual right to self-determination is not ‘unconstrained’ 
in McMahan’s words – so, if the collective right is analogous to the individual right, why 
should it be different?  
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lives of persons is not sufficient to bring a proportionate and necessary 
military action within the purview of the right of national-defense’ (2002: 
131). His argument is that reductive individualists attempt to define 
intervention as just like a case of national defence, having the same end as any 
other case – that of the flourishing lives of the individual people being helped.  
However, he argues that humanitarian intervention is ‘no instance of the 
right of national-defense; it is rather a moral consideration which is in deep 
tension with it’ (2002: 131), since a military intervention in another state can 
be ‘a breach of that state's sovereign rights’ (2002: 131) even if it halts or 
prevents that state’s campaign of murder.  
The assumption in Rodin’s argument is that a state has rights of sovereignty 
which are independent of individual defensive rights, and I would disagree 
with this assumption. A state may not directly possess a right of sovereignty or 
self-determination – if other collectives have a moral duty not to attack a state, 
it is derived from its individual inhabitants’ rights not to be attacked. To speak 
of a state’s ‘sovereign rights’ in the context of an individualist conception of 
collective defence is, I believe, missing the point of reductive individualism. 
Hence, I do not think Rodin’s objection has the force to defeat my argument. 
Under my account, as I will explain in Chapter Four, a state’s actions (in 
oppressing its own citizens) render the oppressed individuals free to delegate 
these rights elsewhere. The right and authority to intervene in their defence 
goes to the new collective to which these people choose to delegate their 
defensive rights, and any other collective entities to which that right and 
authority is later extended. Thus, if the individuals in question have not 
actively delegated their rights of defence to the intervening collective entity, 
then military intervention would seem to be unjustified. 
Since the right of defence is a permission-right, the individual possessing it 
may waive it if she so chooses (for reasons of pacifism, for instance), and if a 
nation or organisation to which she is not affiliated came and defended her 
against her wishes, it seems to me that she would have reason to think they 
had done something impermissible. A collective entity may not presume upon 
the permission of non-members or non-citizens.  
However, it would be equally counter-intuitive to argue that humanitarian 
intervention is never justified, since this might be construed as a mandate for 
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oppressive countries and groups to mistreat individuals’ rights without fear of 
reprisal.  
Of course, this is not what I am saying. It would be impermissible for a third 
party to attempt, by means of war, to rescue threatened citizens from their own 
government without those citizens’ permission, or to presume upon that 
permission, but there is nothing to stop those citizens from granting them 
permission.  
If the beleaguered citizens of an oppressive government issue a general 
appeal for help, then they are extending permission to defend them to any 
country or non-state collective entity which takes it up. Likewise, if they 
appeal to help to a specific country or community (one to which they have 
close ethnic ties, for instance), they are granting permission to defend them 
specifically to that collective.  
Similarly, if a state, community, or an international organisation like the UN 
offers to help and the citizens accept, then they have delegated their right of 
defence to that entity. Requests or appeals for help in defending one’s life are 
one obvious way in which individual rights of defence can be delegated to 
other collective entities. I will explain this more thoroughly in Chapter Four. 
There are, of course, complex issues here, including considerations of how 
many individual people within an oppressed minority need to request help in 
order to delegate their defensive rights to a new collective. An appeal by some 
kind of authority, like the informal leaders of a disenfranchised minority, 
might perhaps be taken as a request by that minority in general, but what of 
cases where no such authority exists, or all that the prospective intervener has 
received is requests for help by ordinary people who are not leaders? What to 
do when the oppressed people have no way of indicating whether they wish an 
intervention in their defence or not? I do not have the space to consider these 
issues as completely as I would like, and I therefore merely note that they are 
difficult questions to answer, which I must leave for a later time.  
 
3iii) The ‘bloodless aggression’ scenario 
 
There remains the issue of a ‘purely political’ threat to a state or collective 
entity (Fabre and Lazar, 2014: 6). As I mentioned, in criticising reductive 
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individualism Rodin criticises rights of collective defence36 which have as 
their end the defence of the members of that collective, by arguing that 
‘bloodless invasion’ (Rodin, 2002: 131), aggressive behaviour against a state 
which does not threaten a single person’s life but only threatens ‘purely 
political’ (Fabre and Lazar, 2014: 6) aspects of statehood, such as a state’s 
territorial integrity, cannot be justified according to such individualist 
accounts, since ‘bloodless invasion’ (Rodin, 2002: 131) does not threaten any 
individual’s life (or flourishing life).  
As I have shown, responses such as Frowe’s do not seem entirely successful 
in defeating Rodin’s objection. Some forms of individualism, such as Fabre’s 
cosmopolitanism, respond by biting the bullet; for instance, Fabre writes that 
‘a pure bloodless aggression – one which is carried out without shedding 
blood and will not lead in the future to dehumanizing rights-violations – may 
not be resisted by killing its perpetrators’ (2014: 114). Her contention, 
however, is that such ‘pure bloodless aggression’ (2014: 114) is extremely 
unlikely to happen in reality, and given this unlikelihood, the individualist (or 
cosmopolitan) position that a collective entity may not resist a bloodless 
invasion does not give us reason to reject it.  
However, under this argument we are still left with the result that, for an 
individualist (or a cosmopolitan), the right of collective defence does not 
extend to situations in which only non-life-threatening interests are violated, 
and however unlikely this is, it is still possible. Therefore, my account does 
not follow this route. Instead, it utilises my slightly different definition of the 
end of individual defensive rights.  
I would suggest that some non-life-threatening interests, those which are 
aspects of a flourishing life, may be a legitimate end of defence. Thus, the fact 
                                                 
36 Rodin’s criticism is specifically aimed at the argument that this kind of right could be 
possessed by states, and he does not here discuss political threats in connection with non-state 
collective entities.  It is, at first glance, difficult to see how this criticism would apply to non-
state collective entities, as they are not states and in most cases have no need of territorial 
integrity.  
However, ‘bloodless’ attacks upon the distinctive identity of a non-state collective entity 
might perhaps be roughly equivalent. In another article, Rodin discusses that the hostile 
takeover of Cadbury’s by Kraft as an example of the destruction of a unique collective identity 
– a ‘bloodless’ attack in that it threatened no individual’s life, but was effectively the conquest 
of one collective entity by another. Therefore, although Rodin refers specifically to the 
defensive rights of states, his objection may also apply to the defensive rights of non-state 
collective entities. I will discuss this example at greater length in Chapter Four. 
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that Rodin’s example of a ‘bloodless invasion’ (2002: 130) does not involve 
the loss of any individual lives unless the invasion is resisted does not 
necessarily mean an individualist account of national defence cannot justify 
resistance. 
So, what interests would a ‘bloodless invasion (Rodin, 2002: 130) threaten? 
Well, the right to ‘self-determination’, as Walzer used it, is often mentioned, 
but since the rights we are concerned with as the end of defence are individual 
rights, then Walzer’s national right of self-determination would not work for 
our purposes. But the individual right of self-determination is unlikely to be 
threatened by a bloodless invasion in some plausible scenarios – Rodin’s 
example of an invasion which aims to annexe a useless piece of land 
belonging to another state, for instance. It is hard to see how this might affect 
one’s ability to choose the course of one’s life, if the bloodless aggressor plans 
to stop at this annexation and not to continue taking territory or resources from 
the invaded country. 
What other aspects of flourishing life might be threatened by the bloodless 
annexation of a piece of land, then? It seems hard to think of any important 
aspects of flourishing life that depend upon the exact shape of a territorial 
border, or state possession of a worthless piece of land.  
However, I would argue that whether or not a bloodless invasion 
immediately threatens aspects of our flourishing lives, some of them are 
threatened indirectly (a mediated threat, if you will). If, as Rodin suggests, we 
should include in our proportionality calculations all those harms that will 
causally result from our actions, including ‘mediated harms’ inflicted by 
others, then we should similarly consider all those threats which causally 
result from the original threat. 
For instance, while the individual right to self-determination is not directly 
threatened by this bloodless invasion, it may be threatened by the lack of 
stability and security brought about by this bloodless invasion. However many 
assurances the invaders give that they will only take that piece of land, that it 
will harm no citizens of the invaded country unless they resist its invasion, it is 
hard to imagine any one being fully convinced by such assurances.  
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This country has, after all, resorted to an unjust and (presumably, given the 
circumstances) illegal invasion to get the piece of land it wants. Are we to 
assume its promises can be trusted?  
And even if they can, what of the international situation? When it is seen see 
that the invaded country is unwilling to defend its assets if a promise not to 
harm any of its citizens is made, other invaders are likely to follow suit, and 
attempt to take what resources they want from this country in the same way. 
Ultimately, to submit to this bloodless invasion is to create an atmosphere of 
fear, uncertainty and instability within the invaded country that is more than 
likely to interfere with their ability to lead flourishing lives.  
The same can be said with regards to the bloodless ‘conquest’ of a non-state 
collective entity. In addition, we must factor in the long-term effects upon a 
person’s ability (or inclination) to lead a flourishing life which might result 
from forcibly losing or changing a basic part of their identity such as their 
nationality, religion or membership of some other equally important 
community. Although, as I will explain later on, I do not believe that in 
Rodin’s example, the ‘conquest’ of Cadbury’s actually threatened sufficient 
aspects of the fundamental rights of its workers, even considering indirect or 
mediated harms to these individuals, to make its defence a just cause for war – 
membership of Cadbury’s rather than Kraft does not seem to be a sufficiently 
basic part of an individual’s identity. However, it is plausible that the 
‘conquest’ of a non-state entity far more integral to the identities and 
flourishing lives of its members, might perhaps do so37.  
For instance, if rather than embarking upon genocide the Nazis had 
contented themselves with passing laws banning the Jewish religion from 
being practised within Germany, this might perhaps have constituted an attack 
upon the distinctive collective identity of the Jewish community; and one with 
far more serious consequences for the individuals involved than the loss of 
Cadbury’s would have had for Cadbury’s workers – consequences potentially 
                                                 
37 Although some non-state collectives, like churches or religious communities, might not be 
immediately capable of accepting and exercising delegated individual defensive rights – if this 
is the case, their members may adapt them so that they become capable, or find a more 
suitable collective entity to defend their community from ‘conquest’. I will expand on this in 
Chapter Four. 
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approaching the amount of uncertainty, fear, confusion and loss of identity 
experienced by the inhabitants of a conquered country. 
Of course, just as mediated harms are to be discounted against in the 
proportionality calculation according to Rodin, the fact that this threat is 
mediated has an impact on how far war can be justified in response to it. 
Direct threats to flourishing lives would be weighted far more heavily than 
indirect ones38.  
The indirect threat would have to be much greater than it would if it were a 
direct threat, and the proportionality calculation would obviously have to take 
into account how likely it is, given the international situation at the time, that 
submitting to the bloodless invasion would lead to escalation, subsequent 
demands, further invasions or loss of rights, as this is bound to impact upon 
the amount of fear and tension to which the inhabitants of a country, or 
members of a non-state community,  are subjected.  
Basically, the proportionality calculation needs to take into account whether 
this indirect impact upon the flourishing lives of the inhabitants of the invaded 
country would be great enough to outweigh the direct threats to flourishing 
lives that would occur if the bloodless invasion were resisted, and since the 
former is only indirect or ‘mediated’, it seems only fair that it be discounted 
against in the proportionality calculation. Nevertheless, my account would in 
some circumstances justify a state’s right to defend its citizens against the 
threat posed by bloodless invasion – or the similar right of a non-state 
collective entity, like a religious community, depending upon whether this 
collective entity’s loss or compromise would have a large enough indirect 
impact upon the flourishing lives of its members.  
 
                                                 
38 In arguing that indirect as well as direct threats to the flourishing lives of individuals may be 
counted as legitimate ends of defence, albeit discounted against, it might be objected that I am 
opening myself up to the suggestion that indirect or mediated threats which are due to 
aggressive acts short of attempted conquest may also be resisted with force. I would say that 
this is a possibility, though only when the threat is deliberate on the part of the aggressor (if 
not, then the last resort criterion demands we try alerting the aggressor to the existence of that 
threat before resorting to war, and this will either end the threat or cause it to become 
deliberate). For instance, if a nation or terrorist group deliberately and maliciously cuts off all 
the supplies of medicine going into a plague-ridden country, although this aggressive act 
(arguably) does not directly cause the deaths of the sick people, if the indirect threat to their 
lives is great enough, I believe the plague-ridden country is justified in construing this as an 
attack and using military force to compel the aggressor to allow the medicines through.  
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4: Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, I attempted to develop my account of the individual right to 
defence into an account of collective defence, using the argument that 
individual defensive rights can be delegated to a collective entity – resulting in 
a collective right to exercise these delegated individual defensive rights. I then 
attempted to explain what kinds of just causes for war would exist, based upon 
this kind of right. 
Before I move on to fully explain the concept of the delegation of rights, I 
must first explain the implications of my account for the war rights of 
combatants, and develop an asymmetric account of the rights of just and 
unjust combatants which nevertheless allows unjust combatants some rights 
during wartime, most importantly the right of individual self-defence.  
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Chapter Three: The Rights and Liabilities of 
Combatants: A Version of the Moral Inequality Thesis 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In order to create a workable account of just cause based upon my 
individualist account of collective defence, I must first demonstrate where this 
account would stand upon the question of the moral equality or inequality of 
combatants. 
As I mentioned earlier, collectivists like Walzer often argue that just and 
unjust combatants may both be permissibly attacked by enemy combatants, as 
there is no difference between just and unjust combatants in terms of liability, 
despite the different positions they are in (morally speaking) – namely, the just 
combatants are engaged in an activity which is justified and permissible, while 
the unjust combatants are engaged in an activity which is unjustified and 
impermissible (which can surely be accepted whether or not the unjust 
combatants themselves are morally responsible for so acting).  
   Adam Roberts gives a practical argument for the moral equality of 
combatants (often referred to as ‘MEC’) which he describes as the ‘principle 
of equal application’ or ‘the principle that the laws of war apply equally to all 
belligerent parties in an international armed conflict, irrespective of the 
question of how the war began or the relative justice of the causes involved’ 
(2008: 226). He defends this thesis for reasons that range from the historical, 
meaning the ‘long and distinguished tradition of thought which views the laws 
of war as applicable to both sides in a war’ (2008: 232) (he points to such 
thinkers as Rousseau, who argued that unjust combatants are no more or less 
liable than just combatants), to the practical, such as ‘the need for a uniform 
and universally accepted set of rules’ (2008: 234) (since ‘having different 
rules applying to, or applied by, different belligerent parties has long been 
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seen as a recipe for chaos’ (2008: 234)) and the ‘difficulty of agreeing which 
side is more justified in resort to force’ (2008: 230).  
   Larry May points out, similarly, that ‘One of the main practical reasons for 
the ‘moral equality of soldiers’ is that it is very hard for theorists, writing after 
the fact, to determine whether a war was waged for a just cause or not’ (2007: 
29) – primarily because even if a just cause exists, the goal of the belligerent 
parties involved may have been something else entirely. And if the task is so 
difficult for theorists working in relatively calm conditions, with the benefit of 
hindsight, then ‘we cannot reasonably expect soldiers during wartime to make 
such a determination’ (2007: 30). Christopher Kutz also argues (though less 
wholeheartedly) in favour of the equality thesis, which he refers to as the 
‘Symmetry principle’ (2008: 69) – he concedes that there is a ‘pragmatic case 
for symmetry’, even though it ‘leaves a bad taste in the philosophical mouth’ 
(2008: 70).  
However, practical considerations in favour of MEC are not sufficient in 
themselves to supply a philosophical case for it. In addition, it is always 
possible to offer practical objections to practical considerations – Coates, for 
instance, suggests Kutz would be wrong in thinking that asymmetry ‘must 
undermine the moral restraint of war’ (2008: 177), because in fact, as Rodin 
and Shue put it, ‘in bello restraint will stem from appropriately satisfying the 
ad bellum condition of right intention which he views as a disposition of 
humanity and solidarity with the enemy’ (2008: 17). The problem is that, 
without actually testing both theories in the field, there is no way of knowing 
which is correct about whether or not restraint in war would survive the loss of 
the symmetry thesis. I will therefore be focussing on theoretical, rather than 
practical, arguments in favour of MEC. 
The inequality or ‘asymmetry’ (Kutz, 2008: 86) thesis, championed by 
individualist theorists like McMahan and Fabre, takes the view that, ‘it is 
morally wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause’ 
(McMahan, 2009: 6), because while unjust combatants are liable to attack 
(since their participation in an unjust war means they have ‘forfeited their right 
against attack’ (2009: 16)), just combatants are not liable (through 
participating in a just war, they do not forfeit this right). So, in McMahan’s 
words, just combatants are ‘illegitimate targets’ and ‘To attack them is 
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indiscriminate’ (2009: 16). Thus, unjust combatants are, according to this 
argument, unable to fulfil jus in bello, since just combatants are not liable to 
attack (unless they render themselves liable by violating jus in bello). 
I will be defending a thesis which admits the moral inequality of combatants, 
but which differs from accounts like McMahan’s in that it allows unjust 
combatants to retain the right of individual self-defence. To do so, I will draw 
upon the distinction between strong and weak liability which I developed in 
Chapter One, and show how this applies to combatants in a wartime situation. 
I will develop two separate but equally important arguments; a) the argument 
that most unjust combatants are under duress or non-culpably ignorant that 
their war is unjust (or both), and that since this duress and non-culpable 
ignorance are sufficiently strong moral excuses to excuse unjust combatants 
from moral responsibility for their actions as unjust combatants, they are only 
weakly liable to attack; and b) the argument that distinguishing the smaller 
number of unjust combatants who may be morally responsible (and hence 
strongly liable) from the weakly liable majority is usually impossible. I will 
conclude from these arguments that we should assume, in the absence of clear 
proof, that all unjust combatants are weakly liable, and hence retain their 
individual defensive rights and are justified in defending their own lives in 
battle.  
Therefore, in this chapter I will strengthen the account of just cause based 
upon my individualist account of the collective right of defence, by exploring 
the way in which this account responds to the issue of combatants’ war rights. 
However, in order to demonstrate the place my moral inequality argument 
holds within the wider just war theory, it is first necessary to briefly outline 
the moral equality and inequality theses, and explain some of the other 
arguments for each position. Therefore, I now turn to the most plausible of the 
remaining arguments in favour of MEC. 
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1: The Arguments for the Moral Equality of Combatants 
 
 
Walzer suggests that combatants on both sides of a conflict, be they just or 
unjust combatants, gain exactly the same set of rights and duties (which he 
termed ‘war rights’ (1977: 136)), and are subject to exactly the same liability 
to attack, because of ‘the mere fact that they are there’ (1977: 35). In his view, 
all soldiers ‘gain war rights as combatants…but can now be attacked and 
killed at will by their enemies’, and they do so ‘Simply by fighting’ (1977: 
136), even when they have not freely chosen to fight.  
Indeed, the source of MEC, in Walzer’s view, is that no soldier has truly 
made a free choice to fight. Ryan gives the example of two ‘slave gladiators’ 
forced by their masters to fight to the death – each gladiator ‘is compelled to 
attack the other, and both are at liberty to kill in self-defence’ (2008: 139). 
Walzer’s view would suggest opposing soldiers are relevantly similar to these 
gladiators. In C. A. J. Coady’s words, this is the view that ‘Opposing soldiers 
are moral equals…because they are in the grip of a shared servitude: they are 
not responsible for the war they wage’ (2008: 159). Paul Christopher similarly 
argued that individual soldiers ‘can never be responsible for the crime of war, 
qua soldiers’ (1994: 96). 
I have already explained various cogent objections to this argument, such as 
McMahan’s objection that the various forms of coercion that a state may bring 
to bear upon potential soldiers, such as legal coercion, or more subtle 
manipulation through means of propaganda, are not justifications for an 
individual soldier to fight in an unjust war39, so I will not go over them again. I 
will instead move on to explore other arguments in favour of MEC. 
 
1i) The case for the moral equality thesis 
 
                                                 
39 In light of the arguments I intend to make later in this chapter, I must add that while I accept 
that such coercion does not justify an unjust combatant’s actions, I disagree with McMahan’s 
assertion that unjust combatants are therefore fully liable to attack – they may, for instance, 
perform morally impermissible actions but lack moral responsibility for those actions, much 
like the Innocent Attacker. However, I believe that McMahan’s argument nevertheless 
provides a successful counter-argument to Walzer’s moral equality thesis. 
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One argument in favour of a Walzerian understanding of the rights of 
combatants is advanced by Yitzhak Benbaji, which he describes as a ‘nuanced 
contractarianism’ (2011: 47). According to contractarianism, Benbaji suggests, 
soldiers on both sides of a conflict freely enter into a relationship governed by 
its own rules – combatants are ‘morally equal (at the level of rights) because 
of the contractual relations between them’ (2011: 45).  
The ‘acceptance…by just combatants’ of this special relationship between 
soldiers, or the ‘traditional war convention, in general, and the equality of all 
soldiers in particular’, Benbaji suggests, ‘frees their enemies from the duty not 
to attack them within a war of aggression’ (2008: 489). This is much the same 
as the position taken by such advocates of the moral equality thesis as Walzer 
and Hurka.  
Benbaji, however, makes the further point that ‘soldiers’ tacit acceptance of 
their status is necessary but insufficient for establishing moral symmetry 
between them’ (2011: 45). It becomes sufficient, Benbaji argues, ‘if and only 
if the symmetrical rules that define soldiery codify a fair and mutually 
beneficial contract among states of the kind that Rawls refers to as ‘decent’’ 
(2011: 45).  
In an earlier paper, Benbaji describes this contract between states as ‘an 
agreed system of rules to govern their future wars, prior to any armed conflict 
between them’ (2009: 599), a system which includes duties of obedience on 
the part of soldiers, since ‘the obedience of soldiers is crucial for the efficiency 
of the national defence which armies provide’ (2009: 599), and enforceability 
– the rules must be ‘enforceable by the warring parties during the war’ (2009: 
600), as well as the assumption of a ‘right to wage defensive wars’ (2009: 
599) on the part of states. 
Benbaji suggests that the state for which the soldiers in question agree to 
fight (he assumes it will be a state) must subscribe to a system of jus in bello 
rules which is ‘mutually beneficial’, meaning that ‘The outcome of following 
a symmetrical code will be better to each relevant party (i.e., individuals and 
decent states)…than the outcome of following an asymmetrical code’, and 
‘fair’ in the sense that ‘The symmetrical jus in bello code is not dictated by, 
nor does it create or maintain, unfair power or welfare inequalities among 
states or individuals’ (2011: 46). If these two propositions are true, and the 
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soldiers consent to these altered rights through their ‘tacit acceptance of their 
status’ as soldiers (2011: 45), they ‘lose their moral claim against being 
unjustly attacked by other soldiers in the course of war’ (2011: 46). 
In criticising contractarianism, McMahan attacks the proposition that the 
symmetrical rights of combatants are mutually beneficial, suggesting, in 
Benbaji’s words, that ‘a regime under which soldiers have no legal right to 
participate in a war of aggression is better for decent states, in terms of 
expected welfare and rights fulfilment, than a regime which allows obedience’ 
(2011: 47). In addition, McMahan suggests that the former regime has the 
advantage of ‘making it more difficult for states to initiate unjust wars’ 
(McMahan, 2011: 146). 
McMahan also argues against the claim that combatants, or at least just 
combatants, lose their rights not to be attacked. He suggests, for instance, that 
even if Benbaji ‘is right that soldiers effectively waive rights they would retain 
if they fought as individuals’, then unjust combatants who ‘invade a person’s 
state’ have, ‘through their wrongful action…compelled him to waive his right 
that they not kill him’ (McMahan, 2011: 147), or ‘wrongfully exploited his 
earlier waiver’ (McMahan, 2011: 147) if he joined the army prior to their 
invasion. In short, these unjust combatants ‘have wronged him by having 
wrongfully created the conditions in which it became permissible for them to 
kill him’ (McMahan, 2011: 147). 
Benbaji attempts to defend his nuanced contractarian account against some 
of McMahan’s criticisms, but I do not believe he is entirely successful, 
particularly with regards to McMahan’s argument that just combatants do not 
automatically lose or waive their rights not to be attacked simply by enlisting 
as soldiers. I do not have the space to analyse Benbaji’s response to McMahan 
here, but I have already discussed some of McMahan’s arguments, and will 
shortly consider the strengths and weaknesses of his position more thoroughly. 
In addition, I believe there is another problem with Benbaji’s argument. In 
describing this contract which ‘codifies’ the symmetrical rules and rights of 
combatants as existing between ‘states of the kind that Rawls refers to as 
‘decent’’ (2011: 45), he implies that no such ‘fair and mutually beneficial 
contract’ (2011: 45) exists between the other states; those which Rawls would 
not have so described.  
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Benbaji writes that ‘Absent contractual relations among them, combatants 
are under a duty to make sure that any violent action that they exercise is just’ 
(2011: 46). They also ‘lack the moral power to undertake a duty of obedience 
to their state, whereby they offer themselves as instruments for whatever wars 
the state chooses’ (2011: 46-7). This suggests that unless a combatant can 
‘reasonably believe’ (2011: 47) that he fights for a state which belongs to this 
‘fair and mutually beneficial’ international contract, he is in precisely the 
situation that McMahan suggests all combatants are in; he must, morally, 
determine whether he is fighting a just war, as if not, his enemies may not be 
liable to attack. 
As with Rawls’ argument, Benbaji’s account may not result in symmetrical 
combatant rights, but another kind of asymmetry. Combatants who fight both 
for and against states which are part of this contract would have symmetrical 
liability. On the other hand, combatants fighting for states which are clearly 
not part of such a contract (which are not members of the UN, for example) 
may, if their war is unjust, attack non-liable combatants, because the 
relationship of mutual consent to waive their rights not to be attacked does not 
exist between them.  
And it gets trickier: when these combatants wage a just war, their enemies 
may make themselves liable to attack as McMahan suggests all unjust 
combatants do. But what of the just combatants? If they are not part of the 
aforementioned contract, how can Benbaji claim they are liable to attack? 
They have neither agreed to waive their rights as part of a fair and mutually 
beneficial contract, nor done anything else to render themselves liable.  
Hence, not only does Benbaji’s argument seem to collapse back into partial 
asymmetry, but it results in the slightly counter-intuitive result that combatants 
fighting a defensive war on behalf of a ‘non-decent’ state are illegitimate 
targets of attack, while combatants fighting a defensive war on behalf of a 
decent state are liable to attack.  
However, Benbaji’s defence of the symmetry argument does make some 
plausible points; in particular, the suggestion that ‘both sides lose their right 
not to be attacked by each other, but retain their right of self-defence’ (2007: 
559).  
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Dan Zupan suggests that another possible argument in favour of the moral 
equality thesis might be the ordinary soldier’s ‘invincible ignorance’ (Zupan, 
2008: 217). He makes the point that soldiers on the front line are often, if not 
always, less informed about the true causes of the war than their leaders or 
governments.  
This may be as a result of deliberate manipulation or misinformation by 
those leaders or governments, the use of propaganda painting an aggressive 
war as a defensive war and so on; or it may be because no individual who is 
not a top-level member of an organisation like a government has all the 
information available (assuming the top-level members do). The result is that 
individual combatants may not have the crucial pieces of information which 
would allow them to see that the war they fight is unjust.  
Zupan admits that many advocates of the inequality thesis would argue that 
in practice, ‘soldiers rarely are in such a position of ignorance’ (Zupan, 2008: 
218). Zupan responds by suggesting that an individual soldier’s ‘actual ability 
to know in the relevant sense is so constrained…that, in theory, MEC is the 
only reasonable position to adopt’ (2008: 218). This is because, once he 
enlists, a soldier becomes subject to what Zupan calls ‘contractual ignorance’; 
ignorance ‘that follows from an appropriate acceptance of one’s station and 
the obligations that stem from it’ (2008: 223).  
In short, it would be impossible to be a soldier if one were constantly 
questioning one’s actions and their morality. Naturally, Zupan logically 
suggests, this does not mean ‘a complete surrender of moral autonomy’, but 
rather ‘an initial benefit of the doubt to the government’ (2008: 223). For 
instance, Zupan writes that ‘An essential feature of the logic of community is 
that we relinquish our right to exercise our individual will at every interval’ – 
unless, of course, ‘there is good reason [to believe] that trust has been 
violated’ (2008: 223).  
A soldier who only thinks the war is unjust may well continue to serve, due 
to ‘a recognition of his or her own fallibility’ and a recognition that the 
government, possessing more information than the average private individual, 
has probably reached a more informed, more accurate assessment of the 
situation. In Zupan’s words, ‘He thinks the war is unjust, but he knows he 
could be mistaken’ (2008: 224). Only when ‘a point of certainty’ (2008: 224) 
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has been reached does this ‘benefit of the doubt’ (2008: 223) mean that the 
soldier must not continue to serve. 
What this seems to amount to is an attempt, on Zupan’s part, to define unjust 
combatants as Innocent Attackers. Like the drugged man in Thompson’s 
example, they are non-culpably unaware that they pose an unjust threat 
(through their belief that they pose a just one).  
Whilst I agree both that Innocent Attackers are liable to defensive action by 
their victims, and that they are not morally responsible for their actions, and I 
conclude that they are only weakly liable, and may permissibly engage in 
counter-defence, that does not mean (as I will explain shortly) that they and 
just combatants have symmetrical war rights.  
It is my belief that an Innocent Attacker’s lack of moral responsibility is an 
excuse for his fighting as an unjust combatant, not a justification. While my 
definition of weak liability is compatible with the Innocent Attacker’s non-
culpable commission of an impermissible action, it seems to me that Zupan 
would need to go further, and say that the Innocent Attacker and his victim (or 
an unjust combatant and the just combatant he attacks) both act permissibly, in 
order to show that their ignorance makes them morally equal.  
Zupan’s actual argument appears closest to the thesis that the actions of 
unjust combatants are excused rather than permissible. This presents problems 
for any attempt to build a justification for equal war rights upon his argument, 
because it is hard to justify giving equal war rights to unjust combatants when 
they are acting impermissibly (albeit excusably). I will expand on the reasons 
why in the next section. 
However, even if Zupan were to say that the actions of unjust combatants on 
the front line are not merely excusable but permissible, it would be 
problematic. The soldiers would, it seems, be in the position of permissibly 
performing an impermissible act, namely participating in the unjustified 
aggressive attack upon the members of another collective. Therefore, although 
it makes some interesting points, I do not believe that Zupan’s argument for 
MEC is wholly convincing. 
 
1ii) Further arguments for the moral equality thesis 
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Cheyney Ryan suggests that a ‘more tenable’ way to understand the moral 
equality thesis, and in particular Walzer’s arguments for that thesis, might be 
to understand MEC ‘as part of the normative system of state sovereignty that 
coalesced in the nineteenth century’ or the ‘sovereignty system’ (2008: 133). 
Under this system, the equal rights of soldiers are ‘grounded in the practice of 
conscription’ (2008: 133). Ryan’s argument is, briefly, that this sovereignty 
system advocates and maintains the ‘moral equality of states’, which includes 
an equal ‘right to generate soldiers’ (Ryan, 2008: 141).  
If this equal right exists, it follows that combatants have an ‘obligation…to 
fight whether or not the war is just’ (Ryan, 2008: 144), because their state has 
the right to compel them to do so – in Ryan’s words, ‘they are called to fight’ 
(2008: 144). And if all combatants have such an obligation, then they ‘all are 
victims of the sovereignty system’ (Ryan, 2008: 145) – they have equal moral 
status (and thus equal war rights) as non-voluntary combatants. 
However, as Ryan points out, this argument stands or falls on whether or not 
one accepts the legitimacy of this sovereignty system. Ryan examines and 
attacks one possible response to this system. He argues that the traditional 
sovereignty system is ‘premised on a morally immature military’, in which 
‘responsibility was shifted onto an abstraction’ – namely, the state – which 
means that ‘no real persons were responsible’ (2008: 148). Zupan’s argument 
that the ‘invincible ignorance’ (2008: 218) of soldiers absolves them of 
responsibility for their actions as unjust combatants runs along similar lines. 
As Ryan points out, there have been many attempts to argue that there should 
be ‘a more morally mature military’ (Ryan, 2008: 148) – a military which 
holds soldiers ‘accountable for the wars they fight’ (2008: 148).  
Coady, similarly, describes the traditional Walzerian account of the moral 
status of combatants as suggesting that ‘membership in the political 
community entails in certain circumstances an obligation to die for the state’ 
(2008b: 228), and objects that ‘adherence to just war theory makes it difficult 
to maintain an unqualified commitment to the obligation’ (2008b: 228) – 
pointing out that conscientious objectors ‘often rely upon a just war 
perspective to legitimate their refusal of service’ (2008b: 228). In short, an 
obligation requiring soldiers to deny their own understanding of whether a 
particular war is justified, ignores their status as moral beings.  
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This suggests that soldiers have, or should have, the authority to refuse to 
fight in wars they consider unjust. However, this is the point at which Ryan 
attacks this view. He suggests that if individual combatants are ‘answerable 
for doing what they should not do’, they must be ‘equally answerable for not 
doing what they should do’ (Ryan, 2008: 148).  
In short, a soldier’s right or obligation to refuse to fight unjust wars even if 
they are ordered to do so, should also translate into a right or obligation to 
‘initiate a war they regard as just – [even] when this too means ignoring their 
government’s orders’ (2008: 148). He refers to this as the ‘Sovereignty 
Symmetry Problem’ (2008: 148). 
Clearly, the suggestion that individual combatants have a right or even an 
obligation to initiate just wars as well as refuse to fight unjust ones is counter-
intuitive. But, does this necessarily commit us to rejecting McMahan’s 
concept of an obligation not to fight unjust wars, or to the equality thesis? 
Ryan suggests that there are possible responses, including the interesting 
response that we might be able to ‘bite the bullet…and grant both obligations, 
the obligation to refuse and the obligation to initiate’ (2008: 150).  
This would mean, in Ryan’s words, that ‘the age of state sovereignty is past’ 
(2008: 150) – that as soldiers become ‘increasingly private contractors for 
hire’, the ultimate choice as to which wars to fight in, who to fight for, and the 
moral responsibility for those choices, is left to them.  
However, as Coady points out, this may not be quite as counter-intuitive a 
possibility as it first appears to be, since the wars soldiers are permitted to 
initiate will not be those with only a just cause, but just wars, which satisfy all 
the conditions of jus ad bellum, and he suggests that it would be ‘very 
difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for private military ventures to satisfy 
these conditions’ (2008: 161). 
I do not agree with the view that soldiers have both a right to refuse to fight 
and a right to initiate a war, since I believe that just combatants’ war rights40 
derive from the individual defensive rights delegated to their collective, which 
authorises them to act as its agents in this matter.  
                                                 
40 By this, I mean the rights to do what they must to win the war, up to and including killing 
enemy combatants who do not yet pose an individual threat to them (excluding jus in bello 
violations, of course). Their right to defend themselves is, I believe, an individual right, and so 
is not derived in the same way. 
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However, I concede that the charge of ‘moral immaturity’ Ryan levels 
against the military mindset accepted by the moral equality thesis is a valid, 
and a troubling, one. The idea that combatants are morally permitted, if not 
actually encouraged, to suspend their judgement of the justice of the war they 
are fighting until or unless the injustice of that war becomes so obvious that 
they reach, in Zupan’s words ‘a point of certainty’ (2008: 224) (a hard thing to 
reach in this uncertain world, so the war’s injustice would presumably have to 
be very obvious), is not a particularly attractive view of the military.  
Uwe Steinhoff offers another interesting argument in favour of a broadly 
symmetrical approach to combatant rights. He suggests that McMahan is 
‘right in principle’ (2008: 220) that in targeting just combatants, unjust 
combatants are ‘deliberately targeting and killing innocent people’ (2012: 
340), but that it does not follow that only unjust combatants are liable to be 
killed in battle or that only just combatants have the liberty-right to attack 
enemy combatants.  
The reason for this, Steinhoff argues, is that ‘in many, if not most modern 
wars ‘‘just’’ soldiers do kill innocent and non-threatening people or non-
innocently contribute to their being killed’ (2012: 341), through contributing 
to collateral damage (or, as Steinhoff calls it, ‘concomitant slaughter’ (2012: 
341). Steinhoff also suggests that even if they do not themselves kill innocent 
people or contribute to their deaths, in most wars they at least pose a threat to 
them’ (2008: 221).  
Most soldiers are probably not directly responsible for ‘concomitant 
slaughter’, but Steinhoff suggests that if they participate or contribute in a 
guilty manner, they can still be ‘held liable’ (2012: 348). For instance, they 
may ‘participate in collective actions’ that cost non-combatant lives, for 
instance ‘maintaining the weaponry, supplying ammunition and marking 
targets during the war’ (2012: 348); or they may contribute by delivering or 
supplying weaponry to the army ‘full well knowing that it would be used for 
the unjust collective actions of the war’ (2012: 349). 
For this reason, Steinhoff convincingly argues, these combatants are not 
‘innocent in the relevant sense (namely in the sense of not wronging others)’ 
(2012: 341), and thus they are liable to attack under Steinhoff’s definition of 
liability, which I explained in Chapter One. It is closest to my account of weak 
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liability, and this argument would perhaps therefore fit with that account – if 
just combatants are causally responsible for the deaths or threats to ‘innocent 
people’ (Steinhoff, 2008: 221), then we can grant that this would make them 
weakly liable. I concede that both the participation and ‘non-participatory 
guilty contribution’ (2012: 348) that Steinhoff describes, would constitute 
sufficient causal responsibility for weak liability. 
Steinhoff also argues, contra McMahan, that the fact that just combatants’ 
actions are justified, even when they cause collateral damage, does not ‘defeat 
liability’ (2012: 358). He argues that ‘the claim that justification defeats 
liability to defensive killing is ad hoc’ (2012: 359), and points out that in 
McMahan’s example (originally Feinberg’s) of a hiker who breaks into an 
empty cabin during a snowstorm and burns the furniture inside to save his life, 
the hiker is still liable to pay compensation to the cabin’s owners, even though 
his actions were justified (and the owners would not have a right of defence 
against his incursion). Some form of liability, it seems, can even be incurred 
by justified actions.  
This, as Steinhoff admits, does not result in a complete moral equality thesis. 
He writes that Mahan’s argument shows ‘it is not true that in all wars the 
combatants on both sides have the same liberty-right to kill enemy 
combatants, provided they abide by the traditional jus in bello restrictions’ 
(2012b: 36). In short, it is possible for just combatants to fight a war in which 
they neither harm nor pose a threat to the non-liable (a war free from collateral 
damage), and in such a war, the just combatants would under Steinhoff’s view 
not be liable to attack by the unjust combatants, leading to asymmetrical war 
rights. However, it is Steinhoff’s contention that this ‘has little relevance’ for 
‘many, if not most, modern wars’ (2012b: 36), because most wars do, in fact, 
involve inflicting some harm to the non-liable, on both sides. 
I think that Steinhoff’s arguments make some very interesting points. In 
particular, I agree with Steinhoff that it is possible to become liable to attack 
(or at least, weakly liable) even when one’s actions are justified. For example, 
I would argue that the victim in the Innocent Threat scenario is justified in 
trying to kill the Innocent Threat, and nevertheless, she also becomes weakly 
liable to defensive attack by the Innocent Threat (as weak liability is 
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symmetrical). However, I do not believe that Steinhoff has defeated McMahan 
as thoroughly as he seems to think. 
His argument raises the question of what defensive actions these just 
combatants make themselves liable to – and I believe they are only liable to 
action taken to prevent the non-combatant deaths that would result from their 
actions. Let me explain. 
If the combatants in question are just combatants, and their collective actions 
aimed at winning the war are thus justified, then surely the only defensive 
actions which the unjust combatants would be morally allowed to take would 
be actions to defend any non-combatants threatened by a particular military 
tactic. The liability that results from these specific actions which cost non-
combatant lives is a specific liability. I do not think, as Steinhoff appears to, 
that it is a blanket liability that renders them liable to any attacks whatsoever. 
That would only be so if they were unjust combatants, who lacked justification 
for fighting at all and were thus liable to any defensive attack that aimed to 
stop them from doing so. 
So, unjust combatants would be justified in shooting down a bomber 
planning to drop his bombs on a site which would result in non-combatant 
casualties, but not in shooting a bomber whose plan to drop his bombs on a 
military compound was reasonably certain to kill only liable unjust 
combatants.  
Not only does this result in unnecessary complications – the unjust 
combatants cannot always be reasonably expected to know or guess whether 
their enemies’ current action will at some point cost non-combatant lives 
(though sometimes it will be obvious) – but it also results in far less liability 
for just combatants than Steinhoff would have us think. Steinhoff may be right 
in saying that most wars involve collateral damage at some stage, but this 
collateral damage is not inflicted by every military encounter – far from it. 
For this reason, it seems to me that Steinhoff’s argument does not succeed in 
proving that ‘in most wars…there is the kind of moral equality of combatants 
that is at issue here’ (2008: 220). His argument, in fact, lapses back into a 
moral inequality thesis. This does not necessarily mean that all the points he 
makes are implausible.  However, I do think that he is not entirely successful 
in defending an effective moral equality for combatants. 
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Although some interesting practical arguments for the equality thesis are put 
forward by Kutz and Roberts, there are, as we have seen, problems with such 
theoretical arguments for the equality thesis as Zupan’s and Ryan’s. Other just 
war theorists, such as Coady and McMahan, have criticised such attempts to 
argue that all individual combatants should have the same basic combatant 
rights, whether they are just or unjust combatants.  
For instance, Coady argues that the question of ‘What moral responsibility 
ordinary soldiers and officers should bear for fighting in war…cannot simply 
be dodged in the way suggested by the moral equality thesis’ (2008: 161). He 
thinks we cannot avoid the issue that there seems to be some kind of moral 
distinction between a soldier who defends his people against unjustified attack 
(the paradigmatic just combatant), and a soldier who fights in an unjust war, 
believes or suspects that it is an unjust war and continues anyway.  
This is the heart of the argument that just and unjust combatants have 
differing rights and different liability to attack. Therefore, I will now move on 
to examine the arguments in favour of the moral inequality of soldiers. 
 
 
2: The Case for the Moral Inequality of Combatants 
 
 
One of the most significant advocates of the moral inequality thesis is 
McMahan. He argues that just and unjust combatants are not, in fact, morally 
equal (in the sense of being subject to the same rights and liability) because 
the just combatants are not liable to attack, not being morally responsible for 
the relevant threat (you will recall that McMahan’s account of liability argues 
that ‘the criterion of liability to defensive killing is moral responsibility, 
through action that lacks objective justification, for a threat of unjust harm to 
others’ (McMahan, 2005: 394)).  
Let us for a moment leave aside the differences between McMahan’s 
account of liability and my own, and consider his argument for the moral 
inequality of combatants.  
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2i) McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality thesis 
 
If we accept that just combatants are not liable to attack, since their actions 
as combatants are morally permissible, then it seems impossible for unjust 
combatants to satisfy the jus in bello requirement of discrimination. McMahan 
argues that ‘to attack just combatants is to attack people who are innocent in 
the generic sense: people who…are not liable to attack’ and that just 
combatants ‘are therefore illegitimate targets. To attack them is 
indiscriminate’ (2009: 16). Unjust combatants, by contrast, are morally 
responsible for their part of the unjust threat their army poses to the 
combatants and civilians of the justly fighting country. 
Of course, as McMahan goes on to say, this does not mean just combatants 
are always ‘illegitimate targets’ (2009: 16). There are, in his view, two ways in 
which they can become liable to attack – firstly, by ‘attacking innocent 
civilians intentionally in the absence of a lesser-evil justification’41, and 
secondly, by ‘inflicting unnecessary or disproportionate harm on innocent 
civilians as a foreseeable side effect of action intended to destroy military 
targets’ (2009: 41); in short, by breaking the jus in bello rules of 
discrimination and proportionality.  
However, if the just combatants threaten noncombatants with ‘harm to 
which they [the non-combatants] are not liable but [which is inflicted] via 
action that is objectively justified’ (2009: 41), then defence against this harm, 
even by the non-combatants themselves, is still indiscriminate, ‘in that the just 
combatants are not in fact liable to attack, even in self-defense by innocent 
people’ (2009: 42). This, McMahan claims, is ‘because the action that makes 
them responsible for the threat to innocent people is morally justified’ (2009: 
42).  
                                                 
41 McMahan accepts that there exists ‘another form of moral justification’ for killing, which 
‘appeals to the moral necessity of averting some terrible catastrophe’ (2008: 23) – in short, an 
overriding consequentialist principle that justifies killing because it is the lesser of two evils, 
even if the victims are not liable. He argues, however, that this justification ‘is restricted to 
cases in which the killing of the innocent is necessary to avert an outcome that would be very 
significantly worse, from an impartial point of view’ (2008: 23), and that it would, practically 
speaking, hardly ever justify unjust combatants in killing non-liable just combatants, since 
only very ‘rare wars’ (McMahan, 2008: 24) would result in a situation in which killing just 
combatants would be the lesser of two evils. 
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This is one aspect of McMahan’s moral inequality account which makes me 
rather uncomfortable, and I think it is a definite advantage of my version of 
the moral inequality thesis that it does not render it impermissible for either 
combatants or non-combatants to defend themselves against harm to which 
they are not liable. 
So, under McMahan’s account, just combatants are, with these exceptions, 
always illegitimate targets, meaning that unjust combatants, in fighting at all, 
fail to satisfy the discrimination rule even if they only target enemy 
combatants.  
What this means is that while just combatants (provided they obey jus in 
bello) may fight in individual self-defence, and to fulfil their just cause, unjust 
combatants are morally prohibited from fighting either to promote their unjust 
cause or to defend themselves or their comrades against attack, since being 
liable to that attack they have, under McMahan’s definition of liability, lost the 
right to defend themselves from this justified attack.  
For this reason, only just combatants have the right to kill enemy 
combatants, only unjust combatants are liable to be killed in war, and all 
potential unjust combatants have, according to McMahan, a moral duty to 
refuse to fight in wars which they consider, or even suspect, lack a just cause; 
though, for ‘pragmatic’ reasons, the do not have a legal duty to do likewise 
(2008: 29). In McMahan’s view, the morality of war and the ‘law of war’ are, 
and should be ‘substantially divergent’ (2008: 19). 
I have already outlined various cogent and interesting objections to 
McMahan’s argument that just and unjust combatants are subject to different 
rights and liabilities, such as Hurka’s objection to McMahan’s suggestion that 
liability to attack applies ‘not just to an enemy group X as a whole but to each 
individual member of X’, so that ‘one is permitted to use force against a given 
person only if he himself shares in the responsibility for the relevant wrong.’ 
(Hurka, 2007: 200), and Ryan’s objection that McMahan gives ‘insufficient 
weight’ to ‘the institutional claims on soldiers in a democratic society’ (2011: 
12), and that his view thus creates a ‘moral dilemma’ (2011: 13) for soldiers.  
Although McMahan attempts to respond to these criticisms, they still have 
teeth. However, so does the concept that the unjust nature of a war should 
affect the permissibility of unjust combatants’ actions. As I have mentioned, I 
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think that McMahan’s definition of moral responsibility is a plausible basis for 
my account of strong liability. So, some elements of the moral inequality 
thesis remain convincing, despite the difficulties with McMahan’s arguments. 
 
2ii) Some alternative arguments for the moral inequality thesis 
 
One way to account for this might be to look at some of the alternatives or 
refinements to McMahan’s arguments which other advocates of the moral 
inequality thesis have devised.  
For example, Judith Lichtenberg defends the moral inequality thesis, arguing 
that unjust combatants are not justified in the overall act of waging an unjust 
war, but some of their actions as combatants may be ‘justified as legitimate 
instances of self-defence against threats to their lives’, although only in limited 
circumstances, as this argument is based upon her claim that ‘one may be 
justified in attacking innocent threats in self-defence when one has not non-
innocently threatened them in the first place’ (Lichtenberg, 2008: 129).  
The just combatants are thus equated with innocent threats; which, in 
Lichtenberg’s view, are not liable to attack, but may be attacked in self-
defence by potential victims.  
So, if an unjust combatant has never ‘non-innocently threatened’ a just 
combatant (Lichtenberg, 2008: 129), then he may be morally justified in 
defending himself against just combatants’ attacks. The possibility of an 
unjust combatant’s being permitted to defend himself in war thus depends 
upon whether, and how far, he is responsible for the unjust threat of harm to 
the just combatants.  
Lichtenberg suggests that the ‘typical unjust combatant…is not non-innocent 
in the way that would forbid him from defending himself against innocent 
threats’ (2008: 117), because even if he fought willingly because he 
‘unjustifiably believed the war was just’, then his fighting ‘At most…played a 
small part in making the threat real’ (2008: 117). I have considerable 
sympathy with Lichtenberg’s view. However, I am doubtful about her method 
of deciding which soldiers are non-innocent in the relevant way.  
Most unjust combatants, whether unjustifiably ignorant, justifiably ignorant 
or maliciously aware that their war is unjust, play but a small part in the 
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overall threat. If this is the criterion by which an unjust combatant’s innocence 
may be judged, then it seems at first that few soldiers will count as relevantly 
non-innocent.  
However, suppose theoretically that one individual unjust combatant found 
herself in a position to make a big difference to the war – she (somehow) 
accidentally stumbles upon the location of the enemy troops at a strategically 
important moment, information which will allow her side to decimate the 
enemy when she delivers it to her superiors.  
Her liability to attack and inability to permissibly defend herself at the 
moment she discovers this secret location, according to Lichtenberg, depends 
not upon whether she knows that she poses an unjust threat, but upon her non-
innocence, and she is non-innocent only because she poses a threat to the just 
combatants.  
As I explained earlier, I think that posing a threat is an inadequate basis for 
liability in the stronger sense. The size of the threat one poses, assuming it is 
sufficient size to be a threat, may determine what size a proportionate response 
will be, but it does not determine whether a response is justified at all. Hence, 
it seems rather problematic that Lichtenberg’s reasoning leaves an individual 
unjust combatant at one moment permitted to defend herself in battle, and at 
the next non-innocent and not permitted to do so, because the size of the threat 
she poses has increased through no fault of her own. 
Lichtenberg does say that the number of combatants whose actions will 
count as justified under this argument depends upon factors such as ‘how 
remote or partial is a particular unjust combatant’s responsibility for the war 
(or for more specific threats to the enemy)’ (2008: 118), but since she does not 
explain how large a part one individual soldier must play in order to become 
non-innocent, one can only assume that no answer is readily available.  
In addition, Lichtenberg considers that other actions of unjust combatants 
(for instance, those not aimed at immediate self-defence) may be ‘excused to 
one degree or another because of duress, mistake or ignorance, and 
(occasionally) insanity’ (Lichtenberg, 2008: 129). She also suggests that 
‘some, but not all, unjust combatants will be able to claim the excuse of 
ignorance’ (Rodin and Shue, 2008: 13).  
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Lichtenberg further argues that although ‘the actions of some unjust 
combatants will be neither justifiable nor fully excusable’ (2008: 129), it 
would not be ‘feasible’ (2008: 129) to punish them with, for instance, legal 
prosecution. The most important reason for this is because, in her words, ‘the 
existence of armies requires a degree of obedience inconsistent with the 
demands of ordinary morality’, in particular the demand ‘that individuals 
continually evaluate the situations in which they find themselves and consult 
their consciences before deciding how to act’ (Lichtenberg, 2008: 127). We 
must, she argues, ‘accept this degree of obedience, which is incompatible with 
the kinds of challenges to authority that the critique of the symmetry thesis 
demands’, if we wish to maintain that armies are ‘necessary and justified 
institutions’ (Lichtenberg, 2008: 130).  
However, does this avoid the problems McMahan’s argument suffered 
from? I would say not – Lichtenberg’s argument follows McMahan’s too 
closely. The most significant difference between Lichtenberg’s argument and 
McMahan’s is that she argues, as I have said, that some violent actions taken 
by unjust combatants in their own defence may be justified, and I have already 
shown why I believe her argument for this conclusion (though not the 
conclusion itself) is problematic. Her account of unjust combatants’ liability to 
attack is similar enough to McMahan’s that it may also be vulnerable to the 
same problems.  
She does attempt to give a role to the ‘invincible ignorance’ of combatants 
described by Ryan and Zupan, by arguing that unjust combatants’ ‘violent 
actions’ may be excused for several reasons, including ignorance and duress. 
Thus, if as Ryan suggests unjust combatants genuinely cannot, or feel they 
cannot, refuse their commitments to fight, or if they are ignorant of the unjust 
nature of the war, perhaps through what Zupan (2008: 223) describes as 
‘contractual ignorance’, which ‘follows from an appropriate acceptance of 
one’s station and the obligations that stem from it’, then, Lichtenberg suggests, 
they have acted wrongly but excusably. 
However, Lichtenberg argues that only some ‘unjust combatants will be 
completely excused’ – some, indeed ‘probably many more’ in Lichtenberg’s 
words, ‘will be excused only in part’ (2008: 129). She is not very specific 
about how we can decide which unjust combatants are wholly excused and 
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which are partially excused – she merely says that this ‘will depend on facts 
about the society a person lives in, the war in question, and the circumstances 
in which a person finds himself – his sophistication, intelligence, and access to 
information’ (Lichtenberg, 2008: 124).  
It is perhaps easy to see why neither Lichtenberg nor McMahan attempts to 
base a law of war upon this account. As Lichtenberg herself says, it is not 
feasible to legally punish those soldiers whose actions were neither justified 
nor excused when ‘Often we will not know who they are; and they themselves 
may not know either’ (2008: 129).  
But, leaving aside the issue of the separation of morality of war and the law 
of war advocated by McMahan and Lichtenberg, the question arises; if the 
justified, excused and morally guilty combatants are so indistinguishable that 
legal judgement is not feasible because the guilty cannot often be identified, 
then how can moral judgement be possible under these circumstances? This is 
a distinct problem for Lichtenberg’s argument. 
Coady gives a similar argument in favour of the moral inequality thesis, 
arguing that unjust combatants may not justifiably kill either just combatants 
or non-combatants, but that they may be excused for killing just combatants 
because of the ‘presumption that warriors are entitled to direct lethal force 
against opposing warriors where they have some plausible warrant for seeing 
them as wrongdoers or attackers’ (2008: 164). The qualification that they must 
have ‘plausible warrant’ (2008:164) for this belief weakens this excuse; for 
instance, it does not apply if ‘the enemy troops are palpably in the right, or 
offer no serious threat’ (2008: 164).  
This means that any realisation on the part of an unjust combatant that he is 
an unjust combatant obliges him to do whatever he can to avoid killing or 
harming the enemy. Coady has some sympathy with the kind of ‘duress that 
combat conditions and coercive command conditions impose’ (2008: 164), but 
not much; he suggests that while this kind of duress may provide ‘some 
excuse’ for unjust combatants’ actions, there are various actions an unjust 
combatant can and should take to avoid killing the enemy, even on the 
battlefield. Coady thus implies that if unjust combatants suspect that they are 
unjust combatants, then they may, indeed must, somehow disobey their orders 
to attack just combatants.  
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I do not necessarily disagree with Coady’s conclusion that unjust combatants 
may only defend themselves in certain circumstances. The main part of 
Coady’s argument that I disagree with, is the assertion that unjust combatants 
on the battlefield may easily avoid fighting enemy troops whenever they wish 
to do so.  
In my opinion, individual soldiers, especially front-line troops, may not have 
as many options to avoid fighting as Coady thinks. He suggests that they may 
avoid fighting by, for instance, ‘eluding combat, firing in the air, or refusing to 
enlist’ (2008: 164).  
The latter might be of some use if a soldier realised that a particular war was 
unjust prior to becoming a soldier, but is less helpful in answering the question 
of whether unjust combatants are able to fulfil their moral requirements if, as 
is more than likely, they do not realise the unjust nature of their war until they 
are fighting it. The suggestions that they may do so by avoiding combat or 
firing into the air seem to me inadequate.  
These actions could not only lead to highly unpleasant consequences for 
these soldiers, including arrest or execution as a deserter or collaborator, but 
might morally prohibit them from defending their own lives. In a confusing, 
volatile situation (battles are almost invariably such), it is highly likely that 
just combatants may not realise one particular unjust combatant is not 
attempting to harm them – more probably they will treat him as they would 
any other enemy. If an unjust combatant who has just realised the enemy are 
‘palpably in the right’ (2008: 164), is faced with a just combatant in the act of 
firing at him, under Coady’s view his returning fire would apparently not be 
permitted or even excused, even if it was the only way to defend his own life.  
This may not seem like a problem to Coady, but it seems rather counter-
intuitive to me. I agree, as I will explain later, that once unjust combatants 
realise the unjust nature of their conflict they are not permitted to act with the 
intention of furthering their cause, or attack the enemy when they ‘offer no 
serious threat’ (2008: 164).  
However, I do not agree that soldiers who did not set out to fight an unjust 
war, but realised too late that it was unjust, are prohibited from defending their 
own lives if they cannot avoid fighting. For Coady, it would seem, the unjust 
combatant’s lack of options (he must fire or die) is not a factor that excuses 
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the defensive actions of such combatants in the same way that ignorance does 
– and this seems unfair to me.  
In addition, the ‘moral dilemma’ (Ryan, 2011: 13), which according to Ryan 
would affect soldiers under McMahan’s view, also seems to me to provide a 
criticism of Coady’s argument.  
If, as Ryan claims, the ‘institutional claims’ (2011: 12) democracies have 
over combatants are strong enough to create a genuine, potentially irresolvable 
dilemma for soldiers before conflict begins, when they are only contemplating 
whether or not to fight in future, from a secure environment where they have 
the time and resources42 to rationally consider their options, then how much 
more difficult will the decision process be when the soldier in question is on 
an active tour of duty, under even more pressure to fight, and her defection 
may result in worse consequences either from the enemy or from her own side, 
such as court-martial (or even summary execution, if it is that sort of army), in 
addition to the pressure created by these claims upon her conscience? This 
would at least add to the practical problems that might prevent a soldier from 
ceasing to fight during conflict.  
 
2iii) Rodin’s case for moral asymmetry 
 
Finally, David Rodin argues for the moral inequality or ‘asymmetry’ (2008: 
45) of soldiers; in particular, he suggests unjust combatants ‘have no right to 
use force against just combatants and should be held responsible for unjust 
killing post bellum’; and ‘just combatants do not possess additional in bello 
privileges’ such as ‘the right to target non-combatants’ (2008: 45).  
Rodin refers to the view that ‘unjust combatants have reduced or no in bello 
privileges’ as ‘restrictive asymmetry’ (as opposed to permissive asymmetry, 
which suggests ‘just combatants have increased in bello privileges compared 
to the current interpretation of jus in bello’) (Rodin, 2008: 55). For brevity’s 
sake, I will focus on his three main arguments supporting restrictive 
asymmetry.  
                                                 
42 For instance, in deciding at home whether an impending war is just or unjust, a potential 
combatant may at least attempt to research it and find out details of the potential belligerents’ 
reasons for waging it via the internet, media and so on, whereas in the midst of the actual 
conflict she may not have these necessary resources. 
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Firstly, he suggests that in order to accept that justified acts of war are 
‘instances of, or analogous to, self- or other-defence’ (2008: 46), we must 
reject MEC, because ‘Legitimate defensive force may only be directed against 
persons who are morally or legally liable to it’ (2008: 46). This is much the 
same as McMahan’s argument that just combatants are not liable to attack, 
making their opponents’ attacks on them morally impermissible.  
However, Rodin convincingly modifies this argument by rejecting 
McMahan’s assertion that, since liability to attack is based on moral 
responsibility for the threat and not on the actual threat posed by the liable 
individual, then, in Rodin’s words, ‘some non-combatants are also liable to 
intentional attack…if they have moral responsibility for the war, for example, 
by inciting, financing, or perhaps even simply by voting for it’ (Rodin 2008: 
47).  
Rodin opposes this view on the grounds that a non-combatant playing a part 
in the declaration of an unjust war is not analogous to somebody setting a 
mechanical trap in motion to kill someone – since the unjust combatants are 
not machines but people, the will of the war’s non-combatant initiator is not 
the only determining force. Rather, in Rodin’s words, the initiator is in the 
situation of someone who ‘culpably provokes’ another into attacking a third 
party (2008: 48).  
This, Rodin asserts, changes our intuitions concerning the initiator. We 
might think that if the initiator brainwashes a person or, to use McMahan’s 
example, ‘implants a device in her brain that irresistibly directs her will to the 
task of killing you’ (2004: 719), it may be permissible to attack and kill the 
initiator if doing so will harmlessly release the controlled person (in short, the 
initiator’s responsibility for the attack makes him liable to defensive action), 
but Rodin suggests we do not think likewise when the initiator has not 
removed the attacker’s will entirely, but rather persuaded or allowed her to 
attack her victim.  
Rodin gives the example of a psychopath who has been released from 
hospital and thus permitted to attack you, as ‘a direct result of the Minister of 
Health’s criminally fraudulent mismanagement of finances in full knowledge 
that his actions would endanger the public’ (Rodin, 2008: 48). He argues, 
convincingly, that it would not be permissible to kill the Minister in order to 
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save yourself from the psychopath43, ‘even though the Minister has greater 
moral responsibility for the unjust threat’ (2008: 48). In this way, the non-
combatants who share in the moral responsibility for the unjustified killing of 
just combatants are not liable to be killed by other just combatants, even if 
doing so would save some just combatants’ lives.  
Rodin goes on to argue that the usual reasons offered to excuse the actions 
of unjust combatants (namely, ‘duress or…non-culpable ignorance’ (2008: 
51)) do not work. Duress, he argues, ‘has not traditionally been recognized as 
an excuse for wrongful homicide’ in ordinary life (2008: 51), so it likewise 
should not be considered an excuse for killing in war.  
David Mapel notes similarly that duress, like fear of being killed (or 
‘personal cowardice’ as he puts it (1998: 178)), is not traditionally considered 
a valid excuse for a just combatant’s abandoning or neglecting his duty to 
fight, and argues that if this is so, such duress should not be an excuse for 
neglecting what Rodin calls the ‘presumably more stringent requirement not to 
engage in wrongful killing’ (2008: 52).  
However, this does not necessarily mean duress should not be considered a 
valid excuse for an unjust combatant’s actions. One would have to bite 
Mapel’s bullet and acknowledge that true duress is also an excuse for failing 
to fight as a just combatant, even if it is not traditionally considered so – but I 
do not think this is too counter-intuitive.  
                                                 
43 One possible response to Rodin’s argument might be to suggest that while our intuitions say 
killing the Minister is not permitted when, as in Rodin’s example, he is responsible because he 
culpably omits to prevent the psychopath’s release, we might feel differently if the Minister 
had shut down the hospital with the sole aim of releasing the psychopath and letting him harm 
people, either with some malicious intent or for a cause he believed justified his actions (like 
highlighting the need for such hospitals). The inference would be that at least some non-
combatants (leaders of a collective entity, for instance) are in an analogous situation; they 
actively set the unjust combatants on the just ones rather than omitting to prevent their attack.  
However, I do not believe this works, even if we grant that the Minister would intuitively be 
liable for defensive action if he deliberately sets the psychopath free to harm people. The 
Minister in this scenario must know that the people his actions will harm are not liable to that 
harm, whereas most non-combatants who either permit or actively cause an unjust war do so 
in the belief that any combatants who are killed by their combatants will be liable to that 
harm, either because they believe that the other side are in fact unjust combatants, or because 
they subscribe to the still-widespread belief that all combatants, just or unjust, have 
symmetrical rights and liabilities. An intuition that the Minister might be liable to defensive 
attack, but non-combatant initiators might not be, could perhaps be explained by this 
difference in moral responsibility – the Minister is clearly doing something wrong, while the 
initiators could perhaps reasonably be excused for believing their actions never harm the non-
liable. 
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If, for instance, a just combatant is reliably informed that his position is 
about to be overrun, and unless he ceases fighting for his just cause he will be 
quickly slaughtered, I do not believe he has a duty to continue fighting 
regardless. Otherwise, just combatants who surrender in the face of 
overwhelming odds are acting immorally.  
Mapel himself admits that ‘we should excuse a civilian who decides to take 
his chances on the Eastern Front rather than face…draconian punishments’ 
like execution or imprisonment (1998: 178). It seems, then, that he does admit 
the power of stronger forms of duress to excuse an unjust combatant’s actions. 
As regards Rodin’s point that in ordinary life, duress is ‘not 
traditionally…recognized as an excuse for wrongful homicide’ (2008: 51), 
again this does not prove it should not be. Someone genuinely forced to 
commit a crime may still be liable to be prosecuted for it, but there is bound to 
be some recognition of the mitigating circumstances (in terms of a shorter 
sentence, for instance). And such recognition amounts to an acknowledgement 
that duress makes a difference to the degree of moral responsibility a person 
may have for a coerced action. 
In addition, Rodin argues, any excuse offered by duress might only be a 
partial excuse, not excusing the actions of soldiers who ‘volunteered or 
allowed themselves to be drafted in circumstances in which there was a 
reasonable likelihood that they would be required to engage in wrongful 
killing’ (2008: 52).  
This implies, however, that the soldiers originally had a choice, they 
‘allowed themselves’ (Rodin, 2008: 52) to be put in a situation where they lost 
that choice, in the knowledge that they would probably be ordered to kill 
wrongfully.  
Freely deciding to give up the choice not to engage in wrongful killing, 
knowing that it is reasonably likely to be required, amounts to declaring one’s 
willingness to engage in wrongful killing – if one was not willing, one would 
not freely abdicate this choice. In short, Rodin’s argument excludes only cases 
I would not consider true cases of duress, but cases of (to coin a phrase) a 
culpable lack of freedom. 
Rodin then argues that ignorance is an insufficient excuse since modern 
freedom of information and technology like the Internet provides potential 
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combatants with access to at least some relevant information, which he claims 
‘may be sufficient to enable a morally reflective person to make a reasonable 
assessment of the justice of war’ (2008: 52). I do not think this is necessarily 
true either, and I will explain why later. 
In his third argument for the moral inequality thesis, Rodin suggests ‘a 
simple contractarian argument’ (2008: 56) can provide reasons for accepting 
an asymmetrical treatment of combatants. This is the Rawlsian argument that 
if ‘all potential parties to war’ were ‘in an original position within which they 
have full factual knowledge about the world but no knowledge of how they 
will be situated in it’ (Rodin, 2008: 57), and if from this position they were 
asked to decide between the moral equality thesis, permissive asymmetry and 
restrictive asymmetry (assuming they had already agreed upon the need for 
and the content of jus ad bellum and jus in bello), then from this original 
position they would, in Rodin’s view, conclude that restrictive asymmetry is 
the best option. 
He claims they would reject permissive asymmetry because they would be 
aware that 1) ‘most combatants at most times will be engaged in a war that is 
unjust’, and 2) ‘when engaged in an unjust war, the majority of combatants 
will mistakenly believe their war to be just’ (Rodin, 2008: 58).  
He supports 1) with the point that, it being improbable in any given conflict 
that both belligerents have just cause (as this would mean both are defending 
themselves against the other’s unjustified attack), at least 50 percent of 
belligerent parties (and probably more) are fighting unjustly.  
2), Rodin claims, is supported by the historical observation that ‘the majority 
of wars have been claimed to be just on both sides’ (Rodin, 2008: 58), the 
psychological observation that war is ‘so difficult, so dangerous and so costly, 
that it is exceptionally difficult for ordinary humans to undertake it without 
believing that they are in pursuit of a cause that is…just’ (Rodin, 2008: 58), 
and the fact that, since war is the final resort when two or more parties cannot 
agree, ‘most conflicts arise from competing interpretations of circumstances 
relating to justice’, meaning that ‘it is to be expected that most combatants in 
most wars will believe themselves to be fighting a just war’ (Rodin, 2008: 59).  
For these reasons, the parties in the original position would be aware that, as 
potential combatants, they are more likely to be unjust combatants that just 
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ones. Accepting permissive asymmetry would therefore, according to Rodin, 
‘expose them and their compatriots to two significant forms of risk on the 
battlefield’ (2008: 59): firstly, the ‘moral risk’ that, believing themselves to be 
just combatants, they might ‘inflict incidental harm on non-
combatants…which was not in fact morally justified’ (Rodin, 2008: 59), and 
secondly the ‘physical risk’ that if they were just combatants and their 
opponents unwittingly unjust combatants, then they as just combatants would 
be in increased danger, because ‘their enemies would inflict upon them unjust 
and excessive collateral harm in accordance with a mistakenly liberal 
interpretation of the proportionality requirement’ (Rodin, 2008: 59).  
Thus, Rodin argues, contractors in the original position would have ample 
reason to reject permissive asymmetry. He then argues that restrictive 
asymmetry does not suffer from any problems that might cause its rejection; 
that it does not, for instance, ‘reduce the likelihood that unjust combatants 
would comply with important current in bello prohibitions such as the norms 
of non-combatant immunity’ (Rodin, 2008: 60), because it is possible to retain 
non-combatant immunity without advocating ‘combatant non-immunity’ 
(Rodin, 2008: 60). In short, the two are not in fact logical correlates of one 
another, as some advocates of symmetrical war rights such as Lene Bomann-
Larsen have suggested. Rather, in Rodin’s view, ‘combatant rights, and 
combatant obligations are logically separable’ (2008: 61). 
However, I do not accept that Rodin’s arguments necessarily prove that his 
restrictive asymmetry is the only, or even the best, version of the moral 
inequality thesis. The success of my arguments will, therefore, depend upon 
how far they can avoid Rodin’s criticisms.  
I hope to defend a form of the moral inequality thesis which can successfully 
avoid them, whilst also avoiding the counter-intuitive conclusion that unjust 
combatants are not permitted to defend their own lives in battle, even if they 
are subject to the worst kind of duress or are non-culpably unaware they are 
fighting unjustly. As I have said, I disagree with Rodin’s arguments against 
duress and ignorance as acceptable excuses for at least some of an unjust 
combatant’s actions. 
So, to sum up, the moral equality thesis defended by such theorists as 
Benbaji and Zupan, which argues that both just and unjust combatants possess 
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the same war rights and privileges, and are subject to the same liabilities, has 
been strongly criticised by such theorists as McMahan and Rodin, who claim 
that the nature of the cause for which a group of combatants are fighting does 
in fact make a difference.  
Advocates of the moral inequality thesis differ on whether they advocate 
permissive or restrictive asymmetry, and also on whether some unjust 
combatants’ actions, although impermissible according to their argument, may 
nevertheless be excusable. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, they 
may be treated as forming a fairly coherent position. The basis for their 
asymmetrical treatment of just and unjust combatants seems to be the 
argument that unjust combatants are liable to attack, and just combatants are 
not. 
Although both the moral equality thesis and the moral inequality thesis have, 
as I have said, various convincing points, it is my intention to defend a slightly 
different asymmetrical account of the war rights of combatants. I intend to 
defend an account based on the definition of liability to attack I developed 
earlier. Basically, my account will accept the three propositions that A: Just 
combatants have a right to attack unjust combatants; B: Unjust combatants do 
not have a right to attack just combatants; and C: Both just and unjust 
combatants may be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have 
a right to defend themselves against attack. I will attempt to show that A, B 
and C are a consistent set, and defend an account of the rights and liabilities of 
combatants based on them. 
 
 
3: The Rights and Liabilities of Combatants Resulting from a 
Dual Account of Liability 
 
 
To recap, my account of liability argues there are two kinds of liability to 
attack: weak liability and strong liability. I define liability in the weaker sense 
as closest to the causal account of liability – meaning that anyone who is the 
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direct cause of an unjust threat of harm to someone who is not liable to attack 
become weakly liable to defensive action.  
Weak liability means the liable person may legitimately be attacked in 
defence, but the liable person retains their right of counter-defence, so that she 
may also defend her life against her victim’s defensive attack. I argue that this 
is the most plausible way to assign liability to Innocent Attackers and Innocent 
Threats.  
Also, I am prepared to accept something like McMahan’s account of ‘moral 
responsibility for an unjust threat’ (2008: 22) as a criterion for strong liability. 
When someone chooses to attack another individual, foreseeing the threat to 
the victim’s life, she becomes a legitimate target for that person’s defensive 
actions, and forfeits her own right of defence. 
What, then, does this mean for the issue at hand – the question of whether 
just and unjust combatants have symmetrical or asymmetrical war rights? The 
causal account of liability perhaps applies best to the moral equality thesis – 
both just and unjust combatants pose a direct threat to enemy combatants, so 
both, according to the causal account, are liable to the enemy’s attack – while 
McMahan’s moral responsibility account of liability, as we have seen, forms a 
main justification for the moral inequality thesis. But what sort of account of 
the war rights of combatants arises from my account of liability, which 
incorporates both the causal and the moral responsibility accounts? 
 
3i) A symmetrical account of weak liability to attack 
 
Well, the first thing to work out is whether just and unjust combatants are 
weakly or strongly liable to attack. In the weak, causal sense of liability, it 
seems fairly clear they can be weakly liable. When combatants (just or unjust) 
launch a direct attack upon enemy combatants, they are causally responsible 
for the resulting threat of harm to those enemy combatants.  
As I mentioned in Chapter One, it is not my belief (as it is Walzer’s) that 
soldiers qua soldiers automatically lose the rights and immunities they had as 
civilians. I am much more sympathetic to McMahan’s view that if soldiers 
lose things like their immunity from attack or their individual right to defence, 
it is because of something else, something not intrinsic to their status as 
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combatants. McMahan’s view is that this was their moral responsibility for 
constituting part of an unjust threat of harm to others. My view is that while 
moral responsibility is one factor, it is not the only one. 
Causal responsibility for an unjust threat to another person’s life is, I 
believe, the other factor that changes a soldier’s rights. It makes her weakly 
liable, meaning that she loses her immunity to attack. However, unless that 
soldier is also morally responsible for the unjust threat (making her strongly 
liable), I suggest she does not lose her individual right of self-defence. Like 
the Innocent Attacker or the Innocent Threat, she may be defensively attacked 
by her victims, but she may also engage in counter-defence44.  
I would accept that all combatants, just or unjust, are at least weakly liable to 
defensive attack. All combatants, in the course of their duties, take actions 
which threaten harm to other combatants. When GI Joe shoots at GI Henry, 
even if Joe is brainwashed, implanted with mind-controlling military 
technology or sleepwalking, he is still causally responsible for the threat to 
Henry, and thus weakly liable.  
Theorists like McMahan might object to this by suggesting that if GI Joe is a 
just combatant and GI Henry is an unjust combatant, then Joe’s attack on 
Henry is not an unjust attack, and does not pose an unjust threat of harm. It is, 
rather, a victim’s act of defence against his attacker – and, given that the 
victim’s actions are justified according to his right of defence, the victim does 
not himself become liable because of it. However, I have already shown that 
this is not necessarily the case. 
It is a potentially uncomfortable consequence of the concept of weak 
liability (although one which must be faced) that the victim loses his immunity 
from attack – he also becomes weakly liable. If the Innocent Threat, because 
the threat she poses is not her fault, does not lose her right to defend herself, 
and her Victim, who is also not at fault, also has a right to defence, then the 
result is that both, through no fault of their own, lose their immunity to attack.  
                                                 
44
 Gerhard Overland makes a somewhat similar point that lethal defensive force may be 
justified even ‘against aggressing soldiers who are morally innocent’ (2006: 455), by which he 
means soldiers who are not ‘morally responsible for the unjust threats they pose’ (2006: 460) 
(he gives examples such as conscripted soldiers fighting under duress, or soldiers who ‘fight 
out of loyalty to their country and out of lawful subservience to it’ (2006: 460)). 
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However, I consider this more plausible than the result that either the 
Innocent Threat or the Victim, through no fault of their own, loses the right to 
defend themselves. Both are in the same situation, faced with an imminent 
threat of harm without being responsible for it, therefore it seems to me the 
best solution that they should both have the same liability to attack.  
If (as Thomson would have it) the Innocent Threat is strongly liable but the 
Victim is not, or if (as McMahan would say) the Innocent Threat is not liable 
at all, then either Innocent Threat or innocent Victim is thus morally obliged to 
permit himself or herself to be killed (even though they may act excusably if 
they disobey this obligation, they still act wrongly, and that is what I believe to 
be implausible). Hence, I would argue that even if GI Joe is a just combatant, 
and therefore acts permissibly in shooting at GI Henry, Joe may nevertheless 
become weakly liable to attack, provided that Henry is himself only weakly 
liable. 
The question we must therefore settle is: assuming neither Joe nor Henry is 
brainwashed, sleepwalking and so on, is either one strongly liable? In short, 
we must determine if either just or unjust combatants are morally responsible 
for the threat they pose to enemy soldiers.  
To begin with, as I mentioned, I agree with McMahan that just combatants, 
all things being equal45, are not morally responsible for the threat of harm, 
because as agents of their collective they are defending all the innocent people 
threatened by their enemy’s unjustified attack. However, I would further assert 
that the vast majority of unjust combatants are also free of this particular 
moral responsibility.  
 
3ii) The argument for combatants’ weak liability – duress and epistemic 
limitation 
 
There are, as I have shown in this chapter, varying reasons why advocates of 
the moral equality thesis such as Walzer argue that unjust combatants are not 
morally responsible for the unjust threat of harm that they pose, and there are 
                                                 
45 In other words, provided they have not made themselves strongly liable to attack by 
deliberately creating an unjust threat of harm in other ways – for instance, by violating the jus 
in bello rules of discrimination or proportionality. 
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also reasons why many advocates of the moral inequality thesis concede that, 
whilst unjust combatants may be morally responsible, their actions are 
nevertheless excused.  
McMahan refers to three kinds or categories of possible ‘excusing 
conditions’46 for fighting as an unjust combatant – namely, ‘duress, epistemic 
limitation and diminished responsibility’ (2009: 116). He agrees with Rodin 
that these conditions do not successfully excuse the actions of unjust 
combatants. However, I hope to prove that the first two47, at least, are in fact 
successful in proving a lack of moral responsibility on the part of soldiers who 
are subject to these conditions.  
Duress, as an excuse for fighting as an unjust combatant, refers to a lack of 
choice in the matter – a soldier who fights under duress has been forced or 
coerced to fight48. ‘Duress’ may be a misleading term, since it seems to refer 
to the most violent, forceful means by which a soldier can be induced to fight, 
such as conscription enforced by death sentences for draft-dodgers.  
Yet, as McMahan defines it, the ways in which potential soldiers can lack 
choice are fairly broad; not just conscription or what McMahan calls ‘a kind of 
compulsion deriving from the grinding exigencies of their economic or social 
                                                 
46 McMahan suggests that these conditions would (if they were successful, and he agrees with 
Rodin in arguing that they are not) act as excuses only, not as justifications for unjust 
combatants to fight for their unjust cause – but their function as excuses serves, in McMahan’s 
words, to, ‘mitigate the culpability of [the] unjust combatants to whom they apply’ (2009: 
123), and this may be sufficient to demonstrate that these unjust combatants are not culpable 
enough to be morally responsible. Hence, although I agree with McMahan that unjust 
combatants cannot be justified in fighting to advance their unjust cause (as I will explain 
later), if these conditions can apply, then these unjust combatants are not morally responsible 
for their unjustifiable actions, and thus are only weakly liable. 
47 The third excusing condition, that of diminished responsibility, I will not be positing as a 
valid excuse for unjust combatants, chiefly because I agree with McMahan that there exist 
‘very few cases in which a soldier is wholly lacking in the capacity for morally responsible 
deliberation and agency’ (2009: 122), and also because many ways in which a soldier’s 
capacity for deliberation might be partially impaired, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (to 
use McMahan’s example), might also be placed under the umbrella of duress, or the inability 
to freely make a choice.  
48 In moral and legal terms, duress is considered an excuse for a person’s actions, not a 
justification. However, I believe this is adequate for my argument. As a moral excuse, duress 
proves not that the actions were justified, but that the agent is not morally blameworthy for his 
actions. And, as Eimear Spain put it, ‘If the act itself is unjustiﬁed, but the actor must 
nonetheless be exculpated, this points to a judgment that the actor chose the morally 
appropriate course of action in light of the circumstances, or at least a course of action for 
which moral, and therefore criminal, censure is not warranted’ (2011: 41). A moral excuse, 
then, is sufficient to prove either a complete lack or a diminution of moral responsibility for 
fighting as an unjust combatant. 
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circumstances’ (2009: 117), but also what he refers to as ‘pressures from 
natural, social, or psychological sources’ (2009: 131).  
It is my contention, also based upon the arguments of other theorists like 
Ryan and Zupan, that there are many subtle ways in which a potential 
combatant may not be completely free to choose not to fight. Therefore, the 
first option I will consider is that unjust soldiers may lack moral responsibility 
due to the fact that they lack the complete freedom of choice49 necessary to opt 
out of fighting – an option that is, I believe, sufficiently similar to the 
traditional excuse of duress for that term to be used.  
Epistemic limitation, as McMahan calls it, takes account of the fact that 
‘Combatants usually act in ignorance of a great many factual matters that are 
relevant to the determination of whether the war in which they have been 
commanded to fight is just’ (2009: 119). I believe that epistemic limitation 
provides a second possible reason why most unjust combatants are not morally 
responsible for the threat they pose, and thus cannot be strongly liable.  
Therefore, I intend to prove that the most plausible possible reasons that 
unjust combatants might lack moral responsibility are their lack of full 
knowledge about the injustice of their cause (called ‘invincible ignorance’ by 
Zupan (2008: 217) and ‘epistemic limitation’ by McMahan (2009: 116)), and 
their lack of freedom to choose not to fight in an unjust war.  
When discussing the consent theory of authority, David Estlund made the 
point that ‘It can only be wrong for a person to refrain from consenting if that 
person has had the opportunity to consent. Indeed, unless there is an 
opportunity, they have not refrained’ (2005: 360). In order to have this 
opportunity, it seems to me that one must both be aware (or culpably unaware) 
that one poses an unjust threat, and have the ability to choose to avoid posing 
that threat – and, as I will demonstrate, most unjust combatants are neither.  
Firstly, if combatants lack the freedom to simply choose not to fight in a just 
war, then McMahan’s claim that they have a moral obligation to do so (and 
                                                 
49 By this, I mean not just a total lack of freedom (as the Innocent Attacker lacks the power to 
prevent himself from killing) but the lack of a reasonable degree of choice in the matter. For 
reasons that will become clear, I believe a person cannot be held morally responsible for her 
actions if there is some force that reasonably prevents her from choosing a more morally 
acceptable path. This might include not just physical force or the fear of intolerable 
consequences such as execution or torture, but other, subtler factors, which I will discuss 
shortly. 
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are thus morally responsible for the harm they do as combatants if they fail to 
fulfil it), is intuitively unreasonable. To have a moral obligation that one can 
be blamed for not fulfilling, it must (presumably) be reasonably possible for 
one to fulfil it.  
Eimear Spain writes that ‘the duress defence is permitted in Anglo–
American law where the will of the defendant is overborne by the threats to 
which he is subjected which constrain his choices’ (2011: 23). I will be using 
an interpretation of this duress defence as the first possible reason why unjust 
combatants are not morally responsible for fighting as unjust combatants.  
However, there could be differing definitions of what it means for an agent’s 
will to be ‘overborne’ (Spain, 2011: 23). The most plausible definition, which 
I will be using, is similar to that set out by Larry May. He suggests that an 
individual is absolved of moral responsibility if she is unable to make a moral 
choice – i.e. she has (she believes) no other available options that are more 
morally permissible. For instance, in describing the defence used in the 
Nuremburg courts to argue that some ordinary Nazi soldiers should not be 
held legally or morally responsible for following the illegal (and immoral) 
orders of their superior officers, May writes that ‘there are two aspects of 
moral choice that are of importance in the Nuremberg defense. The first is that 
the soldier reasonably believes that the superior’s order was legally and 
morally valid. The second is that the soldier believes that following the 
superior’s order was the only morally reasonable course of action open to him 
or her’ (May, 2005: 181). The first aspect appears to relate to non-culpable 
ignorance, the second to duress.  
I would similarly argue that duress would exist where a combatant’s choices 
were constrained to such a degree that, even if she is aware that her collective 
is waging an unjust war, she will consider that serving as a soldier is still her 
only ‘morally reasonable’ option, the only one she can take without violating 
an even more vital duty or incurring an intolerable cost.  
There are, as I have hinted, various reasons why it may not seem, on the part 
of individual combatants, like a morally reasonable option to opt out of 
fighting in an unjust war. One possibility is Ryan’s suggestion that combatants 
in democratic countries may feel they are subject to a ‘democratic duty’ to 
continue to serve, because (in democratic countries at least) serving as a 
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soldier is seen as fulfilling a ‘general duty to support democracy’s protective 
institutions’ (Ryan, 2011: 22).  
This might diminish the degree of choice such soldiers perceive themselves 
to have, since if they believe that fighting whenever commanded to do so is 
part of the larger task of protecting their democratic nation and their loved 
ones within it, they could experience a serious ‘moral dilemma’ (2011: 13).  
As Ryan puts it, their ‘duty not to kill unjustly’ would come ‘into conflict 
with the duty to protect…loved ones’ (2011: 31). They might not feel free to 
opt out of fighting, even if they suspected their war might be unjust – doing so 
would conflict with their democratic duty.  
However, as I argued in Chapter One, Ryan’s argument may be flawed. 
Even though he argues that the democratic duty soldiers believe they are under 
is not a real duty, he appears to accept that belief in this duty inevitably exists. 
Thus, whether or not the state has a right to make these claims upon individual 
combatants, the claims are being made and accepted. As such, they make a 
difference as to the degree to which those subject to them may be morally 
responsible for fighting as unjust combatants.  
But, as I said, McMahan could (and does) argue that the obligation not to 
take part in unjust wars requires combatants to look at the morality of the wars 
they fight in, rather than just accepting that being a soldier of a democratic 
nation means one has a duty to fight without first examining the justice of the 
war.  
Unless one can prove that such a democratic duty exists, soldiers may not in 
fact be constrained from choosing not to fight – as I am not, when I believe I 
am not free to cross the road if I erroneously (due to poor eyesight, say) 
believe there is an unbridgeable gap in the middle.  
In fact, I am free to cross the road, and in fact, the soldiers are free to choose 
not to fight, because I am mistaken in my belief that a gap exists, and they are 
mistaken in their belief that a duty exists. As I said in Chapter One, the way to 
solve the Ryan’s ‘dilemma’ (2011: 13) may be to demonstrate to the 
combatants that they do not have any democratic duty to fight regardless of 
whether the war is defensive. 
However, as a possible reason for combatants’ lack of freedom, this still has 
teeth. Soldiers may be mistaken in their belief that they are subject to a 
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‘democratic duty’ to fight (Ryan, 2011: 22), but this belief can still be relevant 
in determining whether they are free to choose not to fight an unjust war, for 
the following reason.  
These combatants may be mistaken, but non-culpably so. They are not 
responsible for their mistake, because they cannot be reasonably expected to 
know that their democratic duty does not exist. If a soldier from a democratic 
country genuinely believes he has a democratic duty to fight whenever ordered 
to do so (and as Ryan points out there is every reason to think many soldiers 
believe this, since, in democratic countries, serving as a soldier is often seen as 
fulfilling a ‘general duty to support democracy’s protective institutions’ 
(Ryan, 2011: 22)), then how is that soldier to know he is mistaken in believing 
in this duty?  
I believe that they cannot all be reasonably expected to recognise their 
mistake in a world awash with propaganda, national triumphalism, and so on; 
and thus, we cannot convincingly argue that combatants are morally 
responsible for fighting in an unjust war, if they genuinely believed that they 
had a vital duty overriding the moral imperative not to fight. 
This argument might then potentially apply to some non-democratic 
countries as well. If the actual existence of the duty in question is not 
necessary, but only a genuine, non-culpable belief in its existence amongst 
combatants, then might it be possible for the combatants of a non-democratic 
nation or collective to similarly believe in some duty binding them to fight at 
their government or leader’s command?  
It would not be belief in a democratic duty (unless, for instance, the 
combatants non-culpably believed in the validity of a pseudo-democratic 
government set up by their dictator), but they could, perhaps, believe they had 
a duty to protect their particular community, their loved ones or their way of 
life, and that whatever wars they fought, even if they had some other goal, 
would also have the effect of protecting these treasured things.  
Ryan might respond that one reason why a democratic duty seems plausible 
to combatants is the assumption ‘that a democratic government will generally 
go to war for legitimate reasons; more specifically, it will generally go to war 
for reasons of self-defense’ (2011: 23) (even though said assumption is, he 
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argues, false) – and in the case of non-democratic collectives, there can be no 
such assumption.  
However, this response assumes combatants in non-democratic collectives 
are always aware that their leaders may take them to war for non-defensive 
reasons – it assumes a level of transparency and freedom of information which 
is, if anything, less likely in a non-democratic collective than a democratic 
one. Citizens of a dictatorship like North Korea, for instance, might be 
convinced by propaganda about their leader’s infallibility and the just nature 
of their government’s actions, or given a mistaken impression of other 
countries’ intentions. 
Therefore, there is a distinct possibility that combatants in democratic and 
non-democratic countries may not be completely free to choose not to fight 
even if they suspect that the war their country is about to fight may be unjust, 
because they may believe, rightly or wrongly50, that they have a duty as 
soldiers, to fight when called upon to do so. Other factors, such as social 
pressure or propaganda, may similarly constrain their choice. What McMahan 
presents as a simple, free choice, therefore, may not be quite so simple or free. 
However, as it stands there may appear to be a problem with the argument 
that an unjust combatant may be under duress, and therefore not morally 
responsible, due to these factors. The most common legal definition of duress 
as a defence excusing an individual from criminal (or, therefore, moral) 
responsibility, as set out in Article 31 of the International Criminal Code, 
states that criminal responsibility is avoided when the individual’s action  
 
has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent 
death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against 
that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily 
and reasonably to avoid the threat, provided that the person 
does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to 
be avoided51.  
 
                                                 
50 I will not be taking a stance on whether this belief is right or wrong (although as I have said, 
Ryan argues that it is wrong); since, as I have shown, combatants who non-culpably hold such 
a belief have their freedom to choose constrained whether or not the duty exists. 
51 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (reprinted Bassiouni, 1999: 735). 
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Spain wrote similarly that the law ‘requires that an individual face threats of 
death or serious injury to claim the defence [of duress]’ (2011: 150). This 
would set the threshold for duress higher than I set it in my argument. I argue 
that an unjust combatant’s freedom to choose not to fight may be constrained 
by subtle threats or influences like propaganda or the belief in a democratic 
duty; but the legal definition of duress suggests that only direct constraints on 
an individual’s ability to make moral choices, like imminent threat of death or 
serious harm, constitute duress.  
   However, I would contend that duress resulting from factors like social 
pressure or propaganda can legitimately excuse unjust combatants from moral 
responsibility. The apparent problem may be due to the fact that Article 31 
refers solely to ‘duress by threats’ (Spain, 2011: 1), whereas these factors are 
more likely to fall into ‘a subset of the duress defence’ (2011: 3) called ‘duress 
of circumstances’ (2011: 1), distinguished from duress by threats in that it 
‘arises not due to threats directed against the accused but due to the 
circumstances in which the defendant ﬁnds him or herself’ (2011: 3-4). 
Factors like social pressure or propaganda, which do not arise from explicit 
threats made by an individual or distinct group of individuals, but still create a 
situation in which individuals are not fully free to choose a more moral option, 
may therefore be a form of duress. 
 Such factors, while they cannot suspend free will with the same immediate, 
shocking effect as threats to one’s life, they can diminish the ability to make a 
moral choice more subtly, by subverting or unduly influencing the will rather 
than directly overriding it by threats52. In May’s argument, like mine, an 
agent’s belief plays a large part in her ability to choose not to fight – she lacks 
moral responsibility if she a) ‘reasonably believes that the superior’s order was 
legally and morally valid’ and b) ‘believes that following the superior’s order 
was the only morally reasonable course of action open to…her’ (2005: 181). It 
is easy to see how social pressure or propaganda might cause an agent to 
believe she had no other morally acceptable action but to fight, without 
physically threatening her. 
                                                 
52 Although some social pressure perhaps also counts as a form of threatened harm, as it works 
at least partially by threatening people with harms like social exclusion, that may not seem as 
severe as threatening their physical safety, but may possibly count as threats to that person’s 
capacity to lead a flourishing life. 
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Even Spain suggests the definition of duress should not focus on whether or 
not ‘action is compelled under duress’ (2011: 26), as ‘It may be argued that 
this view of duress confuses compulsion with choice’ (2011: 28). Instead, she 
claims ‘it is preferable to view the defences as involving a reasoned choice for 
which the actor is entitled to be exculpated at law’ (2011: 26). This suggests a 
person under duress is not unable to make a choice at all, but that she is not 
wholly responsible for choosing the morally wrong option, since the duress 
she is under constrains her from adopting any more morally permissible 
alternatives. This need not only be through direct, physical threats, but can 
also be through more subtle constraints, like propaganda convincing her that 
she has an overriding patriotic duty to fight for her government whenever it 
commands.  
However, one question remains to be answered; at what point do influencing 
factors like social pressure and propaganda sufficiently subvert or diminish 
unjust combatants’ faculties of free choice so as to excuse their actions?  
One possibility might be drawn from what Spain refers to as attempts ‘to 
curtail the [legal] defence of duress by placing an objective limitation on the 
defence’, by ‘requiring that the defendant show the fortitude of a reasonable 
man’ (2011: 175). In short, this suggests duress only excuses a person’s 
actions if a ‘reasonable man’ (Spain, 2011: 175) would be likewise unable to 
resist the threats (or other factors) that constrain the duress victim from 
choosing a more moral alternative. To apply this kind of restriction to my 
definition of duress would mean the point at which factors like social pressure 
or propaganda become exculpatory is the point at which a ‘reasonable man’ 
would succumb to them – if they are weak enough that anyone of reasonable 
‘fortitude’ (Spain 2011: 175) or strength of will would be able to resist them, 
then they would not be severe enough to excuse anyone’s actions. 
However, this possibility immediately presents a problem, one which Spain 
herself mentions; namely ‘Just who is the reasonable man and what is 
reasonable behaviour?’ As Spain points out, ‘The answer varies across 
societies and through the ages’ (2011: 176). It might be possible to create a 
workable definition of a ‘reasonable’ man and ‘reasonable’ behaviour, but it 
seems to me both unlikely and extremely difficult, and to do so would greatly 
increase the length and complexity of my argument.  
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Instead, I would suggest returning to my original definition of duress. 
Duress, as I understand it, occurs when an individual’s ability to make a moral 
choice is constrained or diminished by circumstances or the actions of others, 
outside that individual’s control. A closer look at this definition will, I believe, 
yield a potential answer to the question of the threshold at which factors like 
social pressure and propaganda become counted as duress. 
As May pointed out, whether an individual can choose a morally permissible 
option is determined by ‘whether the alternatives open included ones that were 
morally permissible’, and ‘whether there were alternatives open that could be 
considered reasonable’ (2005: 193). He adds that ‘In most situations, it is not 
part of one’s moral choices, and hence too much to expect, that one should 
have done something highly dangerous, or otherwise unreasonable’ (2005: 
193).  
When determining whether an individual subject to more insidious kinds of 
constraint, like social pressure or propaganda, was in fact under duress when 
he fought as an unjust combatant, we must therefore determine if there were 
any reasonable morally permissible alternatives open for him. It may at first 
appear as though an individual subject only to these insidious constraints, 
rather than more direct forms of duress, does have other reasonable options 
besides becoming an unjust combatant, since he could refuse to fight in the 
army without facing any actual threats of harm. However, it is possible for 
these factors to limit the reasonable alternatives open to us, simply by making 
us incapable of choosing the morally permissible alternatives.  
For instance, suppose an individual has been, from a young age, subject to 
high levels of government propaganda convincing him he has an overriding 
patriotic duty to fight for his country whenever its government commands, for 
whatever reason. It seems to me that when that government calls him to enlist 
during an unjust war, the option of refusing is not in fact open to him, because 
the propaganda has rendered him mentally incapable of following it – has 
convinced him this is not an option he can take due to his overriding duty. 
The threshold at which factors like social pressure or propaganda become 
duress, then, is the threshold at which that social pressure or propaganda 
becomes powerful and convincing enough to close off any reasonable moral 
alternatives, whether by threatening an individual with some sufficiently 
 154 
severe harm if she chooses them, or by making the alternatives seem so 
unreasonable that she is unable to choose them (e.g. by subjecting her to 
sufficiently convincing propaganda, such that an individual could not be 
reasonably expected to remain unconvinced). 
Of course, this definition at first appears to have a similar problem to the 
first definition I considered; namely, what distinguishes a ‘reasonable’ 
alternative from an unreasonable one? However, I would argue that defining a 
reasonable alternative is simpler than defining a reasonable man, or reasonable 
behaviour. The latter two are much more subjective, varying according to 
different times and cultures, perhaps even altered by extreme circumstances, 
as Spain pointed out (2011: 176). But I would suggest a reasonable alternative 
can be defined more objectively, as one that it is possible for the individual to 
pursue, without incurring a cost too high for him to be reasonably expected to 
pay. May, for instance, defines a situation in which reasonable alternatives are 
open as one in which ‘the agent had alternatives that did not involve a high 
probability that there would be a high price to pay for choosing that alternative 
course of action’ (2005: 193). And it is my contention that such factors as 
social pressure or propaganda may close off these alternatives by affecting the 
agent’s understanding concerning their price.  
For instance, in my example of the individual brainwashed by patriotic 
propaganda, he has been convinced of an overriding patriotic duty to obey his 
government’s call to arms, and so he naturally believes that refusing to fight 
will incur far too high a price, namely ignoring his most important duty. 
Similarly, if there is enormous social pressure to enlist being brought to bear 
on an individual, when he knows that refusal may mean losing his friends, his 
place within society, being disowned by his family, and so on, is it not equally 
likely that refusal to fight appears too costly an alternative? In these cases, the 
propaganda or social pressure is severe enough that individuals could not 
reasonably be expected not to be convinced by it. 
I argue, therefore, that an individual agent subject to severe social pressure 
or propaganda influencing her to fight as an unjust combatant, would have no 
other reasonable alternative open to her. The point at which this social 
pressure or propaganda is severe enough to count as duress is, in my view, the 
point at which individuals could not be reasonably expected to overcome these 
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factors – hence, no reasonable, morally permissible alternatives would appear 
open to the majority of individuals subject to them53.  
In addition, there is the distinct possibility that unjust combatants will not 
only have their ability to make a moral choice constrained in subtle ways like 
these, but will experience more direct forms of duress – most significantly, 
conscription. A conscript, by definition, is a soldier who does not volunteer for 
service in the army, but is forcibly drafted, with varying degrees of force 
depending upon the system of conscription – ranging, as McMahan pointed 
out, from ‘a fine to imprisonment to execution’ (2009: 117). On the immediate 
face of it, conscripts would appear to be soldiers who have not chosen to fight. 
Aristotle makes a similar argument about responsibility for actions under 
duress: if ‘things…are done from fear of greater evils’, such as the fear that ‘a 
tyrant…having one’s parents and children in his power’ would kill them if one 
did not ‘do something base’ (2001: 964), then while one technically acts 
voluntarily, in that the person in question is not telepathically controlled or 
subject to irresistible external physical forces, one’s actions are ‘in the abstract 
perhaps involuntary’, as ‘no one would choose any such act in itself’ 
(Aristotle, 2001: 965) – and no one is morally responsible for involuntary 
actions.  
McMahan also defines conscription as a form of duress (2009: 116). 
However, since he advocates the strong liability of all unjust combatants, 
McMahan argues that duress due to conscription (and indeed other forms of 
duress) does not provide a valid excuse for fighting in an unjust war, and that 
conscripts are therefore just as morally responsible, and just as liable to attack, 
as volunteer soldiers. 
He argues, for instance, that there is an inconsistency between our attitude 
towards unjust combatants who fight because they are subject to conscription, 
and our attitude towards terrorists who might be under similar duress – that we 
                                                 
53 There may of course be some individual variation, in that some individuals may be more or 
less easily persuaded than the majority – but I do not think the existence of exceptional 
individuals who see through propaganda that convinces huge numbers of their compatriots 
substantially alters my argument. The majority could not reasonably be expected to do 
likewise. However, those individuals whose ability to resist propaganda or pressure is lower 
than the average, (people with learning difficulties, for instance) might potentially have a 
lower threshold at which these forms of duress become exculpatory, although I lack the space 
to explore this in any more detail. 
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consider such duress a mitigating factor for unjust combatants, but not for 
terrorists. However, I am not so sure that this is as clear as McMahan wants it 
to be. McMahan himself admits that the kind of duress represented by 
conscription is ‘seldom’ visited upon terrorists, most of whom, in McMahan’s 
words, ‘appear to be fervent volunteers’ (2009: 125).  
Also, war and terrorism are not sufficiently analogous for one reason; the 
direct targets of a terrorist attack are typically non-combatants. As I have 
argued, if even just combatants deliberately target non-combatants, they 
become strongly liable, since the act of targeting non-combatants is wrong 
over and above the justness or unjustness of the war itself. It is simply not a 
means of defence to which the right of defence entitles you. The same can be 
said for terrorism – even if the terrorists have a just cause, they have chosen an 
impermissible means of furthering it.  
However, McMahan also claims there are other options most conscripts 
could take, meaning that they do have the freedom to choose not to fight. For 
instance, if the punishment for refusing to fight when conscripted is 
imprisonment, they could choose to go to prison.  
Since, as McMahan points out, ‘the wrong that is involved in fighting in an 
unjust war is very serious: it is the wrong of intentionally killing people who 
are doing more than defending themselves and other innocent people’ (2009: 
132), it is a wrong of sufficient gravity that suffering imprisonment does not 
seem too high a price to pay to avoid committing it.  
For instance, if one had two alternatives: either to be unfairly sentenced to a 
prison sentence or to get acquitted by killing a member of each juror’s family, 
so that they are too frightened to find you guilty, then McMahan would argue 
(and with some justification), that you may not kill innocent people in order to 
spare yourself this relatively minor harm. Hence, since going to prison would 
seem to be a reasonable alternative to fighting an unjust war, conscripts who 
have this option would, therefore, count as morally responsible. 
McMahan also argues that even stronger forms of punishment, such as the 
death sentence as a punishment for conscientious objection, may not always 
excuse unjust combatants’ actions. He suggests that although the threat of 
death as a penalty for outright refusal to fight may prevent this from being a 
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reasonable option for combatants, there are still other reasonable options open 
to them.  
McMahan refers to an individual situation where a criminal threatens to kill 
you unless you kill a third party. Just as you ‘might be able to satisfy the 
threatener if you compellingly appear to be trying to kill the third party’ 
(2009: 133), so, he claims, a soldier could endeavour to appear to try to kill 
the enemy, whilst avoiding actions which would actually harm them.  
For instance, he suggests it might be possible to ‘refrain from harming 
anyone even in conditions of combat: one can fire one’s weapon into the 
ground, or one can refrain from firing it at all’ (2009: 133). In this way, 
McMahan argues, ‘it is usually possible to “go to war”, even when the war is 
unjust, without actual wrongdoing, provided one’s active participation is 
feigned rather than genuine’ (2009: 134).  
However, I am highly doubtful as to whether this is a realistic option for 
soldiers in the heat of battle. Even McMahan admits that where a conscripted 
unjust combatant (at least one threatened with death if he does not submit to 
conscription) is put in a situation in which a just combatant will kill him if he 
does not kill that just combatant in self-defence, he ‘does wrong but is 
nevertheless blameless’ (2009: 135), since ‘In this case, duress provides a full 
excuse’ (2009: 135). This is consistent with my view. 
However, I disagree with McMahan concerning the frequency of these life 
or death situations in combat. McMahan gives the impression that in the vast 
majority of wartime situations, a conscript will be able to pretend to his 
superiors that he is a committed soldier while avoiding all actions that could 
harm the enemy.  
As I explained in my response to Coady’s similar argument, such pretence, 
if possible, is unlikely to be this easy. Battles are not fought in isolation; each 
soldier would be surrounded by fellow combatants who are bound to notice his 
odd behaviour – and his pretence may not always be sufficient to fulfil his 
superiors’ explicit orders.  
What is the conscientious conscript to do when his co-combatants, perhaps 
fellow conscripts, are about to be killed by just combatants? What is he to do 
if he is assigned to operate the weapons on a plane or an unmanned drone – 
deliberately miss the target? Given modern targeting software, one would 
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think it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to do so and make it 
appear accidental. And what if he is assigned to pilot a military aircraft? While 
he would not directly harm the enemy, his piloting the plane would make that 
harm possible. How could he pretend to fulfil his duties as a pilot?  
All these and other examples serve, I think, to prove that McMahan’s third 
option, that of pretending to fulfil one’s duties as a combatant, is at best far 
less plausible than he believes, and at worst, not even an option for soldiers in 
combat situations. It is likely impossible to determine the exact number of 
situations in which a soldier might be able to pretend to fulfil his orders while 
never harming enemy combatants, but unlike McMahan, I believe they would 
be infrequent. 
The only other option for the conscientious conscript, according to 
McMahan, would be ‘to desert via surrender’ (2009: 135). But what if this is 
impossible, or impossible before one is given unavoidable orders to harm the 
enemy? Take the pilot of an unmanned drone – he could receive the order to 
pilot his drone to a certain spot and fire upon the enemy without leaving the 
base of operations, or without leaving his own country (if the target was just 
across a shared border, for instance). Surrender would not seem to be a 
credible option in those circumstances.  
It also may be impossible to surrender in the heat of battle, or if one’s fellow 
combatants have orders to summarily execute anyone who surrenders. 
Besides, any country willing to punish conscientious objection with death may 
well be willing to punish the families of deserters. Would the knowledge that 
one’s family will be murdered if one deserts be duress enough to render 
desertion an unreasonable option? I think it certainly would, and even 
McMahan implies that he thinks it might be (2009: 137). 
Therefore, it seems to me that the vast majority of conscripts faced with the 
choice of agreeing to fight or being killed are unlikely to have reasonable 
opportunities to refrain from harming just combatants, and will almost 
certainly not have such options when they are ordered to attack the enemy. If 
they do have them, then by all means they should take them, but I believe that 
most, if not all such conscripts lack such options.  
But what of the conscripts whose refusal to fight would result in a relatively 
lighter punishment, such as imprisonment? I agree with McMahan that if a 
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combatant does have a genuine, reasonable option not to knowingly fight in an 
unjust war, he is not under duress. But does imprisonment constitute such an 
option?  
In most cases, I would have to concede that it does. However, having a 
reasonable option not to fight is necessary, but not sufficient to make an 
individual morally responsible for fighting as unjust combatants. He must also 
be aware, or culpably unaware, that his war is unjust.  
Aristotle makes the similar point that ‘Everything that is done by reason of 
ignorance is not voluntary’ (2001: 966) (and it is only ‘on voluntary passions 
and actions [that] praise and blame are bestowed’ (Aristotle, 2001: 964)). He 
refers specifically to ‘ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the 
action and the objects with which it is concerned’ (2001: 966). 
McMahan claims it is possible for all potential unjust combatants, both 
conscripts and volunteers, to discover what sort of cause they are about to 
fight for – and therefore, if they are unaware, they are culpably so, as they 
could have learned their war was unjust and chose not to. However, I believe, 
contrary to McMahan, that the majority of unjust combatants are neither aware 
nor culpably unaware that their war is unjust. Zupan, for instance, also argues 
soldiers cannot reasonably be expected to know with any degree of certainty 
whether their war is just or unjust, and that their ignorance is non-culpable. 
He suggests that soldiers may be non-culpably ignorant either because the 
nature of being a soldier makes it unreasonably difficult, if not impossible, to 
question orders, or because there is insufficient information available for them 
to reach an informed decision – they are, as individual soldiers, not privy to 
some, or all, of the information their superior officers, governments or leaders 
have, and so they must defer to their leaders’ informed decisions.  
McMahan claims, in a similar vein to Rodin, that there is in fact sufficient 
information available for individual combatants to make an informed decision 
about the justice of a war, thanks to the fast distribution of information made 
possible by the internet. However, this is perhaps simplifying things a bit too 
much.  
There is undoubtedly, and perhaps always will be, information which the 
authorities keep to themselves for reasons like ‘national security’; and even 
with the information available, determining the justice of a particular war is 
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not a matter of looking at a small, easily managed body of information, but of 
sifting through a vast amount, any part of which could be mistaken, 
misleading, or incomplete. 
To take one example, the Chilcot Inquiry into Britain’s role in the 2003 Iraq 
War was announced in 2009. It was 6th July 2016 when the Inquiry was able to 
publish its findings, four or five years later than anticipated. Of course, many 
factors contributed to the delay, but one highly significant factor was the 
reluctance of governments and relevant officials to allow much of the 
information essential to the Inquiry’s deliberations to be released to the 
Inquiry, let alone published in the report. For instance, one report by the 
Telegraph on 9th May 2016 blamed the delay on ‘a lot of time-consuming 
wrangling with the Cabinet Office about how much correspondence between 
Blair and Bush could be released’54.  
The Chilcot Inquiry was not, of course, tasked with determining the morality 
of the Iraq War. Its remit, according to the Telegraph, was ‘To examine the 
UK’s decision to intervene in Iraq, how the British army offensive was 
conducted and any lessons to be learned’55. However, I think it illustrates my 
point well enough. If an accurate analysis of the reasons for the Iraq War 
could have been made using solely the information in the public domain, then 
surely the Inquiry would have done so, and avoided the inevitable delays that 
resulted from prising classified facts from military and government 
organisations not known for their open, generous attitude to sharing 
information. And if this information was necessary to the Chilcot Inquiry, it 
would also be essential to an individual attempting to determine the justice of 
the Iraq War before enlisting. The delays and difficulty experienced by the 
Inquiry in obtaining this information, despite all its resources and expertise, 
does suggest that an individual soldier might also find it difficult, perhaps 
almost impossible to obtain all the necessary information necessary to 
determine whether an ongoing war has a just cause. 
A possible response might be that an individual soldier need not undertake 
the same level of time-consuming research needed to determine the exact 
                                                 
54 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/09/sir-john-chilcots-iraq-war-inquiry-report-to-
be-published-on-jul/ 
55 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/09/sir-john-chilcots-iraq-war-inquiry-report-to-
be-published-on-jul/ 
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causes of war, but that she could rely upon media outlets or organisations such 
as the Wikileaks website, that are commonly deemed reputable enough to trust 
and accurate enough to be useful, and consult them as to the cause of war (so 
as to judge its justice for herself). However, my response would be, firstly, 
that determining which media outlets may be helpful may be as difficult a task 
as determining for yourself the true causes of the war. For instance, would any 
ordinary individual be in a position to know if the information released by 
Wikileaks was inaccurate, or incomplete? The necessary information for 
making this determination would be the very information that less scrupulous 
media outlets are likely to wish conceal, and with their greater resources they 
are also likely to be better at concealing it than most individuals are at 
uncovering it.  
Secondly, the difficulty for an individual to determine the truth, in the so-
called ‘post-truth era’, about a military conflict with which she is not yet 
personally involved56 has, in my view, been underestimated by many just war 
theorists. True, as McMahan points out, she has the resources of the internet at 
her disposal. But how much of what she finds out through internet sources, 
social media, supposed eye witness accounts and so on, can be trusted? 
Recently, it has emerged that large numbers of apparent news stories reported 
online, both by websites and unaffiliated individuals, are misleading, 
inaccurate or deliberately falsified. For instance, in April 2017, the singer 
Ozzy Osbourne was falsely reported dead via a Facebook page entitled ‘RIP 
Ozzy Osbourne’, which attracted nearly a million ‘likes’ and messages of 
condolence before the singer’s official representatives confirmed he was still 
alive! Similarly, before the American presidential election in November 2016, 
various hoax news stories circulated online, including one in October 2016 
posted on ABCNews.com.co (a website falsely claiming to be affiliated with 
ABC News), which claimed (entirely untruthfully) that former President 
                                                 
56 Even when a soldier is actually involved in conflict, it seems likely that in most cases she 
would only fully perceive her own part in it, not the whole picture. Thus, she cannot be 
expected to discover the justice of the entire conflict by analysing her own role in it – all that 
she can determine for certain is whether her own actions as a soldier are moral, meaning 
whether or not she acts according to the discrimination and proportionality rules. As far as 
proportionality, I believe it is only necessary for her to know the immediate objective of her 
action (such as eliminating a particular enemy position), in order to determine whether the 
actions she is ordered to take are proportionate to that end. 
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Obama had banned the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in American 
schools. This hoax story was then shared on Facebook more than 2.1 million 
times. This obviously makes it harder to determine which of the ‘facts’ 
reported on the internet are true, and these are only examples of completely 
falsified stories – there may be even more news stories presented online that 
are distorted or misrepresented versions of real events, and these may be even 
more difficult to distinguish from accurate reports, as they may be harder to 
authoritatively refute.  
If such misinformation abounds in relation to trivialities like celebrity news, 
and more serious issues such as political stories that may affect an election, 
then it seems likely it will also flourish with regards to emerging conflicts and 
the causes behind them – with no way of knowing whether denials by official 
representatives are any more truthful. ‘Fake’ or deliberately misleading news 
stories could, for instance, exaggerate or under-emphasize the danger to 
individual flourishing lives posed by an enemy state or rogue group. If the 
possibility for misunderstanding or deception is so great, it seems overly 
morally strict to claim ordinary soldiers are culpably ignorant if they do not 
accurately determine for themselves whether a war is just.  
For these reasons, it seems to me that while politicians and military leaders 
are scarcely infallible, they are perhaps better informed about whether a war is 
just than individual combatants, since the leaders of a collective have a greater 
amount of information available (as well as greater resources and facilities, 
and a team of staff to help them sort that information).  
Thus, to my mind, McMahan’s argument does not completely answer this 
point – it is more than likely that individual combatants will lack the necessary 
information and tools to effectively determine whether a war is just. They may 
well have opinions about whether or not it is just, but are probably aware that 
these are only opinions, as likely to be mistaken as correct.  
For these reasons, I believe that the ignorance of an individual soldier would 
almost always be non-culpable, and no one can be held responsible for 
fighting in an unjust war if they do not know, and cannot be reasonably 
expected to find out, that it is unjust. 
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For these two reasons (lack of knowledge and lack of choice), it seems to me 
that most combatants in an unjust war will not have moral responsibility for 
their participation and actions in that war.  
 
3iii) An argument for the presumption of combatants’ lack of moral 
responsibility  
 
We now move on to the second part of my argument, in favour of the 
necessary presumption of combatants’ weak liability. It must be admitted that 
this lack of moral responsibility will probably not apply to every unjust 
combatant. For instance, many combatants are volunteers rather than 
conscripts, and so would not suffer from any of the more forms of duress I 
have discussed.  
Similarly, while Ryan makes a good point that many career soldiers may 
perceive themselves as having a ‘democratic duty’ to fight, it is surely 
something of a sweeping generalisation to say that all soldiers fight out of a 
sense of duty. Some may perhaps join the army for purely financial reasons, or 
a desire for glory or recognition. Most, no doubt, will be motivated by a 
mixture of reasons.  
It might, therefore, be possible that some unjust combatants, those who have 
a strong sense of their duty to fight, are constrained from choosing not to do 
so, and others, who do not possess such a sense, or do not perceive that duty as 
sufficiently strong or overriding as to make refusal seem an unreasonable 
option, could have chosen otherwise.  
Likewise, it may be possible for some unjust combatants, while unable to 
access the same level of information as those in charge, to access enough 
information to make an educated guess, to get a reasonable suspicion the war 
is unjust – this might be more plausible than accessing enough privileged 
information to be absolutely certain.  
While this suspicion may not be strong enough to ground McMahan’s 
proposed obligation not to fight, it may perhaps be argued that having such a 
suspicion means that combatants should, at least, be more morally critical of 
their orders, and that failure to question, once they suspect something is 
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wrong, might make them culpably unaware of (and thus morally responsible 
for) any unjust threat of harm they subsequently pose.  
Thus, it might be possible for some unjust combatants to have some freedom 
to choose not to fight, and some suspicions that are sufficient at least to alert 
them to the possibility that the war might be unjust. This, however, leaves us 
in the unfortunate position that some unjust combatants may be morally 
responsible for the harm they inflict as unjust combatants, and thus strongly 
liable, while others will not be morally responsible, and will only be weakly 
liable. This is clearly an impossible situation, for the following reason. 
It would be difficult enough for an advocate of asymmetrical war rights to 
determine, post-conflict, which unjust combatants might be exculpated and 
which are entirely culpable. Add the suggestion that some unjust combatants 
may have been (in some circumstances at least), fighting permissibly (being 
weakly liable), and others, being strongly liable and not permitted to defend 
themselves against attack, may have been fighting impermissibly in the same 
circumstances, and you have a mess that is impossible to sort out. Even if we 
do not consider ordinary combatants liable to prosecution for war crimes 
merely for fighting on the unjust side, it becomes practically impossible to 
distinguish those who have acted permissibly from those who have acted 
impermissibly57.  
I would further add that unjust combatants who have both sufficient access 
to information to be aware or culpably unaware that they are fighting an unjust 
war and the unconstrained ability to choose not to fight are likely to be in the 
extreme minority. I have already outlined some reasons why unjust 
                                                 
57 McMahan deals with this difficulty in distinguishing combatants who have acted 
permissibly from those who have not by simply denying that it is appropriate to punish either 
just or unjust combatants for their participation in the war alone – he wrote that ‘Individual 
combatants…should not be held legally liable for the violation of ad bellum laws’ (2008: 36). 
Having argued in favour of a separation between the morality of war and the law of war, he 
argues that unjust combatants have disobeyed the morality of war, but legal punishment is 
only appropriate if they have broken the law of war. I agree with McMahan’s conclusion, 
though not with his reasoning (for the most part because of Shue’s convincing criticisms of his 
argument). It seems more plausible to me that unjust combatants who cannot be held morally 
responsible for their actions also cannot be punished for them – and given the virtual 
impossibility of distinguishing the strongly from the weakly liable unjust combatants, it is 
necessary to adopt a general presumption of weak combatant liability; meaning that if (as will 
almost certainly be the case) no clear and unmistakable proof exists to prove that a particular 
unjust combatant or group of unjust combatants are morally responsible for their actions, then 
rather than risk punishing the innocent we must accept that no unjust combatants may be 
punished simply for fighting as unjust combatants.  
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combatants may lack this knowledge and this choice, and although, as I have 
said, it is theoretically possible for a combatant to fight an unjust war both 
voluntarily and consciously, those who do are likely to be few.  
Many combatants may be conscripts without a credible option for avoiding 
conscription, especially in more aggressive or non-democratic collectives; and 
of the rest, the obedience expected of soldiers, the strength and prevalence of 
beliefs in such things as the ‘democratic duty’ to fight that Ryan describes 
(2011: 10), and the wartime prevalence of propaganda and inaccurate 
information are sufficient to make it extremely hard and probably unusual for 
unjust combatants to both realise that their war was unjust and be under no 
duress, physical or mental, to fight. 
For these reasons, I believe that the best course of action is to adopt a 
general presumption that unjust combatants are weakly liable, unless there is 
clear reason to think that one or more individual combatants are strongly liable 
– for instance, if they were heard to brag about participating in an unjust war 
for money (or, of course, if they break the jus in bello rules).  
Since it would be impossible to determine which individual unjust 
combatants were morally responsible and which were not, and since the 
morally responsible will be in the minority, we can assume, unless clearly 
proven otherwise, that unjust combatants, as a group, are not morally 
responsible, and thus only weakly liable.  
A potential problem with this argument might be that it only shows we 
should not adopt policies that treat unjust combatants as strongly liable; it 
does not prove that at least some of them are not morally responsible, and 
therefore strongly liable. This may be true, but I contend that it does not 
invalidate my conclusion.  
It is likely that some unjust combatants, albeit in the minority, may not fight 
under sufficient duress, or non-culpable ignorance, to qualify as weakly liable. 
I cannot prove the actual weak liability of all unjust combatants, but I do 
argue in favour of moving from the arguments that most unjust combatants are 
weakly liable and that it is extremely difficult, in most cases impossible, to 
distinguish between weakly liable and strongly liable unjust combatants, to a 
general presumption, in the absence of proof, that all unjust combatants are 
and should be treated as weakly liable. It is an assumption of the ‘innocent 
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until proven guilty’ kind; one realises that the defendant could be guilty, but 
without certain proof that he is, we must assume his innocence. 
Admittedly, if proof of some unjust combatant’s moral responsibility (such 
as documentation proving they had always been aware of the unjust nature of 
the war) emerges after the fact, it must be admitted that he was strongly liable 
all along58. However, a general presumption of weak or strong liability is 
needed; a presumption that must cover an entire armed force, in order to serve 
its purpose. We must assume, in the absence of proof, that all unjust 
combatants are morally permitted to exercise self-defence in battle, as armed 
forces must act in war as a coherent, organised group, and when some of the 
members of that group have different war rights from the others (and those 
with different war rights are virtually indistinguishable from the others), the 
necessary level of organisation would seem impossible to maintain.  
To be clear, then, I am not arguing that all unjust combatants are in fact 
weakly liable; merely that the majority are, and that because of the extreme 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing strongly from weakly liable in 
practice, we should adopt a blanket presumption of symmetrical weak liability 
until and unless we are proved wrong in any individual case. I also believe that 
this is sufficient to ground a presumption that all unjust combatants retain their 
individual right of defence, unless and until we have reason to believe that one 
in particular is morally responsible. 
 
3iv) An asymmetrical account of war rights compatible with a presumption 
of symmetrical liability 
 
However, the fact that most unjust combatants are weakly liable (as, indeed, 
are just combatants, by reason of fighting an enemy composed largely of the 
weakly liable) does not mean both have identical war rights. The presumption 
of shared weak liability means only that both have, unless it is proved 
otherwise, the right to defend themselves against the enemy’s direct attacks. 
The fact that just combatants are fighting as part of a larger action of defence, 
                                                 
58 Clear proof of this kind if it emerges at all, seems more likely to do so after the fact, when 
the causes of the war are clearer with the benefit of hindsight, than while the war is ongoing. 
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and unjust combatants are agents of the aggressor, does make a difference to 
their rights and privileges as combatants. 
Broadly speaking, just combatants are justified in taking those actions which 
are a necessary (and jus in bello-compliant) means of achieving their overall 
defensive goal; while unjust combatants are not entitled to take actions aimed 
at achieving their final unjust goal rather than the immediate defence of some 
soldier’s life from attack. 
In the same way, an Innocent Attacker may be justified in defending herself, 
but not in acting so as to carry out her initial unjust threat of harm to Victim, if 
the two actions diverge – for instance, if the threat Innocent Attacker poses is 
a threat of rape rather than a threat to Victim’s life (Innocent Attacker being 
somehow mentally controlled by a sadist who enjoys watching rape). In this 
case, Innocent Attacker, being weakly liable to Victim’s attack, would be 
justified in defending his life from Victim’s defensive attack, but not in 
continuing to try to rape her. 
The actions permitted to unjust combatants by their individual defensive 
rights similarly differ from their overall goal. Thus, it seems to me that weakly 
liable unjust combatants are justified only in actions aimed at defending their 
own (or their [presumably] weakly liable comrades’) lives from direct attack 
by the enemy. The rights of defence which justify these actions would not 
justify actions aimed at winning the war.  
For instance, unjust combatants might not be justified in opening fire on the 
enemy, only in returning fire if necessary to save their own lives. They would 
not be justified in making air strikes on enemy positions, and so on. In short, 
they would be morally permitted only to use defensive military tactics, not 
offensive ones. 
In terms of post bellum punishment or prosecution, however, it seems 
plausible that even though unjust combatants are not entitled to take actions 
aimed at winning or advancing the fight for their unjust cause, the fact that the 
majority are not morally responsible for these unjust actions means also that 
they should not be punished for them. Unjust combatants lack moral 
responsibility for these actions precisely because they have acted excusably, 
albeit not justifiably. The general presumption of weak liability for unjust 
combatants that I have argued for, may also mean that we should assume, in 
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the absence of proof, that all unjust combatants act excusably in this way, and 
so may not be punished for their actions.  
There could, and perhaps should, be some system of prosecution for those 
who are more morally responsible for the unjust war, such as the leaders, 
politicians, government or military officials who have made freer and more 
informed decisions about the war, or even some ordinary soldiers in the 
unlikely event that they are at some point proved to be morally responsible. 
However, since my focus here is specifically on liability to attack, rather than 
liability for punishment, I am unable to explore this argument in great detail. 
I must make it clear that whilst I accept McMahan’s definition of moral 
responsibility as a definition of strong liability, I do not agree with his 
permissive asymmetry. While I would accept that those few unjust combatants 
who are clearly morally responsible for their actions might be strongly liable, I 
do not believe any non-combatants, even those who share the moral 
responsibility for an unjust conflict, are liable to attack by combatants.  
As I said earlier, I believe that Rodin gives a persuasive criticism of 
McMahan’s arguments for permissive asymmetry, without undermining the 
concept of moral responsibility as a basis for strong liability to attack. In 
addition to this, I would suggest that weak liability might be a necessary 
condition for strong liability, or any liability at all.  
Thus, unless an individual is directly causally responsible for the relevant 
threat (as opposed to a link much further back in the causal chain), that 
person’s moral responsibility alone will not make him liable to attack at all, let 
alone strongly liable.  
The overall picture of the war rights and liabilities of combatants that has 
emerged is one of (presumed) symmetrical liability and asymmetrical war 
rights. I have argued that both just and unjust combatants are presumably 
liable in the weaker sense, acknowledging that some unjust combatants may 
be liable to attack in the stronger sense, but necessarily adopting a general 
presumption of weak liability, unless clear evidence is found to the contrary. 
However, I go on to give an asymmetrical account of combatants’ war rights.  
In short, I suggest that combatants’ liability does not solely determine their 
war rights – presumed symmetrical weak liability only means that both just 
and unjust combatants may be assumed to have the right to defend themselves. 
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But just combatants, because they are working towards a justified overall aim, 
also have additional war rights which depend upon their status as defenders 
against a larger act of aggression; chiefly, the right to use force to attack the 
enemy in order to achieve the larger-scale defensive aim, as well as defending 
themselves individually.  
There are two rights of defence at play here – collective and individual. 
Combatants do not lose their individual rights59, whether or not they are also 
acting upon a collective right of defence, and thus even unjust combatants 
retain the right to defend themselves, assuming they are only weakly liable. 
But just combatants have an additional right of defence; their right as agents of 
the collective fighting a defensive war.  
This accommodates Rodin’s objection that just combatants can fight 
proportionately since the harm they inflict may be outweighed by ‘the 
goodness of their cause and the contribution a given military action makes to 
the cause’ (Rodin, 2008: 53), but harm inflicted by unjust combatants may not 
be thus outweighed, ‘for (their cause being unjust) there is no good which 
could render the harmful effects proportionate’ (Rodin, 2008: 53).  
Under my view, those actions of unjust combatants that aim at winning their 
unjust war are not justified. Only the actions they take to defend their own 
lives may be permitted, and these can be proportionate, because their 
immediate aim is not an unjust cause, but the preserving of a person’s life, to 
which (assuming they are only weakly liable) they still have a right. This is, 
therefore, a good consequence that can outweigh harm inflicted to achieve it. 
Therefore, the fact that just combatants’ actions are aimed at achieving a just 
cause means the force they use against unjust combatants is permitted; whilst 
unjust combatants, are not morally permitted to use offensive action in order 
to win their war (though any such actions they take may be excusable). Hence, 
just and unjust combatants have (presumed) symmetrical or equal liability, but 
asymmetrical war rights. 
It might seem that this argument is still vulnerable to Ryan’s argument that 
the moral equality thesis renders combatants ‘morally immature’ (Ryan, 2008: 
                                                 
59 Delegating defensive rights to a collective means that individuals must allow that collective 
to exercise them on their behalf when it or its agents can, but when they cannot (or when, 
being its agents, they are themselves the front line of defence) individuals may defend 
themselves. 
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148) by creating a ‘passivity among soldiers’ – since ‘an abstraction’ (2008: 
148), like a collective entity, would be responsible for waging an unjust war 
and the harm inflicted in the course of waging it, then ‘no real persons were 
responsible for anything’ (2008: 148), and no soldier needs to evaluate the war 
he is about to fight.  
Although my argument does not result in MEC, is not based upon the 
traditional sovereignty system Ryan is critiquing, and I would not place moral 
responsibility for war upon abstractions but most probably upon leaders, 
presidents, prime ministers and other government officials, this problem might 
still apply. My argument retains the assertion, common to many versions of 
the moral equality thesis, that unjust combatants are, or may be assumed to be, 
not morally responsible for the harm they inflict. This is precisely what makes 
soldiers morally immature in Ryan’s opinion (he writes, for instance, that the 
way to create ‘a more morally mature military’ was ‘by reasserting personal 
responsibility’ (2008: 148)). In addition, it might appear to create an incentive 
for soldiers not to enquire too deeply into the justice of their cause.  
Since it must be assumed that soldiers are not morally responsible unless it is 
clearly proved they had both the choice not to fight and the knowledge that 
their war was unjust, it might seem in a soldier’s own self-interest to avoid 
coming into possession of such knowledge, as by so doing she would ensure 
that she could not be considered morally responsible for her actions.  
However, I would dispute this reading of my argument. As I mentioned 
earlier, if an unjust combatant lacks moral responsibility because of her 
ignorance of the injustice of the war, then that ignorance must be non-
culpable, meaning that she must not be to blame for it. When a soldier 
deliberately avoids an opportunity to find out if the war she is about to fight is 
just or unjust, then she is responsible for her ignorance of the injustice of her 
cause – it is culpable ignorance, and she therefore would still be morally 
responsible for the harm she inflicted as an unjust combatant. 
I would further suggest that my argument may avoid Ryan’s criticism 
regarding a ‘morally immature military’ (Ryan, 2008: 148), in that my account 
does not ignore the possibility that soldiers could, if conditions were right (if 
combatants were not under duress or non-culpably ignorant that the war was 
unjust), be morally responsible for their actions as unjust combatants.  
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For this reason, I do not believe my account would necessarily result in the 
kind of passive, morally immature obedience Ryan warns about. Soldiers 
would need, to morally evaluate whether they have a possibility of learning 
whether the war was unjust (and pursue it if they do), and if they believe the 
war is unjust, they might also need to determine whether refusal to fight is a 
reasonable option open to them. However, if (as I believe will be the usual 
case) this reasonable option and this possibility do not exist in any useful 
degree, failure to pursue them would not render those soldiers morally 
responsible. 
I must clarify one more point, however: the existence of the reasonable 
option not to fight and the possibility of discovering the war is unjust must be 
clear enough to be reasonably apparent to both the potential combatants and to 
any impartial observers. Without such clarity, combatants who fail to take 
advantage of their available choices and information could not be morally 
blamed for failing to do so. Soldiers cannot be held morally responsible for 
failing to take advantage of choices and opportunities of which they are non-
culpably unaware. 
Therefore, I would argue in favour of a general presumption of weak 
liability for unjust combatants, resulting in symmetrical weak liability for just 
and unjust combatants in the absence of any evidence of individual unjust 
combatants’ strong liability. 
However, I would also argue that the overall war rights of just and unjust 
combatants are not symmetrical. Only just combatants are waging a campaign 
with an overall aim of defence, and hence just combatants have additional war 
rights. They have the right to fight offensively – to attack their enemy as well 
as defend themselves.  
Hence, I defend a slightly different form of the moral inequality thesis to 
many just war theorists, such as McMahan, but my account, I believe, better 
reflects our intuitions that while just combatants have additional rights as just 
combatants, this does not mean that if (as is the case with some conscripts) an 
unjust combatant cannot avoid fighting without being executed, his only 
morally justifiable option is to die.  
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   4: Conclusion 
 
 
In conclusion, in this chapter I have discussed arguments for the moral 
equality of combatants, and arguments, like McMahan’s, for the moral 
inequality of combatants, which suggested that all unjust combatants are 
strongly liable and thus lack all the rights just combatants possess, including 
the individual right to self-defence. Having rejected many elements of these 
ideas, I have argued in favour of a slightly different form of the moral 
inequality thesis.  
I believe that all just combatants and the vast majority of unjust combatants 
are weakly liable, and since attempting to pick out the few strongly liable 
unjust combatants, especially during a war, would be extremely difficult if not 
impossible, both just and unjust combatants may be presumed, in the absence 
of clear proof, to retain the individual right of self-defence, but that just 
combatants have the additional war rights to perform aggressive military 
actions because these actions are justified in order to achieve their larger goal 
of defence.  
This version of the moral inequality thesis, I believe, follows on well from 
my account of just cause for war, and best accords with our moral intuitions 
concerning the rights of individual soldiers.  
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Chapter Four: The Conditions for Possession of a 
Collective Right to Defence 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In previous chapters I considered individual defensive rights and how they 
ground a definition of just cause for war; in this chapter I intend to discuss the 
delegation of these defensive rights from individuals to collective entities, and 
determine what kinds of collective entities can possess the authority to wage 
war. As I mentioned in the introduction, I accept the definition of ‘war’ as an 
organized, stable military campaign, aimed at achieving some goal or goals.  
Although I elsewhere argue against some of McMahan’s points, we agree 
that it is highly counter-intuitive that individual people might have the power 
of ‘conscientious initiation’, as Ryan (2011: 38)60 calls it – the moral 
authority, in short, to declare and subsequently wage war. I have shown, in 
Chapter Two, that the appropriate subject of the kind of right of defence that 
can justify war (the right to exercise delegated individual defensive rights) 
must be a collective entity. 
I argue that individual defensive rights belonging to each member of a group 
may be delegated to that group as a whole, giving that collective entity as a 
whole the right to take necessary (and proportionate) action to defend these 
members. I must now explain what kinds of groups may have this collective 
right of defence, and demonstrate how individual rights are delegated to such 
groups. Since, as I will argue, the right to wage war and the authority to do so 
are inextricably linked, this also amounts to a rough working definition of who 
has the authority to go to war. 
                                                 
60 Ryan is referring to combatants in particular, but I believe the point stands. His suggestion 
is that it is implausible for individual combatants to have the authority to initiate a war alone – 
if this is implausible, then it must be even more implausible to suggest that the same authority 
should also belong to non-combatants. 
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Traditionally, there is often an assumption that the only collective entities 
with rights of collective defence (and thus the authority to wage war in 
defence of their members) were sovereign states. This may be based on 
arguments that can be traced to the beginnings of just war theory. The 
argument that to declare war justly one must have legitimate authority goes 
back to St Augustine, who writes that in order to lawfully make war, one must 
have the command or permission of a ‘higher and legitimate authority’ (2007: 
348). The exact composition of this ‘authority’ is then further defined by 
Thomas Aquinas, who writes that, in addition to just cause and ‘rightful 
intention’, a just cause requires ‘the authority of the sovereign by whose 
command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private 
individual to declare war’ (1947: 1359). 
Thus, Aquinas’ definition of legitimate authority is that of the ruler or 
government of a ‘city, kingdom or province’ (1947: 1359), which modern just 
war theory would describe as the government of a nation-state. Many laws and 
conventions of war appear to accept this definition almost wholeheartedly.  
For instance, the 1907 Hague Convention IV ‘Respecting the Laws and 
Custom of War on Land’ refers to ‘the belligerent States’61 and ‘belligerent 
parties’ interchangeably, as though ‘States’ were the only entities that could 
conceivably wage war; and in the chapter headed ‘The Qualifications of 
Belligerents’ it specifically states that the ‘laws, rights and duties of war’ 
apply only to armies ‘commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates’62 – in other words, the army must be an ‘army of the State’63, 
following the orders of some ruler or government officials who are thus 
responsible for that army’s actions.  
To begin with, then, I must explain why I do not believe sovereign states are 
the only collective entities to which individual defensive rights may be 
delegated. I must decide which kinds of collectives are the appropriate kinds 
to receive delegated individual defensive rights, and therefore what collective 
entities may possess a collective right to exercise the delegated individual 
                                                 
61 Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Regulations, Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section 1, Article 37. 
62 Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Regulations, Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section 1, Article 1. 
63 Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Regulations, Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section 1, Article 8. 
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defensive rights by means of war. In doing this, I will also determine which 
collective entities have the authority to wage war, as the two are, if not 
perfectly synonymous, at least inextricably connected. To have the right to 
exercise delegated defensive rights by means of war (or, more succinctly, the 
right to wage war) is to have the moral authority to do so. It would seem 
contradictory to grant that a collective entity has the right, and duty, to 
exercise its members’ defensive rights by any necessary and proportionate 
means, including war, and yet assert that it lacks the moral permission or 
authority, and thus the liberty, to do so.  
Rodin mentions that a ‘radical’ (2004b: 94) implication of reductive 
individualism for the legitimate authority condition is that ‘if national defense 
is reducible to personal self-defense, as the reductive view holds, then it would 
be presumptively legitimate to form private armies to fight private defensive 
wars’ (2004b: 95), because ‘personal self-defence may be undertaken by 
private individuals’ (2004b: 94-5).  
While I do not believe this is necessarily a problem for individualists (since 
many, such as Fabre, conclude as I do that some ‘private’ defensive wars, in 
the sense of being fought by non-state entities or organizations, may in fact be 
justified), it does suggest that possession of the right to self-defence that 
grounds just cause may be linked to possession of legitimate authority to wage 
war. 
One objection might be that an entire collective may have the right to go to 
war, but only a small part of that collective (its government or elected 
leadership, for instance) may have the authority to take that group to war. 
However, this kind of authority to wage war is, I believe, distinct from the 
definition of legitimate authority I wish to use. It appears to be a definition of 
legitimate authority as political authority, involving the suggestion that 
possession of the authority to go to war derives from a person or group’s 
acknowledged role within a collective entity (as the recognised leader or 
elected government), and it is therefore not possessed by entire groups but by 
the leaders of those groups. 
There are practical advantages of limiting authority in this way; for instance, 
to do so may make it clearer which parties within that collective may be held 
accountable for the decision to wage war or to continue with a military 
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campaign. Also, it means that the process of negotiation is perhaps simplified 
for the antagonists.  
It is also possible, as Steven Lee argues, to understand the legitimate 
authority criterion solely in terms of ‘Legal legitimacy’ or ‘authority that is 
exercised in accord with the rules (or laws) of an organization’ (2012: 82), and 
to therefore deny that the criterion has any moral content.  
However, it seems to me that definitions of legitimate authority as purely 
political or legal aren’t sufficiently normative for a just war theory. 
Determining whether a state or government is legally or politically legitimate 
does not help to determine whether that state or government’s being able to 
wage war is morally justifiable – and this seems to me to be the point of this 
criterion. A more useful definition of legitimate authority for this purpose is 
that of a moral authority, required in order for a collective to have the right to 
wage war; an authority which can be possessed by an entire group, and which 
some cosmopolitans, such as Fabre, suggest may even be possessed by one 
individual alone.   
Few would deny that in collectives where there is an elected or otherwise 
acknowledged leadership, which has the authority and duty to exercise certain 
powers, that leadership has the practical or political authority to declare war. 
To say that a government has the authority to take its country to war is simply 
affirming that the government’s role within that society is to take such actions 
when they are appropriate. To interpret the legitimate authority criterion in this 
way makes it much too wide in scope; any collective would have legitimate 
authority to wage a war if that war was declared by the appropriate political 
authority.  
The same could be said for Lee’s definition of legitimate authority in terms 
of legal legitimacy. Lee himself admitted that ‘the criterion is likely to be 
satisfied by any war, understood as a conflict between large 
organizations…given that the de facto rulers of organizations capable of using 
force act under the rules (official or unofficial) of that organization in 
initiating war’ (2012: 82-3).  
This reduces the legitimate authority criterion to the merely ‘procedural’ 
(Lee, 2012: 82), suggesting that all political leaders, or all leaders who follow 
the rules of their societies in declaring war, are automatically legitimate 
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authorities. The reason seems to be that these definitions ignore the link 
between legitimate authority to wage war and the right to wage war. As I said, 
I believe that these, while not quite the same thing, are inextricably bound up 
together – one cannot have the authority to wage war without the right to do 
so, and having the right to do so implies one has the authority, as a right that 
one has no authority to exercise seems inert, useless, even faintly absurd. But 
political authority or legal legitimacy are not linked to the right to wage war. 
Many just war theorists besides myself have separated political or legal 
legitimacy and the right to wage war – Rawls, for instance, argued that 
‘outlaw states’ (1999: 90) may possess the former, but cannot possess the 
latter; and cosmopolitans like Fabre might claim individuals or groups who do 
not have the former can nevertheless have the latter. 
My own argument differs from both Rawls and Fabre. I would suggest that a 
better definition of legitimate authority is that of a moral authority to wage 
defensive war (much more closely connected with the right to wage war than 
political or legal authority) which is dependent upon the delegation of 
individual defensive rights to a collective entity. A collective entity has the 
moral authority to wage war, but only to exercise the individual defensive 
rights of its citizens. There is no such thing as the moral, or legitimate, 
authority to wage an unjust war64.  
I would therefore argue that the legitimate authority to wage war is distinct 
from legal or political authority to take one’s collective to war. The legitimate 
authority criterion should be concerned not (or not primarily) with which 
group within a collective has the legal right or the political authority to take 
that collective to war, but rather with which groups are morally permitted to 
wage war – just war theory is, after all, intended to determine the morality of 
war, rather than the legality of war. I do not deny that collectives capable of 
waging war must have leaders or governments in place with the political and 
legal authority to declare war, but legitimate authority to wage war is not this 
kind of authority, but rather a moral authority. I therefore argue that the 
                                                 
64 The one exception might be if the enemy were to use non-discriminatory or disproportionate 
tactics that threatened innocent civilians, in which case even a collective already waging an 
unjust war might gain the moral authority to fight in their defence (albeit only in their defence 
– the larger campaign of war would still be unjustified, and the collective would still have no 
moral authority to wage that war). 
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collective right to exercise delegated individual defensive rights which 
grounds a collective entity’s just cause for war also grounds that collective’s 
legitimate authority to wage that war. This is the clearest distinction between 
my definition of legitimate authority and other definitions that rely on political 
or legal authority. 
Another objection to my argument might be that claiming a collective entity 
may have just cause but lack authority to wage war need not necessarily mean 
it cannot exercise its right of defence, but only that it cannot do so in certain 
ways (ie by waging war) – in short, its right is circumscribed. However, since 
a collective right of defence is simply the right to exercise delegated individual 
defensive rights, to suggest a collective has a partial or circumscribed right to 
do this suggests that all the individual defensive rights delegated to it are 
similarly circumscribed. And unless the attack in question is not serious 
enough to threaten sufficient aspects of their flourishing lives to make war a 
proportionate response, this does not seem plausible.  
I will therefore assume that collective entities have one of two options; they 
may either possess the full right to exercise delegated individual defensive 
rights by any necessary and proportionate means (including war), which 
means that they have the right, and moral authority, to wage war, or that they 
may lack this right and authority altogether. 
In this chapter I will determine which kinds of collectives individuals may 
delegate their defensive rights to, as this is the basis for the right and moral 
authority to wage war. I begin by examining and criticising the reasons why 
stalwarts of the just war tradition like Grotius and Rousseau, as well as other 
more modern just war theorists, argue that states are the only collective 
entities that possess legitimate authority. Ultimately, I will reject the 
identification of states or official governments as the only entities with 
authority to wage war. I will go on to develop a definition of what 
distinguishes the kinds of collective entity that could be custodians of 
delegated individual rights, and are thus potential legitimate authorities, from 
the kinds that cannot, drawing upon the arguments of theorists like David 
Estlund, Michael Gross, Margaret Gilbert and Peter French. I will then go on 
to further explore the implications of the delegation of individual defensive 
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rights, for instance what rights and duties states or non-state collective entities 
might bear as a result of accepting delegated individual defensive rights. 
 
 
1: A Consideration of Various Definitions of Legitimate 
Authority  
 
 
First, I must explain why I reject other traditional and modern definitions of 
the authority to wage war, many of which limit it to political or state authority. 
For instance, Aquinas was among the first just war theorists to claim that 
legitimate authority was possessed only by a sovereign power, or nation-state. 
He claims this because firstly, the private individual ‘can seek for redress of 
his rights from the tribunal of his superior’ (1947: 1359) – in other words, he 
has no need to wage war because there is an authority above him that he can, 
and should, appeal to for justice.  
Secondly, private individuals are not permitted to ‘summon together the 
people’ (1947: 1359) – in other words, raise an army and command it to fight. 
Finally, he suggests that  
 
‘as the care of the common weal is committed to those who 
are in authority, it is their business to watch over the 
common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to 
them...[and] so too, it is their business to have recourse to 
the sword of war in defending the common weal against 
external enemies’. (Aquinas, 1947: 1359-60) 
 
   In other words, since political leaders are responsible for the ‘common 
weal’ or general good of those in their charge, they have the authority to 
defend them by war if necessary. The government has the job of defending 
and protecting the interests of their citizens in the international arena, and 
therefore it must also have the job of defending them from attack. That, 
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Aquinas seems to suggest, is simply what a government is there for; it is part 
of its mandate or remit. 
More recently, some just war theorists have refined this argument, and 
suggested other reasons why either all nation-states, or some nation-states in 
particular, depending upon whether or not they fulfil certain criteria, have 
legitimate authority (and thus would be the appropriate subjects of a collective 
right of defence).  
For instance, Weeks suggests that rather than being grounded upon the 
possession of sovereign authority per se, the authority to declare war should 
depend upon the wishes of the citizens of the belligerent state, since state 
authorities are ‘tasked to represent the will of the people’ (2010: 63).   
This would seem to suggest that only states which have the consent of their 
citizens to go to war have the authority to actually wage that war. A 
consequence of this argument might be the limitation of authority to wage war 
to democratic states, as dictatorships seldom consider themselves to be 
‘tasked’ with representing the wishes of their citizens (Weeks, 2010: 63). 
However, as I will show later in this chapter, such an argument does not 
necessarily limit legitimate authority to states, since non-state collectives may 
also have the consent of their members to wage war. 
In another example, Jonathan Parry suggests that, in the nineteenth century, 
the Liberals sought to ‘underpin state legitimacy’ through ‘maintaining and 
promoting the health and vigour of the national community’ and also through 
‘The constant articulation of pride in the values that Britain projected to the 
world’ (2006: 389).  
This is in some ways similar to Walzer’s argument that states possess 
collective ‘rights of territorial legitimacy and political sovereignty’ (1977: 61) 
(upon which their status as legitimate authorities would seem to depend), but a 
state’s possession of these rights ‘depends upon the reality of the common life 
it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are 
willingly accepted and thought worthwhile’ (1977: 54).  
If the ‘reality of the common life’ (Walzer, 1977: 54) (or the ‘health and 
vigour of the national community’ (Parry, 2006: 389) are in doubt, or if ‘the 
state doesn’t defend the common life that does exist’ (Walzer, 1977: 54), then 
Walzer would argue ‘its own defense may have no moral justification’ (1977: 
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54)65. Not only could such a state not have just cause for war under Walzer’s 
argument, but it cannot make the same ‘claims to territory and sovereignty’ 
(1977: 54) that other states can. This argument would, therefore, seem to 
suggest that only states which fulfil these conditions are legitimate authorities. 
Massimo Renzo also advances an interesting argument, suggesting that 
legitimate authority (which he defines politically, as the state’s ‘right to rule’ 
(2011: 575), as well as the authority to wage wars) derives from individuals’ 
‘natural duty not to pose unjust threats to others’ (2011: 578).  
This, he suggests, is a duty which anybody refusing to enter a state and live 
by its rules (‘anarchists’ as he calls them (2011: 578)) inevitably flout, because 
they ‘prevent the state from performing its legislative, executive and judicial 
functions, which are necessary in order to have a minimal level of order and 
security’ and thus ‘expose those living next to them to the dangers of the state 
of nature, thereby posing an unjust threat’ (2011: 578)66.  
A significant common thread running through these varied concepts of 
legitimate authority is their acceptance that the only kinds of collective entities 
with the authority to wage war are nation-states, although they may differ on 
the subject of how many nation-states possess this authority, and why the 
others are excluded.  
For instance, Renzo admits that he is leaving aside the possibility of other 
forms of legitimacy besides the state’s, because ‘states are the most common 
form of political organization’ (2011: 579). Weeks also only discusses consent 
to state authority, and Walzer does not believe non-state communities are 
possessors of collective rights that would ground their right or authority to go 
to war precisely because they are non-state communities, and he only 
                                                 
65 However, it is Walzer’s contention that very few states will, in practice, lack legitimacy in 
this way. He writes that ‘most states do stand guard over the community of their citizens, at 
least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of their defensive wars’ (1977: 54). 
66 He further argues that ‘would-be independents can be justifiably coerced in self-defence to 
enter the state’, because ‘those who pose an unjust threat to others can be justifiably coerced 
in self-defence, at least when they are morally responsible for posing the threat’ (2011: 580). I 
am doubtful about this whole argument, primarily because I disagree with Renzo concerning 
the degree of threat ‘would-be independents’ pose to the functioning of a state unless there are 
an improbably large number of them (in which case, they could form their own state and be 
just as legitimate in this sense). I find it hard to picture a few individuals living in the state of 
nature threatening the smooth-running of an entire state, even if they do ‘end up in 
disagreement about practical matters’ (2011: 588). Also, I am uncertain that any threat posed 
to a state would be an unjust one if the ‘would-be independents’ are themselves oppressed or 
otherwise endangered by that state. 
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considers state rights (political sovereignty and territorial integrity) to be 
grounds for just cause and proper authority. 
The question I must first answer is, therefore, whether there might be a valid 
argument that only nation-states possess legitimate authority. I have already 
examined and rejected Walzer’s collectivist rights as a basis for just cause, and 
so they will not do as a basis for legitimate authority either – my account 
requires a very different definition of a collective right of defence. I will 
therefore begin by examining the reasons why two stalwarts of just war theory 
think legitimate authority belongs only to states. 
 
1i) Arguments for the state as sole legitimate authority  
 
To begin with, I will examine Hugo Grotius’ argument. Grotius claims it is 
‘unlawful by the Law of Nature’ (2012: 338) for the inhabitants of a country to 
rise up and declare war against their ‘Superiors’, because the state was 
‘instituted for the Preservation of Peace’ (2012: 338). He subscribes to the 
Hobbesian view that society developed to put an end to the chaotic ‘war of all 
against all’ (Hobbes, 1998: 30) that was the state of nature.  
Following on from this argument, individuals’ right to defend themselves 
against injustice can, in the interests of ‘maintaining publick Peace and good 
Order’ (Grotius, 2012: 338), be overruled by the state, which by its mere 
existence acquires ‘a superior Right in the State over us and ours, so far as is 
necessary for that End [peace and order]’ (2012: 338). 
A similar argument is made by St Augustine, who writes that the 
requirement that ‘the authority and the decision to undertake war rest with the 
ruler’ was according to ‘the natural order’ (2007: 351). This argument is 
absolute: no attempt by anything besides a state to declare war is morally 
permitted because, if such attempts persist, all things will descend into chaos – 
‘there would be no longer a State, but a Multitude without Union’ (Grotius, 
2012: 339).  
If states choose to treat their citizens unjustly, and no other state decides to 
intervene, then, however heinous the treatment in question might be, the 
situation is unchanged – in Grotius’ words, ‘we ought rather to bear it 
patiently, than to resist by Force’ (2012: 338).  
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Leaving aside the question of whether Grotius is correct about the practical 
claims he makes (that a war by any entity other than a state would result in the 
breakdown of society) I feel there is still a serious problem with this argument.  
To discover that problem, we must look more closely at why Grotius 
believes that anarchistic chaos, the ‘Multitude without Union’ (2012: 339), is 
such a terrible thing, to be avoided at such cost. It can only be because of the 
consequences to people of living in chaos, without the protective shield of 
society. 
The evils of chaos exist solely in the suffering of those who endure it. The 
disorganised chaos of a world devoid of intelligent inhabitants does not seem 
an inherently bad state of affairs, because that chaos harms no one. Besides, 
Grotius’ use of the words ‘Multitude without Union’ (2012: 339, my italics) 
clearly shows he is thinking of the effects of a lack of ordered society upon 
humanity. 
If humanity’s suffering in a state of anarchy is something to be morally 
concerned about, why should the suffering of humanity through the 
‘Injury…done us by the Will of our Sovereign’ be so cavalierly dismissed as 
something we ‘ought to…bear patiently’ (Grotius, 2012: 338)? Is constant fear 
and suffering caused by living in anarchy really worse than constant fear and 
suffering caused by living in a despotic political state?  
I believe that the two cases are in fact likely to be equally unpleasant. If the 
one is severe enough to justify setting up the state in order to end it, surely the 
other might justify setting up another state, even by fighting a revolutionary 
war against state authorities.  
There are, of course, a few cases in which this was done peacefully, for 
example, as Jan Narveson remarked, pacifist means used to win an 
independent state in India were ‘apparently rather successful’ (1970: 263), but 
inevitably in many cases the despotic nature of a state may make a peaceful 
resolution impossible.  
In these cases, it seems that if suffering caused by anarchy justifies the 
institution of ‘civil society’ by whatever means necessary (in a state of 
anarchy, one can hardly assume all parties peacefully agree to give up certain 
freedoms to become citizens of a stable society), then the means private 
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individuals take to rid themselves of suffering caused by despots are also 
justified – up to and including war. This undermines Grotius’ argument. 
Rousseau gives a different argument; he suggests not that it is immoral or 
unjustifiable for anything but a state to wage war, but that it is impossible.  
Rousseau writes that ‘War is…not a relationship between one man and 
another, but a relationship between one State and another, in which individuals 
are enemies only by accident…as soldiers’ (2004: 46-7). His argument states 
that ‘war can only arise within a certain framework, one that presupposes the 
so-called civilized order’ (Reichberg, Syse and Begby, 2006: 482). 
In other words, there are conditions of war that only the nation-state can 
fulfil; namely, the fact that, as Rousseau put it, ‘War is a permanent state 
which presupposes lasting relations’ (2004: 166). Conflict between 
individuals, on the other hand, can arise and be settled swiftly, in no more time 
than it takes to have a fistfight outside the pub, to use a modern example. In 
Rousseau’s words, friendships and enmities between individuals are ‘in 
continual flux’ (2004: 166).  
As a collective body, a state can have collective aims and interests, 
considerably wider in scope than those of individuals, and can endeavour to 
achieve them for longer periods of time by focussing the combined efforts of 
large numbers of its citizens towards achieving them. Rousseau claims this is 
necessary for war, and this is why, he argues, the constant relationships 
presupposed by the state of war ‘rarely obtain between man and man’ (2004: 
166).  
He claims it is equally impossible for an individual or non-state group to 
declare war against a nation-state, as ‘any State can only have other States, 
and not men, as enemies, inasmuch as it is impossible to fix a true relation 
between things of different nature’ (Rousseau, 2004: 47). 
This is not necessarily to say that conflict between a state and a group of 
civilian rebels could not be described as a war because the conflict would be 
unequal, but rather that the ‘constant relationships’ necessary for war can only 
obtain between two entities that are similar in the relevant ways (fixed laws, 
stability of purpose, length of potential existence and so on); namely, states. 
Thus, according to Rousseau, only states can wage war, so state authority is 
the only legitimate authority. 
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This is a practical argument – an argument about the nature of the world 
(and war); it is, therefore, a practical objection I offer to it. Rousseau claims 
‘continual relationships’ are impossible except between states; I would argue 
they are not. Rousseau’s mistake is to assume that ‘individuals’ and ‘nations’ 
are the only two kinds of entity capable of entering into relationships like 
alliance or enmity. 
He states that besides individual people, the only entities capable of this are 
‘artificial’ (2004: 169) or collective entities, composed of numerous 
individuals who surrender certain freedoms in order to better achieve their 
common interests and goals. His assumption is that the only ‘artificial’ entity 
in existence is the state. This, I suggest, is not the case. 
There are many non-state ‘artificial bodies’, which can be said to pursue 
aims, make alliances, even command (or compel) their members to certain 
action, just as a state commands its soldiers to take military action.  
One obvious example is a trade union, which often forms collective goals on 
behalf of its members, and orders its members to a form of campaign action by 
calling a general strike – long-term disputes over, for instance, pay or working 
hours between the trade unions and the government require a continual 
relationship of opposition, like the continual relationships Rousseau describes 
as necessary for war67. 
For example, the miners’ strike against Margaret Thatcher’s government 
lasted from 5th March 1984 to 3rd March 1985. In order to mount such a long-
standing campaign to achieve clearly specified goals – to prevent the 
government’s ‘programme of closures that would see 20 pits shut and 20,000 
miners lose their jobs’68 – Rousseau’s ‘lasting relations’ (2004: 166) must 
certainly have existed between the trade union and the government.  In support 
of this point, Gerry Wallace writes that ‘Strikes, like wars, are examples of 
collective conflicts, the nature of which may make it impossible to play by the 
rules that apply in conflicts between individuals’ (1991: 133). 
Many other examples exist of non-state collective entities capable of 
maintaining ‘constant relationships’: there are multinational corporations, 
                                                 
67 This is not necessarily to say that trade unions can, or should, wage war! My point here is 
simply that some organisations, such as trade unions, can maintain these kinds of ‘continual’ 
relationships. 
68 BBC News, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3494024.stm 
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some of which could be said to hold power equal to that of a small country; 
there are terrorist groups like al-Qaeda; there are international religious groups 
or cults; and there are rebel movements and informal ‘people’s governments’, 
seeking to overthrow an older regime. 
In fact, it might even be possible to argue that a popular protest movement 
with no official leadership hierarchy can constitute a collective entity, can 
(through social media like Facebook and Twitter) formulate its own goals, 
plan its actions, and perhaps achieve them.  
For instance, during the 2011 protests in Egypt, the BBC News website 
commented that the protests ‘were co-ordinated through a Facebook page 
where organisers say they are taking a stand against torture, poverty, 
corruption and unemployment’69. When discussing the Egyptians’ overthrow 
of Mubarak’s regime or the Tunisians’ ousting of their president Zine al-
Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, it often seems sensible to refer to the ‘protest 
movement’ as a collective entity and discuss ‘its’ aims. 
Thus, I believe Rousseau is wrong when he claims that only nation-states 
can maintain the ‘constant relationships’ which I agree are necessary for war, 
as many of these collective entities can clearly do so.  
Whether all these entities have the moral authority to wage wars is, of 
course, another issue, but Rousseau does not address it. His argument is that 
war is, by definition, only possible for a nation-state, and I have shown this to 
be false. It is even possible for a non-legitimate authority to wage a war, 
provided they have the ability to effectively do so (as IS does, for instance), 
even if they cannot wage a justified war. 
Lionel McPherson gives a different argument, defining legitimate authority 
as state or political authority, and arguing that most non-state groups which 
‘resort to political violence’ (McPherson, 2007: 546) are not waging war but 
engaging in terrorist activity.  
One distinctive thing, however, is that McPherson suggests non-state 
political violence, while it does not count as ‘conventional war’ (2007: 546), 
may not necessarily be impermissible if a non-state group has what he calls 
‘representative authority’, which is ‘morally analogous to the legitimate 
                                                 
69 BBC News, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12289475 
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authority of states’ (2007: 543)70 (which, he asserts, most states possess, 
except tyrannical ones perhaps, drawn from ‘the majority support of their 
people’ (2007: 545)).  
Nevertheless, it is his contention that ‘Typically, nonstate actors engaged in 
terrorism do not meet this requirement’ (2007: 545), so that terrorism (as he 
defines it) can be distinctively wrong ‘with regards to a defeasible perspective 
from which nonstate actors lack representative authority and states have it’ 
(2007: 545).  
Terrorism is defined by Louis Pojman as ‘a type of political violence that 
intentionally targets civilians (noncombatants) in a ruthlessly destructive, 
often unpredictable manner…in order to inspire fear and create panic’ (2003: 
140). However, as I have said, McPherson argues that terrorism can be 
identified by the fact that ‘terrorists do not have adequate authority to 
undertake political violence’ (2007: 524). Janna Thompson similarly suggests 
that all ‘attacks…military or non-military’ (Thompson, 2005: 153) committed 
by non-legitimate authorities are, by definition, terrorist.  
However, I subscribe instead to what McPherson calls the ‘dominant view’ 
(2007: 525), that terrorism is distinctively wrong because it is specifically 
violence performed in deliberate contravention of the in bello discrimination 
rule – violence which is aimed intentionally at non-liable non-combatants, 
with the aim of creating fear – what McPherson refers to as a ‘fear-effects 
clause’ (2007: 529).  
McPherson criticises this ‘dominant view’ on the grounds that the fear-
effects clause ‘does not morally distinguish terrorism and conventional war’ 
(2007: 529). Ordinary civilians, he argues, have more to fear from acts of 
conventional war than acts of terrorism.  
Furthermore, the suggestion that acts of terrorism can be distinguished from 
acts of war because terrorist acts are aimed at targeting civilians and creating 
fear while acts of war, if the belligerent in question follows jus in bello, cannot 
intentionally target civilians is, McPherson suggests, implausible because 
                                                 
70 I agree that representative authority is one of the necessary conditions for a non-state group 
to be a potential moral authority (as will become clear later in this chapter, when I will outline 
and discuss this condition at greater length), but, as I will show, I disagree that non-state 
collective entities lack representative authority as ‘typically’ (2007: 545) as McPherson would 
have it. 
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‘when the unwarranted harm can reasonably be expected, commonsense 
morality is not committed to recognizing that the agents’ intentions make a 
moral difference, at least in the manner that the conventional interpretation of 
the DDE allows’ (2007: 537).  
In other words, he simply denies any moral distinction between an agent 
who intends to kill civilians in order to create fear, and an agent who foresees 
a reasonable chance that civilians will be killed and fear created as a side-
effect of her actions, and chooses to go ahead anyway. 
While McPherson makes some interesting arguments, I disagree with him on 
two points. Firstly, I do not believe the same kind of fear is created by a 
terrorist act as would be created by an act of war that abides, even technically, 
by the discrimination rule.  
A large part of what makes terrorism a frightening prospect is the thought 
that one could, oneself, be deliberately targeted, that someone might hate you, 
an ordinary civilian, enough to want to kill you. I think that McPherson is too 
quick to dismiss the role of intention here – it does make a difference, whether 
to the amount, or the quality of fear produced by a violent act. 
Kamm, for instance, makes the similar point that ‘the intention to harm and 
terrorize NCs [non-combatants] as an end or means’ (2006: 65) is a 
‘distinctive element’ of terrorist activity. However, she differs from me in 
arguing that this intention to terrorise ‘does not play as large a role in 
accounting for the prima facie wrongness’ of terrorist activity ‘as does the 
harm it causes’ (2006: 65).  
I believe that the harm caused by terrorist violence does also play a role, but 
this distinctive intention on the part of the terrorist plays a larger role, as it is 
that which makes his actions worse than the actions of a non-terrorist (a just 
combatant following the in bello rules, for instance) who inflicts the same 
amount of harm.  
Secondly, I think that acts of terrorism and ‘acts of conventional war’ 
(McPherson, 2007: 537) cannot be as clearly separated as McPherson or 
Thompson would like. I would instead argue that legitimate authorities such as 
states are quite capable of using terrorist tactics.  
While most of a legitimate state’s military actions could not be described as 
terrorist, having defensive aims rather than the principal intent to terrorize, 
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there are many examples of presumably legitimate authorities (in McPherson’s 
sense) performing acts of terrorism – the Blitz, for instance, or the 
firebombing of Dresden.  
Steinhoff seems to agree – indeed, he writes that terrorism’s ‘most frequent 
form is state terrorism’ (2007: 13). I also do not believe there is anything 
contradictory about suggesting that a state could perform acts of terrorism as 
part of its war effort. The Blitz, for instance, was an act of terrorism and an act 
of conventional war. I would therefore argue that military violence cannot be 
sharply divided into acts of war and acts of terrorism – I think that many acts 
of war can also be acts of terrorism if they deliberately flout the in bello 
condition of discrimination with the aim of shortening a war by terrorizing 
enemy civilians.  
Therefore, I believe that the attacks of non-legitimate authorities could fall 
into the same category as attacks by legitimate authorities which fail to satisfy 
right intention or last resort, or any other ad bellum condition. The attacks of 
unjust belligerents are acts of (unjustified) war, and whether they are also 
terrorist acts will depend upon whether they aim to create terror by targeting 
non-combatants.  
In short, I also disagree with McPherson’s arguments that only state 
authorities are legitimate authorities, as his argument that non-state political 
violence does not count as war, but rather terrorism, is too problematic.  
Another argument for the state as the sole legitimate authority, made 
primarily by Coates, suggests that a state has a right to war which 
‘derives…from its membership of an international community to the common 
good of which the state is ordered and to the law of which it is subject’ 
(Coates, 1997: 126). He adds that ‘the right of war is vested in the state as a 
political community and that powers are entrusted to rulers of governments as 
agents of those communities’ (1997: 129).  
This might potentially exclude some states, such as those which do not 
consider themselves subject to the laws of the international community (Nazi 
Germany, for instance) but the identification of the authority to wage war with 
some form of state authority remains.  
However, this definition of legitimate authority is, I believe, successfully 
criticised by Steinhoff. He writes that Coates’ overall argument is 
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contradictory, in that Coates claims that legitimate authority is a ‘logically 
prior principle’ (Coates 1997: 123), but derives it, at least partially, from a 
state’s being subject to international law. And, as Steinhoff points out, ‘the 
requirements of causa justa and non-combatant immunity’ are ‘constituents of 
international law’ (2007: 12) – meaning that under Coates’ definition, 
legitimate authority is actually ‘dependent upon these requirements’ 
(Steinhoff, 2007: 12). If a state wages war without just cause or violates the 
discrimination rule, it ceases to abide by international law, and thenceforward 
lacks legitimate authority.  
Therefore, it is my belief that none of these arguments successfully prove 
that states alone can possess the authority, and thus the right to wage war. I 
will consider and reject one last argument for this point, which discusses a 
more general account of authority; but applied to my account of the collective 
right of defence, it could produce an argument for the delegation of individual 
defensive rights to democratic states alone.  
 
1ii) Normative consent as a possible grounding for state legitimate authority 
 
David Estlund argues that the consent of the citizens of a state is necessary 
for its government to have authority over them. He is speaking in terms of 
more general authority than the authority to declare war – he defines the kind 
of ‘authority’ he was referring to as ‘the moral power to require action’ (a 
definition he credits to Joseph Raz), meaning that ‘To say you have authority 
over me on certain matters is to say that on those matters if you tell me to do 
something, then I am, for that reason, required to do it’ (Estlund, 2005: 352).  
However, Estlund’s argument might also be useful in showing how the 
delegation of individual rights grounds the right and authority to wage war, as 
these entail, for instance, the ‘moral power to require’ (Estlund, 2005: 352) 
combatants to engage in hostilities against another group of combatants. If 
individuals consent to delegate their individual defensive rights to a particular 
collective entity, then this could establish that collective’s moral power to 
require such things of them. 
Estlund argues in favour of what he calls ‘normative consent theory’ (2005: 
352). This is an expansion of actual consent theory, which, as Estlund 
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describes it, is the argument that ‘without consent there is no authority…, but 
unless there are certain nullifying conditions…consent to authority establishes 
authority’ (2005: 352).  
The ‘controversial element’ (2005: 353) of actual consent theory, Estlund 
suggests, is the clause that without consent there can be no authority (which he 
refers to as the ‘libertarian clause’ (2005: 353)), because this would mean that 
not all governments of nation-states necessarily have authority over their 
citizens. A government operating without majority consent, under this 
definition, might lack the moral power to require its citizens to pay taxes, for 
instance.  
Estlund’s normative consent theory differs from actual consent theory in that 
he asserts that not only can consent be disqualified by ‘certain nullifying 
conditions’ (2005: 352), as actual consent theory suggests (for instance if it is 
extracted under extreme duress), but that there are also conditions under which 
non-consent would be invalid. Under these conditions, Estlund argues, ‘this 
wrongness…cancels what would otherwise be the authority-blocking power of 
non-consent, with the result being authority’ (2005: 356).  
He gives the example of a flight attendant who, after a crash, orders an 
uninjured passenger to help her with the injured. Under actual consent theory, 
if the passenger refuses to consent to help, then she has no authority over him, 
even though, as Estlund put it, ‘owing to her knowledge and situation, you 
would be wrong to refuse to consent to her having the power to require actions 
of you’ (2005: 358).  
Estlund suggests that this is an implausible conclusion, and that if we believe 
instead that the bystander ‘has not escaped the authority by refusing to 
consent’, then we must conclude that ‘In this case, non-consent to authority is 
null’ (2005: 357). 
In this way, Estlund argues, a democratic state has authority grounded upon 
the normative consent of its citizens. Estlund suggests, in David Enoch’s 
words, that ‘given its epistemic and legitimacy credentials, and the 
humanitarian obligations to avoid all sorts of catastrophes—we all ought to 
consent to its authority, and so it has authority just as if all of us did in fact 
consent’ (2009: 39).  
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Estlund gives a lengthy, complex argument that ‘people would be required 
to consent to the…authority of democratic legal arrangements’ (2008: 135). I 
do not have the space to explore this argument in detail, but briefly, it rests 
upon the view he calls ‘epistemic proceduralism’ (2008: 135). Enoch defines 
this as the view that ‘Specific political decisions in a democracy…are 
legitimate because they are the outcomes of a democratic procedure, and that 
procedure itself is legitimate because it is likely…to lead to correct, that is, 
qualifiedly acceptable, decisions’ (Enoch, 2009: 38).  
This might be applicable to my account of the right and authority to wage 
war, which I have suggested is established by the delegation of individual 
defensive rights. If we assume Estlund is correct, and there is a normative 
reason why individual citizens should consent to the authority of their 
democratic state in matters such as this, which under my account means that 
they should consent to delegate their defensive rights to that democratic state, 
then should Estlund’s argument be successful, democratic states must be 
legitimate authorities, with the collective right of defence I have defined, 
whether or not the individuals in question actually wish to delegate their 
defensive rights to that state. 
However, in order for normative consent theory to be entirely successful, it 
needs to answer one question – if the existence of normative consent rests 
upon an obligation to consent to that authority, then what is that obligation 
grounded upon? Estlund suggests two potential ‘approaches to authority that 
also do not rely on actual consent’ (2005: 364), upon which this obligation 
might be grounded. 
One possibility is ‘urgent task theory’, which ‘holds that some tasks are 
morally so important that there is a natural moral duty to obey the commands 
of a putative authority who is well-positioned to achieve the task if only 
people will obey’ (2005: 365). The problem with this approach is, as Estlund 
convincingly argues, that some tasks that might be important achievements 
‘nevertheless make no plausible moral claim on everyone who we might try to 
enlist by commanding them to help’ (2005: 365). He gives the example of 
building a temple – a morally important achievement for believers in the 
relevant faith, but not a task the builder necessarily has authority to command 
others, especially those who are not his co-religionists, to assist with.  
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Estlund suggests urgent task theory could nevertheless be used to support 
normative consent theory, by arguing that ‘in the case of some urgent tasks, 
but not others, those who are commanded would, if asked, be wrong not to 
consent to the commander’s authority for these purposes’ (2005: 365). He 
suggests that ‘The wrongness of refusing consent, rather than urgency itself, 
would be the explanation for why some urgent tasks ground authority and 
others do not’ (2005: 365).  
However, this argument seems somewhat question-begging to me. The 
reason why in some urgent tasks, like saving the lives of the passengers in the 
wrecked aircraft, the passenger would be wrong to disobey the orders of the 
putative authority, seems to be that refusing consent is wrong in these cases.  
However, it seems to me that the passenger might not be wrong to disobey 
the stewardess’ orders if the situation were different – say, if she ordered him 
to help her with another passenger’s baggage. His refusal in this non-urgent 
situation might be discourteous, but not wrong. On what is the ‘wrongness of 
refusing consent’ in the first situation grounded if not in the ‘urgency itself’ 
(Estlund, 2005: 365)?  
Estlund’s second possibility is the ‘fair play’ or ‘fair contribution’ argument 
(2005: 365). This is the argument that ‘it is wrong to take advantage of the 
cooperation of others in an arrangement from which one benefits without 
contributing one’s fair share’ (2005: 365).  
He suggests this argument generates an obligation to obey a putative 
authority, in that there would be a ‘requirement to consent to this…person’s 
authority so long as there is a proper and competent effort at fairness’. In 
Estlund’s opinion, such a requirement ‘might best explain authority when it is 
understood as falling under the larger umbrella of normative consent theory 
(2005: 366).  
I would agree that this is a more plausible attempt to ground normative 
consent theory than urgent task theory, and it fits well with Estlund’s 
suggestion, that democratic states are the only legitimate authorities. But I 
nevertheless find this ‘requirement’ (Estlund, 2005: 366) too problematic.  
Estlund admits that making a ‘proper and competent attempt at fairness’ 
(2005: 366) does not necessarily mean one will succeed in being fair. Estlund 
admits that ‘the state is fallible’; it may ‘not always distribute burdens quite 
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fairly’ (2005: 366). Nevertheless, if it is attempting to be fair, the ‘fair 
contribution’ argument (Estlund, 2005: 365) and the normative consent theory 
together suggest we have ‘a duty to comply with the commands even when 
they are mistaken’ (Estlund, 2005: 366). This is precisely what I find 
problematic.  
If a state attempts fairness, but is so ignorant or mistaken in its information 
that it is in fact giving extremely unfair orders, why should the attempt itself 
ground an obligation to obey those mistaken orders? Civil disobedience may 
even serve to alert the state to the unfairness of its orders when other methods 
fail.  
I do not rule out the possibility that something else might possibly ground a 
duty to obey a state even in these circumstances, but I simply do not think that 
its good intentions could be that thing. If ‘burdens’ are ‘distributed’ so unfairly 
that some members of society are starving, even dying, would the 
government’s mistaken or ignorant belief that the distribution is fair really 
ground an obligation to obey the state’s authority if there is no other way 
besides civil disobedience to alert the government to the situation? I do not 
believe it would. 
Therefore, I do not think that Estlund’s normative consent theory is 
successful enough to provide a plausible basis for the delegation of individual 
defensive rights solely to democratic states. Nevertheless, elements of actual 
consent theory, in particular the basic idea that some form of consent (whether 
active or tacit) by the delegators is necessary for delegation to take place, is an 
attractive one, and one to which I will return. However, without the 
problematic normative element of Estlund’s expanded consent theory, this 
argument can provide no reason why democratic states should be the only 
collective entities to which such delegation is plausible.  
 
1iii) A possible Cosmopolitan definition of the authority to wage war 
 
I now turn to Fabre’s account of the right and authority to wage war, which I 
consider more plausible than the accounts which attempt to identify legitimate 
authority solely with political authority. To recap, Fabre suggests that 
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‘whatever rights and privileges states have, they have them only in so far as 
they thereby serve individuals’ fundamental interests’ (2008: 964).  
Fabre argues that a state is legitimate (which she defines as the possession of 
a ‘moral right to govern’ by state officials (2014: 45)) only if ‘its institutions 
and officials, through the laws which they vote and enforce and the executive 
decisions which they make on the basis of those laws, respect and promote the 
fundamental rights of both the state’s members and outsiders’ (2014: 46)71.  
However, like myself Fabre separates the political authority to declare war, 
possessed by leaders of legitimate states, from the moral authority derived 
from the ‘right to go to war’ (2008: 965), which is not confined to political 
authorities. Rather, she suggests both that groups acting without state backing 
‘may resort to war to overthrow an illegitimate state’, and that ‘individuals 
acting alone have the right to go to war against unlawful foreign belligerents’ 
(2008: 965). 
The reason for Fabre’s extension of ‘the right to go to war’ (2008: 965) to 
non-state collectives like ethnic groups or civil movements, as well as 
‘individuals acting alone’ (2008: 965), derives from her cosmopolitan political 
theory; in particular, her argument that ‘individuals are the fundamental units 
of moral concern and ought to be regarded as one another’s moral equals’ 
(2008: 964). Fabre’s cosmopolitanism advocates an individualist conception 
of defensive rights as a just cause for war, and she naturally accompanies this 
with an individualistic conception of the authority to wage war. 
She rejects ‘legitimate authority’ in its traditional political sense – meaning 
specifically ‘an organization that has the authority to make and enforce laws 
over a given territory, and has a claim to be recognized as such by other 
comparable organizations’ (Fabre, 2008: 967) – and also broader political 
definitions which include some non-state agencies like ‘national liberation 
movements’, because ‘they defend ‘state values’ such as national sovereignty 
                                                 
71 However, she allows some room for consent – she adds the caveat that if state A would be 
better at protecting the interests and rights of the citizens of state B than state B’s government, 
this does not automatically give state A the right to govern state B against the wishes of state 
B’s citizens, because ‘it is a necessary condition for an individual permissibly to be given that 
to which she has a right that she should (in some sense) consent to it’ (2014: 48). The same 
holds true for a community of individuals – if ‘A has good reasons to believe that B would not 
consent’ (2014: 48), then A does not necessarily have the right to govern B. I have some 
sympathy with this part of Fabre’s argument, as I will show. 
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and territorial integrity from, typically, foreign, colonial powers’ (2008: 968). 
Her argument is that ‘a cosmopolitan account of the just war must renounce 
the requirement that a war be declared by a legitimate authority [in this sense] 
in order to be just’ (2008: 968). 
This cosmopolitanist account argues that ‘violations of individual basic 
rights, as well as violations of collective, political rights’ (2008: 969) may 
constitute a just cause for war, if those basic rights ‘protect central aspects of 
individuals’ prospects for a minimally flourishing life’ (2008: 969).  
This may at first seem fairly compatible with my own definition of just 
cause, since I would agree with Fabre that the right to a flourishing life72 is 
both an individual right73 and the appropriate end of defensive rights. 
However, as I will show, the cosmopolitan account soon diverges considerably 
from my arguments.  
Fabre goes on to argue that because the violations of individual rights can 
provide a just cause for war, it is not plausible to conclude that only states or 
political communities, can wage war, because any group of individuals, she 
claims, can have a just cause if their individual rights are sufficiently violated.  
She continues that if a non-state collective entity, for instance a religious 
community, has a just cause then advocates of the political definition of 
legitimate authority are committed to the view ‘that [the religious group] 
cannot wage a just war…, but that it would have been able to do so had it been 
a state’ (2008: 969). This, she argues, is ‘misguided, on cosmopolitan 
grounds’ (2014: 145), because it would deny the fundamental cosmopolitan 
principle that ‘all human beings have human rights to the goods and freedoms 
they need in order to lead a minimally flourishing life’, including ‘the right to 
protect oneself from violations of one’s human rights’.  
                                                 
72 Although I define it as a cluster-right, which is slightly different from her definition, this 
need make no appreciable difference to this portion of the argument. 
73 Although Fabre’s point that some collective rights, like the right to collective self-
determination may furnish aspects of a flourishing life is an interesting one, I would argue that 
the cluster-right to a flourishing life itself remains an individual right. Other aspects of this 
cluster-right, such as a minimal social life, can only be achieved in conjunction with the 
presence of others (and indeed, the aspect of a flourishing life that Fabre describes, if it exists, 
might perhaps also be described in terms of the individual right to live within a stable and self-
determining community), but the cluster-right to a flourishing life which we are concerned 
with remains an individual one.  
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By denying this religious community the right to wage war to protect their 
ability to lead flourishing lives, we are denying its members this human right 
because they belong to a non-state group rather than a state or political 
community. Thus, Fabre argues that cosmopolitans are committed to arguing 
that such non-state collective entities may have the right, and thus the moral 
authority, to wage war to protect their rights. 
In practical terms, Fabre suggests that most, if not all, non-state collective 
entities may, if they have a just cause, also have the right to wage war in 
defence of their rights. For instance, she suggests that ‘the very poor are 
legitimate holders of the right to defend their subsistence rights against the 
affluent’s dereliction of duty’ (2014: 116)74, and that a war ‘may be fought by 
those individuals acting singly, or by their acting together without the 
attributes of state sovereignty’ (2014: 116).  
Similarly, she argues that if ‘some individuals within state A have a just 
cause for taking up arms against their regime’, the fact that their group is not 
itself a state does not mean they have no authority to wage war for this cause. 
This would suggest revolutions or uprisings by non-state organisations or 
loose alliances of different groups might, potentially, be just wars (assuming 
just cause, reasonable chance of success, etc.).  
She even proposes it need not necessarily be only groups that have the right 
to wage war. Although she admits a single individual is unlikely to have a 
reasonable chance of success, and so will almost certainly be unable to wage a 
just war, she writes that while this would ‘lead us to deny him the right to 
wage that particular war’, it would not ‘rebut the radical claim that he can 
hold the right to wage war in general’ (2014: 148).  
Although, as I have said, I agree that states are not the only entities that 
possess the authority to go to war, there are other aspects of Fabre’s argument 
I find problematic – particularly her suggestion that it is theoretically possible 
for individual people to have the right to wage war.  
                                                 
74 Subsistence being one of the most important aspects of a flourishing life, it is Fabre’s 
contention that affluent groups, in particular nations have ‘negative and positive duties’ (2014: 
112) towards poor or deprived groups, such as the negative ‘duty not to subject distant 
strangers to severe deprivation’ and positive ‘duties to provide help for the very deprived 
should they be unable to access the resources necessary for a minimally decent life’ (2014: 
110). I do not agree, but since my focus here is on Fabre’s definition of legitimate authority, I 
can only mention it in passing. 
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Since I argue that to possess the right, and authority to wage war is to be the 
appropriate recipient of delegated individual rights of defence, and thus to 
possess the collective right of defence that grounds just cause, to grant this 
kind of authority to individuals would mean a single individual could possess 
this kind of defensive right, which seems contradictory.  
For an individual person to possess this right, the act of defence in question 
must be the defence of a group of people who have (for whatever reason) 
delegated their defensive rights to that individual, which seems to me a 
different concept to that which Fabre is discussing, and is in any case highly 
problematic, since there seems little or no reason for people to consent to such 
a delegation. One lone individual75 would be no better equipped to protect 
their right to a flourishing life than they themselves would be.  
However, this is not my only criticism of Fabre’s argument. I also object to 
her argument that any group of individuals can have the right to wage war 
(which would mean in terms of my account, that any group might be the 
appropriate recipient of delegated individual defensive rights).  
I must admit that if this were the case, then it would follow that all collective 
entities would in fact have the moral authority to go to war. Inherent in the 
possession of a defensive right is the suggestion that one is morally permitted 
(and thus has the moral authority) to exercise that right in necessary and 
proportionate ways. However, I do not necessarily agree with Fabre that just 
any group can possess the defensive right in question.  
For instance, in addition to states and non-state collective entities such as 
religious and ethnic groups or civil and political movements, should collective 
organisations like a local amateur dramatic club, or a bird-watching society, 
have a collective right to defence, resulting in a theoretical authority to declare 
war? Fabre would probably retort that such small groups will almost certainly 
fail to fulfil the other ad bellum conditions, in particular reasonable chance of 
success, and this is true, but it seems to me to miss the point.  
                                                 
75 An absolute ruler might perhaps be a different issue, since he is presumably at the head of 
some form of state or army, with the resources to protect his subjects if he wishes to do so. 
One might therefore argue that the defensive rights of his subjects are not delegated to the 
ruler as an individual, but as the head of state (or non-state collective – an absolute religious 
leader, for example), which in a group organised in this way would be much the same as 
delegating them to the collective entity. I believe it may be theoretically possible that this kind 
of collective could be morally entitled to wage war, if the ad bellum criteria are satisfied. 
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There seems, intuitively, to be something fundamentally wrong (as well as 
futile) with according an unsuitable collective like a bird-watching society 
even the theoretical right to wage war, even if one knows they can never 
justifiably use it. Fabre’s separation of legitimate authority (as she defines it) 
from the right to wage war may be what causes her to miss this point. The fact 
remains that suggesting that an entity has the right to wage war necessarily 
means that that entity has some sort of authority, some moral entitlement to do 
so.  
I believe that granting the right to wage war (and hence the moral authority) 
to any group that perceives a threat to its members’ flourishing lives, misses a 
fundamental element of the authority criterion. Furthermore, it misses one of 
just war theory’s fundamental aims – that of limitation. Far from limiting the 
number of conflicts that might count as justified wars, this aspect of Fabre’s 
cosmopolitanism seems to potentially increase them. 
However, given that authority to wage war needs to be limited to certain 
kinds of collective entities, we still need to determine which collective entities. 
In the next section, therefore, I outline my account of the kinds of collective 
entities which may possess the right to wage war, and hence the moral 
authority to do so, by determining which collective entities may receive 
delegated individual defensive rights. To do this, I also need to flesh out how 
individual defensive rights can be delegated to collective entities. 
 
 
2: An Account of Legitimate Authority based upon the 
Delegation of Rights 
 
 
To recap, I argued in Chapter Two, that the appropriate subjects of the 
collective defensive rights which ground defence as a just cause are the 
collectives to whom individual defensive rights have been delegated.  
I have shown that the appropriate recipients of our delegated individual 
defensive rights are collectives; and I must now show why these rights are 
delegated to some kinds of collective entities rather than others. Why my 
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nation or my ethnic community, and (presumably) not my book club? There 
must be some way of distinguishing between the two: we do not delegate our 
defensive rights to every collective entity we are affiliated with, however 
small or unsuitable.  
Perhaps the consent theory of authority, which we have already examined in 
this chapter, could provide some help. It seems plausible to me that we might 
be able to delegate our defensive rights through the active or tacit act of 
consenting to delegate them. 
But before I move on to determine how consent might provide grounds for 
the delegation of individual rights to a collective, I must first give a working 
definition of a collective, and explain what kinds of collectives might be the 
appropriate recipients of delegated defensive rights. 
 
2i) The Collective as a Recipient of Delegated Individual Defensive Rights 
 
There are various kinds of collective; some are often accepted as potential 
subjects of defensive rights (like states), but others (like football clubs, or 
corporations), many would consider inappropriate entities to which to entrust 
their defensive rights. Groups which cannot receive delegated individual 
defensive rights cannot, I believe, hold legitimate authority to wage war. It is 
therefore necessary for me to give an account of the kinds of collectives to 
which individuals may permissibly delegate their individual rights. 
First, the distinction must be made between casual agglomerations, like the 
passengers on a bus, or a group of people who join forces to move a fallen tree 
out of the road; people who come together for some short-term common 
purpose but whose group lacks more formal cohesion and structure; and those 
groups which are stable, organised collective entities. Peter French makes a 
relevant distinction here, between ‘aggregates’ and ‘conglomerates’ (1984: 5, 
13). In Geoffrey Scarre’s words, aggregates are ‘mere unstructured collections 
or gatherings of people’ (2012, 77). They may have some common purpose, 
but ‘they have not assembled to pursue some project as a group, and no 
purpose(s) can be assigned to the group as a whole which cannot be assigned 
to its members separately.’ (Scarre, 2012: 77). The bus passengers and tree-
removers would seem to fit into the category of aggregates. 
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Conglomerates, on the other hand, are more highly structured and organised, 
and their members have more to unite them than shared purpose(s). French 
defines a ‘conglomerate collectivity’ as ‘an organization of individuals such 
that its identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of the identities of the 
persons in the organization’ (1984: 13) – in short, a conglomerate is more than 
just ‘a determinate set of individual human beings’ (French, 1984: 13), it is a 
collective with a distinct identity over and above its members’ individual 
identities (whereas an aggregate is ‘merely a collection of people’ (French, 
1984: 5)). Scarre adds that a conglomerate ‘possesses some form of 
organization or structure appropriate to achieving certain goals or purposes 
that belong to the group as a whole rather than to its members qua individuals’ 
(2012: 77). French’s examples of conglomerates include ‘the Rolling Green 
Country Club’, ‘the Democratic Party’, and ‘the Red Cross’ (1984: 13).  
Thus, the members of a conglomerate do not merely share the same 
individual purpose, but have joint purposes, which cannot be achieved 
individually, and, indeed, might not even make sense individually. For 
instance, a debating society might have the purpose of enjoying stimulating 
discussions of interesting topics – which can only be a purpose aimed at 
jointly by two or more individuals. 
   French also suggests there are degrees of conglomeration, which, as Scarre 
observed, depend ‘upon the level of internal organization devised…in order to 
realize the shared purposes of the group’ (Scarre, 2012: 77) – so ethnic groups, 
for instance, could be more or less conglomerated according to the degree to 
which they have what French calls ‘CID’ or ‘Corporate Internal Decision’ 
structures (French, 1979: 212). These are, in Scarre’s words, the kind of 
‘hierarchical structure…well-defined policy- and decision-making procedures, 
codes of conduct or rules of operation’ (2012: 77) typically found among 
conglomerates like corporations or universities; and as French put it, a CID 
structure’s ‘primary function is to draw experience from various levels of the 
corporation into a decision-making and ratification process’ (1979: 212). 
Possession of CID structures ‘in at least a minimal degree’ (Scarre, 2012: 77) 
is necessary for a group to be conglomerate. 
   This distinction between aggregate groups and conglomerate groups seems 
to me a valid one, and conglomeration seems a plausible minimal condition 
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for a group to be what I would term a collective entity (or, in brief, a 
collective)76. But to return to the question of which groups are the appropriate 
recipients of delegated rights; would either aggregates or conglomerates (or 
both) be such recipients?  
   The fact that aggregates, while their members may share the same individual 
purposes, do not have joint purposes or a fully realised decision-making 
structure seems to rule them out77. The defence of all members of a group 
would require the kind of well-structured, well-defined internal decision 
structures that French describes as a distinctive feature of conglomerates. A 
mere ‘collection of people’ (French, 1984: 5) could not plan and carry out a 
defensive military campaign at all. In addition, while the defence of large 
numbers of people might appear to be a shared individual purpose, I believe it 
is a joint purpose once the defensive rights of these individuals are delegated 
                                                 
76 David Copp objects to French’s suggestion that aggregates and conglomerates can be 
distinguished because an aggregate is ‘merely a collection of people’ (meaning that an 
aggregate’s ‘existence as that particular aggregate is not compatible with a varying or 
frequently changing membership’ (French, 1984: 5)) whereas conglomerates have an identity 
over and above that of the individual members’ identities, and so are not fundamentally 
changed when one member arrives or departs. Copp points out that ‘an audience may gain or 
lose members. Notice that we do not say that there is a new audience when a few latecomers 
arrive’ (1984: 256). His point is that an aggregate may continue to exist as a particular 
aggregate if it has ‘historical continuity in membership’ (1984: 258); meaning, as May put it, 
that ‘most members stay the same over time’, and if ‘there is a “unity relation”…something 
which is common to all members and which thereby links individual persons to one another’ 
(May, 1987: 28). This is a valid point, but I believe French’s distinction holds up nevertheless. 
An aggregate may be roughly the same if a few members arrive or leave (and a ‘unity relation’ 
exists) but it still does not have the kind of joint purposes, structure or identity that ‘is not 
exhausted by the conjunction of the identities’ of the people involved (French, 1984: 5) – in 
short, Copp’s argument does not eliminate the other, more important differences between 
aggregates and conglomerates, and thus does not fundamentally alter the distinction. I would 
also reject May’s criticism that some aggregates without formal organizational structures like 
‘teams and mobs’ can ‘have sufficient structure to require a nonindividualistic analysis of their 
behaviors, even though they have no formal organizational structure’ (May, 1987: 23). I do 
not have the space to analyse May’s argument in full, but he suggests a group without any 
structure at all can ‘engage in joint action’ if they ‘attain unity’ (1987: 23); as for instance if 
an angry mob storms into a building or an audience applauds at the end of the play. This may 
well be the case, but I do not believe such ‘unity’ is sufficient to make the mob or the 
audience into a conglomerate as French defines it. Engaging in a joint action does not mean 
the audience’s behaviour cannot be ‘reduced to its members, and their behaviour’ (May, 1987: 
23) – the audience members applaud simultaneously, but while their purpose of showing 
appreciation is a common one, it is not a joint one. I think French’s point that the members of 
an aggregate have a common purpose behind their joint action and the members of a 
conglomerate have a joint purpose sufficiently demonstrates that even when members of an 
aggregate act together, their behaviour is still reducible to individual behaviour. Thus, I 
believe French’s aggregate/conglomerate distinction also survives this criticism.  
77 Cosmopolitans like Fabre (2014: 148) suggest that any individual or group (aggregates and 
conglomerates alike) could in theory be permitted to wage war, but I have already given my 
reasons for disagreeing with this argument.  
 203 
to a collective entity. While the end of a defensive war remains the individual 
lives of the right-holders, the purpose of that war is the defence of all their 
lives, not separately but together.  
   A collective waging war is not simply a group of people each aiming to 
defend her own life, like a group of random women each struggling to defend 
herself against a mob of rapists, but it is a well-structured group aiming to 
defend all the individual lives of a group of people, whether members of that 
collective or another collective. The cooperation and participation of a large 
number of people is necessary to produce, as Rousseau would have it, ‘a 
mutual, steady and manifest disposition to destroy the enemy State, or at least 
to weaken it’ (2004b: 175), and therefore this would seem to be a joint 
purpose.  
   For these reasons, I accept the definition of a ‘collective entity’ as a 
conglomerate group, and I further believe rights can only be delegated to a 
group that is a collective entity in this sense, rather than a casual, disorganized 
group of people. Therefore, in order for a group to be the appropriate recipient 
of delegated rights, it must be a conglomerate, which would mean its members 
could have a joint purpose, and that it would have organisation and decision-
making structures necessary to achieve joint purposes. But is being a 
conglomerate sufficient to be an appropriate recipient of delegated individual 
defensive rights? 
   Well, consider the implications if it were. Any number of non-state groups 
or organisations may be conglomerates, without being technically (or morally) 
suitable to wage war. For example, one might categorise a bird-watching 
society as a conglomerate, its members united in a joint purpose and 
possessing the necessary organisational structures to take joint action to 
achieve that purpose.  
Let us imagine that some aspects, such as freedom of movement, of the 
flourishing lives of members of a small bird-watching society (say twenty to 
forty members) are being threatened or stripped away, because they are the 
only members of a very small ethnic minority within their country, towards 
which the government has adopted a policy of oppression. Could the members 
of this bird-watching society, even in principle, delegate their defensive rights 
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to this society and authorise it to wage war to defend these aspects of their 
flourishing lives? 
Granted that the bird-watchers have a right to defend these aspects, I still do 
not think that the bird-watching society, at least in its current form, structure 
and size, could be the appropriate collective to defend them by lethal means, 
or, therefore, a legitimate authority to wage war. 
Of course, just war theorists could rightly observe that a bird-watching 
society cannot in these circumstances fight a just war even if we grant them 
just cause and legitimate authority – such a small non-state organisation 
attempting to wage war against a state is likely to fail the condition of 
reasonable chance of success.  
However, I do not think that this solves the problem. The issue is not 
whether the bird-watching society can fight a just war (clearly, they cannot), 
but whether they could have the right and authority to wage war in general. As 
Fabre points out, the lack of a reasonable chance of success would not ‘rebut 
the radical claim that [an entity] can hold the right to wage war in general’ 
(2014: 148). 
This demonstrates part of what makes this argument so counter-intuitive. If 
this bird-watching society, at least in part due to its size and lack of resources, 
lacks the ability to fight a potentially just war under any circumstances, how 
can it have the authority to wage war? It seems implausible to suggest that a 
collective entity that lacks this ability should nevertheless have the authority to 
wage war in a general sense. 
   Yet such groups may be conglomerates, with distinct identities and 
sufficiently developed organisational and decision-making structures to 
formulate and achieve joint purposes. If all conglomerates are appropriate 
recipients of delegated defensive rights, then collectives like these may 
potentially be appropriate recipients. 
   I do not wish to extend the field of legitimate authorities to declare war, to 
include all conglomerates. Therefore, I propose additional criteria which a 
collective must fulfil in order to have a potential right to fight a defensive war. 
To begin with, I will draw upon another view of the definition of a collective 
entity. 
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   Margaret Gilbert writes that she considers a group to be a collective (as 
opposed to a mere aggregate) only if she considers it to be a ‘genuinely 
collective [subject] of intention, action, and so on’, and that ‘a population is a 
genuinely collective subject of intention if and only if, roughly, it can 
plausibly be regarded as having an intention of its own, an intention, if you 
like, of the population as a whole’ (2002: 123). In her view, the ‘intention’ of a 
collective is not ‘a plurality of intentions of individual members’ (2002: 127), 
not every individual member each intending to wage a war (which could be 
impossible), but rather derives from a ‘joint commitment’ to perform a certain 
action, which can occur  
 
‘without everyone…knowing or even conceiving of the 
content of their commitment…if there is a joint commitment to 
authorize as a body some person or body to make decisions, 
form plans, and so on, on behalf of the jointly committed 
persons. For the sake of a label, one might call this an 
authority-producing joint commitment’ (2002: 127). 
 
  The delegation of individual defensive rights to a collective entity might 
plausibly constitute a kind of joint commitment to permit that collective, or its 
leaders and agents, to act in our defence. I do not accept every aspect of 
Gilbert’s argument, for instance, as I will argue, I do not believe joint 
commitments must be openly expressed in any ‘large group where people do 
not know one another personally, or even know of one another as individuals’ 
(2002: 126), and (perhaps because defensive commitments are not the only 
commitments common to citizens of a state) it seems to me that failure to enter 
into this commitment (i.e. pacifism) would not disqualify an individual from 
membership of a state (although it might disqualify her from membership of a 
collective whose sole joint commitment was defensive, like a resistance 
movement). Nevertheless, it seems minimally plausible that a collective entity 
must be a collective subject of intention in order to hold and exercise 
delegated individual defensive rights, as some kind of collective commitment 
to defend individual lives would seem to be necessary for any kind of 
collective action like the waging of a defensive war.     
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   However, this alone does not sufficiently narrow the field of appropriate 
recipients of delegated lethal defensive rights. For instance, many of the 
collectives I mentioned earlier, like bird-watching clubs and debating 
societies, might also fulfil this criterion – for instance, a bird-watching club 
might form a collective intention to go on a fund-raising drive for their trip to 
a bird sanctuary. To rule out these collectives, we must devise further criteria.  
   These criteria must limit the collectives that may hold delegated individual 
defensive rights to those capable of fulfilling them. As I said, to suggest a 
collective like a bird-watching society is an appropriate entity to hold 
delegated individual defensive rights, when it is fundamentally incapable of 
usefully acting upon such rights, seems highly counter-intuitive.  
   I have argued that the moral authority to wage defensive war and the moral 
right to wage defensive war are inextricably linked, and that the moral right 
and authority to wage defensive war arises from the delegation of individual 
defensive rights to a collective entity; it follows, therefore, that to delegate 
defensive rights to these collective entities would be to accord them a power 
they would be utterly incapable of exercising. It is pointless to extend a moral 
authority to entities that could never act upon that authority.  
   Therefore, I have devised the following list of criteria to determine the 
appropriate recipients of delegated individual defensive rights, which limit the 
field to collective entities that are at least potentially capable of exercising 
these rights.  
 
1) The collective entity must be, as Gilbert proposed, a ‘genuinely 
collective [subject] of intention, action, and so on’, in that it must 
‘plausibly be regarded as having an intention of its own, an intention, if 
you like, of the population as a whole’ (2002: 123)78. When I describe a 
                                                 
78 Gilbert’s argument that our political obligations arise from ‘a sense of joint commitment’ 
(1993: 127), and that ‘The widespread observed use of such phrases as 'our government' and 
'our country', alongside any relevant behavior, would itself appear to provide a basis for 
common knowledge in a population that a substantial portion of its members have openly 
expressed their willingness jointly to commit in the relevant way’ (1993: 128) may appear 
similar to my definition of tacit consent to delegate defensive rights, as I will go on to explain 
it. However, I do believe they are quite distinct. Besides the fact that mine is at bottom a 
voluntarist argument, and Gilbert’s arguments have most often been linked with 
nonvoluntarist contract theory, I do not believe that individuals who merely consent tacitly 
have ‘openly expressed their willingness’ to enter into any defensive commitments, as it  
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collective entity as intending to perform a certain action, like waging a 
war, I therefore mean it in this sense.  
2) The collective entity must be large enough and stable enough to wage a 
military campaign79. It is not necessary that this quite amounts to a 
reasonable chance of success in that campaign (although such a chance is 
of course necessary for it to fight a just war, since it is one of the jus ad 
bellum criteria), but it is necessary that it should be capable of devising 
and sustaining the kinds of activities necessary for a stable, organised 
military campaign, (raising troops, formulating and implementing long-
term military strategies, and so on). A collective entity which is utterly 
unstable and on the verge of collapse would probably be unable to fulfil 
this criterion, as would a small, non-combatant organisation like a bird-
watching society (ruling out a radical expansion of its size and 
resources).  
3) There must be a central, organised structure and decision-making 
procedure. A central locus of responsibility within the collective entity 
would seem necessary; some individual or group of individuals 
(government, general, ruling council, etc.) which has the authority to 
officially declare and co-ordinate a war on behalf of that whole 
collective, and is primarily responsible for waging that war should it 
emerge that it is an unjust one. However, this kind of authority is strictly 
political authority, not moral authority, as I have mentioned. A 
collective’s moral authority to wage war arises from individuals’ 
delegation of their defensive rights to that collective, and belongs, in 
principle, to the collective as a whole; while practically speaking, 
                                                                                                                                            
seems contradictory to suggest that the open expression of willingness could occur without the 
expresser’s conscious knowledge, but tacit consent to delegate defensive rights can, as I will 
explain later, take place before the consenter becomes aware of it.  
79 It may be possible for a smaller or less stable collective, which lacks the resources or the 
organisation to wage a traditional military campaign, to fight using less traditional means like 
terrorist tactics or sabotage. However, as I have already explained, I do not believe terrorist 
tactics are ever permissible as a method of waging war, and so the capability for terrorist acts 
does not render a collective entity capable of waging war. Acts of sabotage, like the actions of 
the French Resistance during World War II, might be permissible (subject to the in bello 
criteria), but I believe they could only be considered acts of war if they took place as part of a 
larger campaign, or as one front of a campaign waged by other allies on other fronts using 
more conventional means. Hence, it is possible for such smaller or less stable collectives to 
wage war alone – although they might play a part in assisting a larger collective or group of 
collectives in a jointly-waged war. 
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political authority to declare war usually belongs to a small group within 
a collective entity, namely the leaders of that collective. It is also not 
necessarily the case that such a central locus of authority can only be 
found within states; it may be less common, but it is not impossible for a 
non-state collective entity to develop a distinct centre of authority. For 
instance, during the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party 
and its militant wing the Red Army, had both a distinct chain of 
command and distinct figures of authority, most notably its chairman 
Mao Zedong80. 
4) The collective entity must be well-intentioned, i.e. it (or rather its leaders 
and officials) must intend to defend those who delegate their defensive 
rights to it in order for that delegation to be effective. They must intend 
to actually and fully exercise these defensive rights if and when it 
becomes necessary, rather than merely feign such intentions in order to 
further some self-serving end, such as remaining in power, or gaining 
recognition for philanthropy amongst the international community. For 
instance, say Collective A initiates an interventionist war, ostensibly to 
defend the lives of an endangered minority within Country B, but never 
intends to defend them – accepting their plea for defence is in fact a ploy 
to increase the popularity of Collective A’s leaders for an impending 
election, and once the election is over these leaders intend to find an 
excuse to quietly withdraw from the war with the minority’s defence 
unfinished. This intention nullifies the minority’s delegation of their 
defensive rights to Collective A. It may not always be obvious in 
peacetime whether or not a collective fulfils this condition81, but once a 
collective purposefully fails to defend the flourishing lives of those 
                                                 
80 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mao-Zedong 
81 It may be difficult for individuals to determine, when there is no current threat to their 
flourishing lives, whether their collective intends to exercise their defensive rights should the 
need arise. However, assumptions can perhaps be made based upon the accountability of the 
collective’s leaders to individual members, and the collective’s record on upholding their 
members’ rights in other, less urgent situations. If it does become clear that a collective would 
not defend its members’ lives should an aggressor threaten them, then individuals may 
immediately delegate their defensive rights elsewhere, or they may attempt to (non-violently) 
alter their collective through peaceful protests or governmental reform to increase its level of 
accountability, for instance, so that they can be reasonably certain that it will defend their lives 
should the need arise – an option they will not have in situations where defence is 
immediately necessary. 
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people who rely upon it to do so, it becomes apparent that those 
individuals must delegate their defensive rights elsewhere. 
 
   These four criteria are essential conditions. States which fulfil these 
conditions would, I believe, be suitable candidates to receive delegated 
individual defensive rights. Non-state collective entities also need to fulfil 
these conditions but, as I will show, they also need to fulfil further conditions 
in order to be suitable to receive delegated individual defensive rights.  
   First, however, there is a fifth general condition for both states and non-state 
collectives, that is not essential but is nevertheless desirable, as individuals are 
more likely to consent to delegate their defensive rights to collectives which 
also fulfil this fifth condition, and less likely to withdraw their tacit consent to 
delegate these rights82. 
 
5) It is preferable that the collective entity be non-isolationist; i.e. that it 
permits free and friendly relations with other collective entities – not the 
kind that misuses other collectives, for instance by financially exploiting 
them, or prevents its own citizens from engaging with other collectives 
(like North Korea, for instance). Individuals are more likely to actively 
consent to delegate their individual defensive rights to collectives that 
fulfil this condition because, among other things, these collectives are 
presumably less likely to wage aggressive (and therefore unjust) wars 
against other collectives, and individuals may lead richer and more 
prosperous lives as members of such collectives, as they would have 
more opportunities for improving their own lives through commercial 
and cultural engagement with other collective entities. Also, the 
leadership of a collective that misuses members of other collective 
entities may someday turn to misusing minorities within its own (or 
majorities, if an elite minority is in power) – it therefore seems 
preferable to delegate one’s rights to a member of a collective that does 
not misuse members of other collectives, as there is less likelihood that it 
will someday turn to misusing you. 
                                                 
82 This will become clearer when I explain my account of the delegation and withdrawal of 
individual defensive rights to and from collective entities later in this chapter. 
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The collective entity to which individuals delegate their defensive rights 
therefore must be a conglomerate entity (as French defines it), a collective 
subject of intention and action (as Gilbert suggests), and one which is stable, 
well-intentioned, and of sufficient size and capabilities to wage a campaign of 
war. I also suggest that it may be either a state or a non-state collective entity. 
Although I disagree with Fabre’s cosmopolitan conception of the authority 
or right to wage war on the grounds that it grants this right to all groups and 
even individuals, I do agree with her that at least some non-state collective 
entities could have the ‘right to wage war’ (2014: 152) for a just cause. Kamm 
similarly suggests it is ‘hard to believe that no nonstate group can legitimately 
represent and permissibly act for people who suffer sufficient injustice’ (2004: 
652). Many other just war theorists, like Rodin, argue against this assertion, 
but I do not believe they successfully defeat the proposition that some non-
state collective entities, at least, could have the right and authority to wage 
war. 
For instance, Rodin argues that non-state collective entities are not the 
appropriate subjects of the kind of collective defensive right that would render 
that entity a morally legitimate authority. In one of his articles, he uses the 
example of the hostile takeover of Cadbury’s by Kraft Foods in February 
2010. He attempts to base an argument against this kind of non-state collective 
defensive right upon what he suggests is an intuitive understanding that 
Cadbury’s did not have the same ‘permission to use lethal force’ (2014: 73) in 
its defence that we accord to states, not even in a ‘lesser form’, even though 
Cadbury’s was a distinct collective entity, an ‘independent and self-
determining community’ (2014: 73) with a ‘unique collective identity’ (2014: 
70), which Kraft’s actions were threatening, and which was actually wiped out 
by the ‘conquering’ company in the end. 
Rodin describes it as ‘madness’ to suggest that groups like Cadbury’s may 
be the appropriate subject of lethal collective defensive rights. However, our 
intuitions concerning this example may, I believe, be complicated by the fact 
that it is decidedly uncertain whether Kraft’s actions constitute either a direct 
or an indirect threat to sufficient aspects of a flourishing life to make armed 
defence in this case justified, even if a company like Cadbury’s is an 
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appropriate subject of delegated defensive rights. I do not, in fact, think that 
Kraft’s actions constitute such a threat.  
Rodin suggests that ‘the right to the independence of our state’ is one of the 
‘fundamentally important rights’ that we have the right to defend, because it is 
‘grounded in the moral value of participating in a self-determining 
community’ (2014: 73) – however, we are all part of many different self-
determining communities throughout our lives. The impact of the loss of a 
particular community upon our ability to lead flourishing lives depends upon 
that community’s importance to our lives and identity.  
In my opinion, Cadbury’s may well have had a unique collective identity, 
but being a part of that particular collective identity would not be an 
important enough aspect of its workers’ lives for its defence to constitute just 
cause for war. As I pointed out earlier, it would also not have sufficient 
indirect impact upon their lives to justify the direct threats to their lives that 
would be incurred by war. It might be more plausible, given that only lesser 
aspects of its members’ flourishing lives are threatened in this scenario, that 
Cadbury’s might have a lesser right of defence, permitting them to take legal, 
non-violent actions in defence of the existence of Cadbury’s as a community, 
and thus the aspects of its staff members’ flourishing lives that depend upon 
membership of that community, such as launching media campaigns.  
However, if we consider whether it would be intuitively plausible for the 
management of Cadbury’s to have the right or authority to declare war on 
Kraft should Kraft actually threaten sufficient aspects necessary to the 
flourishing lives of Cadbury’s workers, (by assassinating workers at 
Cadbury’s in an attempt to force the management to agree to their demands, 
for instance), the answer might be different. If, for some reason, no state or 
other official entity were able to step in and stop this from happening, and the 
only other collective entity with an interest in stopping the assassinations was 
Cadbury’s itself, would it be so impermissible for the management of 
Cadbury’s to engage their own ‘combatants’ (i.e. private security teams) to 
wage a defensive war against Kraft, if this were the only way to defend their 
workers?  
If we think that this might be permissible under these circumstances, as I do, 
then this would suggest it is at least possible for some non-state collective 
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entities like Cadbury’s to become legitimate authorities, if the members of 
those communities should delegate their defensive rights to them. It is simply 
the case that most individuals, at least in fairly peaceful nation-states, never, or 
hardly ever, delegate their defensive rights to non-state collective entities, for 
an obvious reason.  
In actual fact, if Kraft’s had used violence or intimidation against Cadbury’s 
workers, Cadbury’s would have been able to report it to the civil authorities, 
thus ending it. The defensive rights of Cadbury’s workers never needed to be 
delegated to their company, because they were already being adequately 
exercised by their state.  
But if the state ceased to exercise these rights, and Cadbury’s were perfectly 
able and willing to do so, then I do not think it inherently impossible or 
counter-intuitive for Cadbury’s workers to rely upon their company to protect 
their ability to lead flourishing lives, if no other collective entity would or 
could do so. Hence, I do not agree with Rodin’s suggestion that non-state 
communities obviously lack rights of defence.  
Both some states and some non-state collectives seem potentially capable of 
satisfying my four general essential criteria – many non-state collective 
entities will of course, fail the second criterion in that they lack sufficient size 
and resources, but it is possible for some non-state collectives, perhaps even 
Cadbury’s, to fulfil it. In addition, attempts such as Rodin’s to suggest that 
non-state collectives can never be the appropriate entities to defend their 
members’ rights, fail. Therefore, I posit that some non-state collective entities 
can be appropriate recipients of delegated individual rights. 
However, there remain two further conditions which I believe non-state 
collectives must fulfil in order to be appropriate recipients of delegated 
individual rights. States may to some extent be excused these further 
conditions, but as I will argue later in this chapter, a non-state collective entity 
has more to prove. 
 
2ii) Further conditions for the delegation of rights to non-state groups 
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The first condition is that those non-state groups which are appropriate 
recipients of delegated defensive rights must have, as Christopher Finlay 
suggested, ‘representative legitimacy and consultative input’ (2010: 288). 
The possession of these, Finlay argues, would be ‘typically vital to the 
authorization of non-state entities and hence to their ability to invoke the 
targeting rights characteristic of war’ (2010: 288-9). Finlay provides a 
convincing argument that non-state entities need to have this quality in order 
to be legitimate authorities, even though, as I will show, it does not provide 
the sole necessary condition for non-state legitimate authority that he suggests 
it does.  
On the other hand, I believe states which lack representative legitimacy (for 
instance, non-democratic states which do not always consult their citizens, 
whether or not their actions are nevertheless consistent with those citizens’ 
wishes) may nevertheless remain appropriate recipients of individual rights. 
This is because (as I will argue in the next section) while active consent is 
necessary to delegate defensive rights to a non-state collective, individuals 
may delegate rights to a state by tacit consent, and retain them so long as it 
does not fail to exercise them when necessary. If a non-representative state 
passes the four general essential conditions, I see no reason why it should not 
be a legitimate authority if its citizens continue to give their consent to be 
defended by that state. Otherwise, we reach the unpalatable conclusion that a 
non-democratic, non-consultative state with a good human rights record, 
which stands ready and willing to wage war to defend its citizens from an 
invasion force intent on mass slaughter, is not morally permitted to defend 
them. 
But to return to Finlay: his basic argument is that non-state collectives’ 
‘moral authority claims’ may be grounded in ‘a criterion of representative 
legitimacy’ (2010: 305). This would suggest that in order to be appropriate 
recipients of delegated individual defensive rights, non-state entities 
‘considering recourse to violence’ should both ‘consult with those they claim 
to represent’, and ‘seek wide endorsement in order to legitimate their 
programmes for action’ (2010: 309). In short, they should ensure that by 
waging war they would truly represent the wishes of the individuals whom 
they are defending, because this, in Finlay’s view, gives them legitimacy. 
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Michael Gross similarly argues that guerrilla organisations, in order to gain the 
legitimate authority that is so often granted unquestioningly to states, ‘must 
evolve in the direction of rational authority’, which he defines as having four 
conditions – ‘effectiveness, domestic recognition, representation, and 
international approval’ (2015: 41).  
Of these conditions, the most significant for our purposes would seem to be 
representation and effectiveness, as domestic recognition and international 
approval would seem to be conditions more concerned with making nation-
states recognise that the non-state organisation has moral authority than with 
actually gaining that moral authority. Effectiveness as a condition for non-
state legitimate authority will be returned to later83.  
Representation, however, is also essential to Gross’ definition of non-state 
legitimate authority. He writes that the necessary representation ‘might be 
democratic – that is one person, one vote – but may also include group or 
corporate representation whereby local leaders speak for their community’ 
(2015: 41) – which is a plausible suggestion. 
Finlay argues that the criterion of representative legitimacy is necessary for 
two reasons. Firstly, he suggests that those non-state entities in particular that 
wage wars ‘at least partly on behalf of claims about the self-determination of 
ethno-national communities’, base this justification upon a presupposed 
‘identity between the will for self-determination and the desire for national 
independence’ (2010: 305). If this ‘identity’ were mistaken, and ‘the 
community in question preferred to remain part of a larger political entity’, or 
even if it were significantly divided upon the question, then these claims 
would be either ‘falsified’ or ‘diminished’ (2010: 305).  
Secondly, Finlay claims that support for this representative legitimacy 
criterion may arise ‘from important empirical concerns about contingency and 
unpredictability’ (2010: 306). He writes that if the goals for which a non-state 
                                                 
83 Effectiveness, as in a group’s ability to effectively achieve its goals (or cause) by means of 
war, is also, as I mentioned earlier, a necessary condition for any collective entity’s ability to 
wage war in the descriptive sense, and thus it comprises part of the second of the four general 
criteria I mentioned earlier; the criterion which requires that any collective must be capable of 
organising and carrying out a long-term military campaign. Any collective, state or non-state, 
must fulfil this condition in order to be capable of holding delegated defensive rights. 
However, effectiveness as a condition for non-state legitimate authority is, as I will show, 
distinct from this second general criterion. 
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collective entity wages war are not ‘present in sufficient force’ within the 
people for whom they are ostensibly fighting (that is, in my terms, if the non-
state entity aims to protect or preserve aspects of individuals’ flourishing lives 
which the individuals either do not feel are sufficiently threatened, or do not 
actually value as significant aspects of a flourishing life), then ‘either an 
attempted liberation will fail in its immediate military objectives through a 
lack of popular support during the war; or if its war succeeds, the political 
goods it sought to achieve will fail due to the lack of popular support or 
participation after the war’ (2010: 306).  
Firstly, he suggests that representation is a necessary condition for 
consequentialist reasons; because if legitimate authority were considered to be 
possible without it, then such non-state collective entities would be extremely 
unlikely to be able to fulfil or sustain their goals.  
He then argues that representation is necessary for two further reasons, the 
first of which draws upon Hannah Arendt’s arguments that ‘violence…is 
inherently unpredictable’ (Finlay, 2010: 307). This means that ‘only the most 
proximate, short-term goals can sensibly be pursued by violent means because 
any more distant aims would probably be thwarted by the means employed’ 
(Finlay, 2010: 307). Next, Finlay refers to Arendt’s argument that ‘violence is 
generative’, meaning that ‘it tends to alter in more or less radical ways the 
political situations in which it was initiated and may thus overwhelm the 
purposes for which it was initially intended as a means’ (2010: 307).  
For these reasons, Finlay argues that a non-state collective entity considering 
waging war needs to ensure ‘that all or as many as possible of those whose 
rights and interests are involved in the decision should participate in making 
it’ (2010: 309), since ‘it can never provide demonstrable assurance…either 
that all hope is to be abandoned of future non-violent amelioration or that 
recourse to violence will achieve a satisfactory result’ (2010: 309).  
The unpredictable nature of war, therefore, makes it absolutely necessary 
that the individuals being defended are consulted, participate in the decision 
and give their ‘wide endorsement’ (2010: 309), in Finlay’s words, not only to 
delegate their defensive rights to this non-state entity but that it should fight 
this war on their behalf. 
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However, although I believe that Finlay adequately proves that this criterion 
of ‘representative legitimacy and consultative input’ (2010: 288), which 
involves not only the consent but the active participation of the individuals 
being defended, is necessary to ground a non-state collective entity’s authority 
to wage war, it nevertheless seems to me that there may be a need for a further 
condition to determine which non-state collective entities are appropriate 
recipients of delegated individual defensive rights.  
After all, a non-state collective of questionable principle or practice like the 
Colombian FARC or al-Qaeda could hypothetically claim to be thoroughly 
representative of the wishes of its members and to consult them adequately 
about the progress and direction of its military campaigns, but I would like to 
avoid the conclusion that these are potential legitimate authorities, whether or 
not they can fulfil the other ad bellum conditions. Therefore, I propose a 
second condition to determine which non-state collective entities are 
appropriate recipients of delegated individual defensive rights – the condition 
of effectiveness. 
 Recall that effectiveness was one of Gross’ other conditions for a guerrilla 
organisation’s possession of legitimate authority. Gross suggests, as I 
mentioned, that non-state collective entities like guerrilla organisations must 
not only be effective in creating and securing an accurate framework of 
representation and consultation with those they claim to represent, but must 
also ‘be effective agents of just cause’ (Gross, 2015: 40). This would mean 
that only those non-state organisations which either were at that moment 
reasonably capable of successfully waging a war for their just cause, or could 
quickly gain such capabilities should they choose to do so – for instance, non-
state political entities like the National Transitional Council during the first 
Libyan civil war in 2011; or more generally speaking, such non-state 
organisations, corporations or ethnic or religious communities, which might 
have sufficient resources to acquire those things that might be necessary for a 
reasonable chance of success, such as professional combatants. This 
incorporates the first and second conditions necessary for any state or non-
state collective to be the appropriate recipients of delegated individual rights, 
and goes a little further – collectives must not only be able to effectively 
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achieve their aims by means of war, but they must be able to effectively 
achieve just, or legitimate, aims. 
This condition is distinct from the aforementioned conditions that a 
collective must be of sufficient size and stability to wage war and that it must 
be a conglomerate, and thus sufficiently organised to take joint actions aimed 
at achieving a joint purpose. If a state satisfies these two conditions, then it 
will also be capable of effectively achieving just war aims – whether it in fact 
does so or not. The same cannot be said for non-state collective entities – for 
instance, an extremist movement might be both a conglomerate and of 
sufficient size to be able to effectively wage a war, but because of its nature, 
its goals, beliefs and prejudices, it is incapable of effectively achieving just 
aims by means of war.  
Janna Thompson gives a definition of legitimate authority that is somewhat 
similar to Gross’s. She suggests that three conditions are necessary for the 
possession of legitimate authority. One of them is broadly similar to Finlay’s 
requirement of representative legitimacy – she writes that the ‘leaders of the 
state or organization should be acting as the agents of its people’, meaning ‘the 
people in whose name or for whose sake it claims to act’ (2005: 155). 
The other two conditions state that ‘it must be an organization in control of 
the violence of its members…able and willing to enforce obedience to the 
restrictions of just war theory’, and secondly, that ‘it must recognise (even if it 
does not always live up to) the restrictions of just war theory’ (Thompson, 
2005: 155). These two conditions might form elements of the effectiveness 
condition – in order to be an effective agent of just cause, it certainly seems 
probable that an entity would need to recognise the limitations imposed by just 
war theory, and to be able to enforce obedience to them. Both states and non-
state collective entities might fail to satisfy this criterion, but as I have argued, 
there is reason to believe that states might retain delegated individual 
defensive rights even without satisfying this and the representative legitimacy 
criterion. 
It might be observed that my argument suggests non-state organisations need 
to satisfy more conditions than states do in order to be appropriate recipients 
of delegated rights. States need only fulfil the four general conditions, while 
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non-state collective entities must also satisfy the further conditions of 1) 
representation and consultation, and 2) effectiveness.  
Some just war theorists such as Finlay and Gross, bite this bullet and accept 
that non-state entities must satisfy more conditions. Gross, for instance, writes 
that ‘Unlike states…guerrilla organisations must constantly struggle to gain 
legitimate authority’ (2015: 43).  
However, the main reason for this difference is that, as I will argue in the 
next section, it is usual for individuals to tacitly delegate their individual 
defensive rights to the state they live in. Non-state collective entities can only 
receive those rights when individuals withdraw them from the state they had 
previously delegated them to and need another collective entity to act in their 
defence. If the state to which these individuals had previously delegated their 
defensive rights lacked representational legitimacy or effectiveness, this may 
give individuals good reason to withdraw their defensive rights from that state 
and delegate them elsewhere.  
However, people often have sentimental or patriotic attachments to the state 
that they live in, and place a high value on being able to entrust their own 
defence to it that state. As I argue in the next section, individual consent 
established the delegation of individual defensive rights, and I believe 
individuals are free to give their consent, as long as the state in question can, 
and intends to, exercise their defensive rights84. And as I have said, it seems 
counter-intuitive to conclude that a state which can and will defend its citizens 
when they wish to delegate their rights to it, is not permitted to do so, simply 
because it is not democratic and thus lacks representational legitimacy. 
I think, therefore, that for states, these two extra conditions are, like the fifth 
main condition, desiderata rather than essential conditions. States which fail 
the fifth condition by exploiting other states or by stifling their citizens’ 
interactions with other states and collectives, or which lack representational 
legitimacy or effectiveness as agents of just cause, may still retain delegated 
individual defensive rights, although I do also think it is plausible that they 
                                                 
84 It is, of course, possible that a group of individuals might, for whatever reason, wish to 
delegate their defensive rights to a collective entity that either can’t or does not intend to 
exercise those defensive rights. However, this is one exception in which I would say that 
consent alone does not establish the delegation of defensive rights. A state that won’t exercise 
individuals’ defensive rights effectively rejects the delegation of these rights to it, and thus 
invalidates the delegation. 
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might have a diminished authority to wage war. Perhaps such states might 
retain the authority to wage war to defend the flourishing lives of their own 
members, who (as I will argue) have already delegated their defensive rights, 
but not the authority to accept the delegated defensive rights of other 
individuals – so they would potentially have the authority to wage self-
defensive wars, but not other-defensive or interventionist wars. 
Since both of these situations require the individuals in need of defence to 
actively choose another state or non-state collective entity to delegate some or 
all of their defensive rights to, it seems plausible that the appropriate choice to 
make would be one which is capable of effectively defending them by just 
means, and is willing to act upon their wishes and consult them about the 
decision to go to war. Such will also be the case whenever individuals choose 
to delegate their defensive rights to a non-state collective entity, as the 
delegation will always be an active choice on the part of the individuals.  
So, to sum up, I would argue that in order for non-state collective entities to 
be appropriate recipients of delegated individual defensive rights, they must 
also satisfy two further conditions; the first, drawn from Finlay’s argument, 
being the twofold condition of ‘representative legitimacy and consultative 
input’ (2010: 288), meaning that they must accurately represent the wishes the 
individuals they defend, and see that ‘as many as possible of those whose 
rights and interests are involved in the decision should participate in making 
it’ (2010: 309), and the second, drawn from Gross, is effectiveness, meaning 
that collective entities must be able to achieve their just cause by means of just 
war, as without a reasonable chance of success they are not, in Gross’ words, 
‘effective agents of just cause’ (2015: 40). 
If, therefore, a state fulfils at least the four main criteria, or if a non-state 
collective entity fulfils these and the two additional criteria as well, then 
individual defensive rights may be delegated to that collective entity. In the 
following sections, I will explain how they may be delegated, and what rights 
and duties collective entities derive from agreeing to exercise individual 
defensive rights. 
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3: A Reworking of Consent Theory as a Basis for the 
Delegation of Defensive Rights to Collective Entities 
 
 
3i) Consent Theory and Social Contract Reasoning 
 
As I said earlier in this section, the basic argument of actual consent theory 
is that, in Estlund’s words, ‘without consent there is no authority (the 
libertarian clause), but unless there are certain nullifying conditions (the 
nullity proviso) consent to authority establishes authority (the authority 
clause)’ (2005: 352). The act of delegating one’s individual rights, in 
particular the right of defence, to a collective entity, certainly gives that 
collective entity some authority – the authority of acting on my behalf in 
circumstances which involve my defence and the defence of the other 
members of that collective, so an account of the basis of authority would 
definitely be useful here. 
Earlier in this chapter I rejected Estlund’s normative consent theory, but 
perhaps certain elements of actual consent theory would be useful in defining 
a legitimate basis for the delegation of defensive rights. Firstly, the ‘libertarian 
clause’, which states that consent is a necessary condition for authority to be 
established, could perhaps be adopted as a basis for the delegation of the right 
of defence to a collective entity.  
The authority clause could perhaps also be included in a weaker form – 
meaning that the authority to exercise individuals’ defensive rights would be 
at least partially established by the consent of the individuals who would be 
defended. 
It certainly seems plausible to suggest that some form of consent is 
necessary for the delegation of individual rights to a collective entity – I would 
reject, as I have explained, Estlund’s normative argument that authority may 
exist without consent in circumstances where refusal of authority would be 
‘morally wrong’ (2005: 356) for some reason. I would also reject 
nonvoluntarist approaches like John Horton’s, who argued that ‘Political 
association is for most people in an important sense non-voluntary’ (2010: 
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146) and that ‘Individuals most often become members of a polity by being 
born in a particular place or of particular parents, just as they are born into a 
family’ (2010: 149), without consenting to the duties and obligations of that 
membership. At least, I would reject this argument as regards the defensive 
obligations of collectives and individuals – the account of tacit consent that I 
will develop explains why I believe that some consent is necessary to justify 
these particular obligations. The question of other, more general political 
obligations, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  But given that 
consent is necessary for the delegation of defensive rights, what sort of form 
could this take? 
Zupan, for instance, suggests, as Rodin and Shue put it, ‘a form of social 
contract reasoning’, under which ‘We all surrender to collective national 
institutions the individual right to use force that we possessed in the state of 
nature in order to gain the benefits of improved security’ (2008: 13). He draws 
upon the Lockean argument that, in Samuel Freeman’s words, ‘no person can 
be obligated to become a member of any political society and subject to 
another’s political authority except by his or her own consent’ (2012: 142), 
and that by residing within a society and enjoying its benefits, we give our 
‘tacit consent to obey its laws and not undermine it’ (2012: 142) – a tacit 
consent that may be assumed to exist, unless explicitly denied or withdrawn. 
By similarly drawing upon this, I could perhaps argue that through 
consenting to be defended by a particular state, individuals ‘give up certain 
rights that they had in the notional state of nature’ (Zupan, 2008: 215-6), 
namely the rights to defend themselves in circumstances where the state is in a 
position to defend them, and ‘cede that authority and responsibility to the 
state’ (Zupan, 2008: 216); that is, consent to allow the government of their 
nation to exercise these defensive rights on their behalf.  
I do not, however, believe that this consent establishes the total surrender of 
the individual right of defence, but merely delegates it to the relevant 
collective entity, giving that collective and its leaders the authority to exercise 
this right, and in exchange, agreeing that one will not continue to exercise it in 
circumstances where the collective entity is willing and able to do so on one’s 
behalf. While this conclusion has crucial differences to the conclusions of 
social contract theorists like Locke or Rousseau in that it is not a transfer or a 
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surrender of rights, but the right is retained by the individual, I believe that it 
is similar enough to be established by a theory of consent. 
In addition, as it stands this theory of consent does not seem able to 
accommodate my argument that individuals might also delegate their 
defensive rights to other collective entities besides nations or states. As I have 
said, I agree with Fabre that it is at least possible that some non-state groups 
may also have what Zupan calls ‘Proper Authority’ (2008: 215) to declare 
war. However, the same kind of tacit consent which (as I will show) usually 
establishes the delegation of individual defensive rights to the state, will not 
suffice to explain how such delegation might occur. 
Briefly, this tacit consent can only occur where there is some prior 
understanding (whether conscious or not) of a collective entity’s recognised 
defensive role in wartime. But as it stands, the relationships we have with the 
non-state communities we belong to, do not typically involve those 
communities taking a defensive military role. Any scenario in which 
individuals also delegate these defensive rights to non-state organisations or 
communities cannot, therefore, be the same kind of tacit consent that some 
social contract theorists such as Locke argue we automatically give in 
exchange for the ‘security obtained from accepting common laws which are 
enforced by the sovereign’ (Zupan, 2008: 216), since these groups are not 
usually in charge of matters involving the military defence of their members.  
Ultimately, the point of a social contract is that tacit consent to that contract 
is given by the members of a state because their contract with that state is 
generally accepted and consistent over a long period of time; nation-states are 
the widely-accepted defenders of their citizens, and therefore the social 
contracts which involve the delegation of rights of defence to a collective 
entity, specifically, are with nation-states. That seems unlikely to change.  
There are also further problems with using a social contract approach to 
justify more general political authority and political obligations. For instance, 
David Hume argues it is dubious that an original social contract at the 
beginning of civilization could explain or justify the political authority of 
modern-day states, as ‘being so ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand 
changes of government and princes, [the original contract] cannot now be 
supposed to retain any authority’ (1987: 471). He suggests that in order for 
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their argument to be plausible, social contract theorists must contend ‘that 
every particular government, which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of 
allegiance on the subject, was at first, founded on consent’, but that this claim 
‘is not justified by history or experience, in any age or country of the world’, 
as most modern states were founded by ‘usurpation or conquest’ (1987: 471). 
In addition, Hume argues that if the express consent of present-day citizens, 
rather than the original social contract, is used to justify the political authority 
of existing states, then a further problem emerges. He points out that there is 
little or no evidence that the majority of people have ever thought about why 
their state might have authority over them, or why they might have obligations 
to obey that state, let alone that these people have freely consented to the 
state’s political authority. ‘’Tis strange’, he writes, ‘that an act of the mind, 
which every individual is supposed to have formed, and after he came to the 
use of reason too…should be so unknown to all of them, that…there scarce 
remain any traces or memory of it’ (1987: 470). Even though some of Hume’s 
argument here, for instance his assertion that almost all states and sovereigns 
do not regard themselves as subject to a consensual contract with their 
citizens, but ‘claim their subjects as their property, and assert their 
independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession’ (1987: 470), is 
arguably outdated, he nevertheless makes a good point that a large number of 
ordinary individuals ‘never make any enquiry about its [state authority’s] 
origin or cause’ (1987: 470), but merely accept that the state has authority over 
them, and so they cannot be said to have expressly consented to that authority. 
Thus, grounding the existence of political authority on individuals’ express, 
active consent is problematic. 
Therefore, for these reasons, I do not intend to use a full social contract 
theory, or express consent, to explain the delegation of individual defensive 
rights to collective entities. I suggest instead that elements of the reasoning 
behind social contract theory85 may explain why and how we delegate our 
                                                 
85 To make it clear, I am not proposing a social contract of the kind proposed by social 
contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke and Rawls, which suggests that [by ‘consent[ing] to the 
rule of law’ within a particular society (Zupan, 2008: 216), one is tacitly agreeing to surrender 
certain rights to that society, on the condition that it agrees to protect and exercise those rights. 
I am merely suggesting that elements of the reasoning behind social contract theory may 
perhaps be used to suggest that a similar form of consent may instead constitute a tacit 
agreement to delegate one’s defensive rights to that society or state, and that active consent 
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individual rights to nation-states, most significantly the Lockean argument 
behind actual consent theory, that either express or tacit consent to allow 
another entity to exercise your right on your behalf is necessary to give that 
entity the authority to do so. In order to avoid Hume’s aforementioned 
objections, it is necessary that tacit consent, in addition to the express consent 
that, as Hume rightly points out, is not usually in evidence, may also permit a 
collective entity to exercise defensive rights on the behalf of its individual 
members. Hume’s objections to the notion of tacit consent will be considered 
and responded to shortly. 
However, I would first like to emphasize that my argument differs from 
Locke, Rousseau and many other social contract theorists in that I argue, as I 
have said, that this consent does not establish a surrender or transfer of rights. 
Rather, I argue that such consent establishes the delegation of your individual 
defensive right to a collective entity, a permission for that entity to exercise it 
on your behalf. As I have explained, it is quite possible for someone to 
delegate the right to defend themselves to another party whilst remaining the 
holder of that right. 
Hence, this is not an irreversible process. For instance, if states cease to 
exercise this right, and thus to protect our flourishing lives, then its actions 
invalidate our previous delegation, in which case the rights revert to us and we 
can actively delegate them elsewhere – to a non-state collective entity, if 
necessary.  
Allen Buchanan makes a similar point when he argues that any ‘right to 
secede’ which groups may possess must be a ‘remedial right’ (1997: 34). By 
this he means that ‘a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has 
suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of 
last resort’ (1997: 34-5). They do not have a ‘primary right’ to secede from 
their original nation or collective entity, which would be ‘a (general) right to 
secede in the absence of any injustice’ (Buchanan, 1997: 35). I think this is a 
                                                                                                                                            
can similarly establish the delegation of individual rights to a non-state collective entity.  
Unfortunately, I do not have the time or the space here to develop a clearer or more detailed 
social contract theory. 
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plausible point – this right to withdraw our tacit consent to delegate our 
defensive rights to our state would also seem to be remedial in this way86. 
For example, if a collective entity within a nation-state, such as a religious 
community, is threatened with the loss or destruction of significant aspects of 
its inhabitants’ flourishing lives, either by forces external to the state or by the 
state itself, and the state knowingly chooses not to defend that group, then I 
believe that whatever tacit consent to delegate their defensive rights to this 
state that the individual members of this religious community might have 
given becomes invalid because of this lack of defence87. 
The tacit delegation of individual rights to the state takes place on the 
condition that the state must exercise the rights that individuals delegate to 
them. Without this condition, it seems to me that there would be very little 
point in having a social contract at all. By failing to exercise them, the state 
then fails to honour this contract, and its individual members become free to 
delegate them elsewhere. As I mentioned earlier, the intention to do this is also 
one of the conditions that makes a collective entity suitable to receive 
delegated defensive rights. 
As I argued in Chapter Two, the collective defensive right that grounds 
defence as a just cause originates in the defensive rights of individual people, 
which they delegate to a particular collective entity. However, these individual 
defensive rights still remain individual in object, and scope; they are simply 
being exercised by a collective entity. So, when a state fails to exercise the 
defensive rights of a number of its citizens at a time when the flourishing lives 
of these citizens are threatened and need defending, it makes sense to suggest 
                                                 
86 This is not to say that we necessarily only have a remedial right to immigrate to other 
countries – I would not consider ordinary emigration (as opposed to fleeing to another country 
as a refugee) to be withdrawing our consent, so much as extending it to a second nation. An 
individual’s right to do this is more likely to be a primary one that is dependent upon the legal 
permission given by the countries involved. 
87 The degree of invalidity may be determined by the number and importance of the aspects of 
the individuals’ flourishing lives which the state refuses to defend. If it refuses to defend such 
aspects as their physical lives and bodily integrity, then their tacit consent becomes wholly 
invalid, but if the state proves itself willing to defend these aspects of a flourishing life, but 
not lesser aspects such as freedom of speech, then the situation becomes more complicated. I 
think it plausible, as I will show, that such a lesser failure might furnish a reason for 
individuals to permissibly withdraw their defensive rights and delegate them elsewhere if they 
wish.  
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that they can withdraw their consent, even if that consent was, up until the 
moment of their state’s failure, only tacit88.  
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, one option for such groups of people might 
be to delegate their defensive rights to another state, thus justifying the form of 
war that is commonly known as humanitarian intervention. A conscious 
choice to make this delegation would plausibly be required – in other words, 
either some leaders of the threatened group in question, or a majority of the 
people themselves, would have to request the other nation of which they were 
not a part to exercise their defensive rights on their behalf and that other 
nation-state would have to both receive and accept this request.  
This second nation-state cannot, therefore, presume upon the consent to be 
defended of the threatened individuals; they must explicitly consent to 
delegate their defensive rights to this second nation, most probably in the form 
of some sort of request for help.  
The reason for this, I believe, lies in the fact that the individuals in question 
are not members of the nation to which they are now appealing for help; no 
social contract exists between them, no tacit consent to delegate certain rights 
has been given. The delegation must therefore start from scratch and be 
explicit. 
However, living in the imperfect world we do, there are likely to be 
situations in which a group of endangered individuals are unable to delegate 
their rights to any other nation. This might perhaps be because no other 
nations can or will agree to accept it for reasons of their own, or because the 
individuals themselves are for some reason unable to make this request, for 
example if they are being persecuted or imprisoned by their own hostile state 
which has ensured that they are unable to contact the international community 
                                                 
88 In criticism of the consent theory of authority, Fabre makes the point that basing authority 
on consent would mean that a collective entity with a just cause might not be able to fight for 
that just cause if it does not have the consent of the people who are being defended. However, 
here I would bite Fabre’s bullet and agree that without some form of consent a collective 
entity cannot wage a war, because consent is necessary for the delegation of individual rights 
to that entity, and thus without that consent it would not be possible for that entity to have a 
just cause for war, as it would not have the collective right of defence upon which just cause 
is, I have argued, grounded. Also, intuitively, it seems plausible that if a group of individuals, 
for whatever reason, do not wish their rights to a flourishing life to be defended by a particular 
state or non-state entity to which they have not already delegated their rights, that that state 
does not have the right to fight for these individuals even if their defence would be a just 
cause. The individuals must have the ultimate choice as to if and where to actively delegate 
their rights.  
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in order to appeal for help. In any cases where groups of threatened 
individuals cannot delegate their defensive rights to another nation89, it seems 
plausible that they may consent to delegate these rights to a non-state 
collective entity90. 
It also seems plausible that the collective entity need not be pre-existing; in 
short, a collective entity could be brought into being, in order to provide an 
entity to which to delegate their defensive rights. For instance, it is all too 
possible that the lives of a community or ethnic minority may be endangered 
by the actions of their own state, but that state, being the cause of the danger, 
either will or can do nothing to alleviate it. It is also possible that this group is 
unable to ask other pre-existing states or non-state collective entities to defend 
them, or that their pleas go unheard.  
In these circumstances, I believe they can form a new organisation, for 
instance a resistance movement, to which they could delegate their defensive 
rights (provided it could fulfil both extra criteria, in addition to the four main 
ones). There are some cases in which this has been done; in which the entity 
fighting a defensive war on behalf of a minority has been not a pre-existing 
state or collective entity, but a movement or organisation that arose out of the 
oppression of that minority, and attempted to defend them when their state 
authorities could or would not – for instance, the Polish/Jewish resistance 
movements (the Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa (Jewish Combat 
Organization) and the Żydowski Związek Wojskowy (Jewish Military Union)) 
                                                 
89 I am suggesting the delegation of defensive rights to a non-state collective entity as a 
secondary choice to delegating them to a nation-state for purely practical reasons; because a 
nation-state, with its vast resources and standing army, is practically speaking much better 
equipped to fight a war, and therefore much more likely to fulfil the reasonable chance of 
success condition than a non-state organisation. It therefore seems plausible that individuals 
should petition states for help first, and consider the delegation of defensive rights to non-state 
organisations to be something of a last resort.  
90 As Christopher Finlay rightly pointed out, when non-state collective entities wage war, they 
‘often…aim at goals of a political nature that cannot easily be reduced to the immediate 
defence of individual victims from clearly identifiable ‘aggressors’’, such as ‘national 
liberation’, ‘secession based on communal self-determination’, or ‘achieving civil rights in 
situations where the oppressor state stops short of direct personal violence’ (2010: 296). I do 
not have the time and space in this dissertation to determine exactly how many such ‘political 
goals’ would count as justifiable reasons for war under my account of just cause, but suffice it 
to say that a great many probably would. It all depends on how many aspects of a flourishing 
life are being threatened by the political or civil oppression which such entities aim at 
stopping or preventing, and that is something that would vary on a case-to-case basis. 
However, I believe it is safe to say that this will not greatly affect my argument. 
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which unsuccessfully attempted to resist Nazi forces in the 1943 Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising. 
If a collective entity arises in this way, then it would seem to be necessary 
that it accept the delegated defensive rights of the people in question, as this is 
the very reason for its existence. Indeed, in such a case, where the organisation 
is formed by the vulnerable group themselves, this acceptance is not merely an 
obligation that it must comply with – defence is what it was created to do, it is 
not a duty so much as an essential part of its nature. On the other hand, I can 
see no obligation requiring pre-existing states or non-state collective entities to 
accept the rights of individuals who have not already tacitly delegated their 
defensive rights to them.  
Such collectives must consider the individuals they already have a duty to 
defend, and may even consider whether it is in the interests of that collective 
as a whole to accept these delegated defensive rights, even if it is only on a 
temporary basis. The same can perhaps be said for pre-existing non-state 
collective entities of which the individuals may already be members, but 
which have not previously had defensive rights delegated to them (for instance 
corporations, churches and religious organisations) – they have no obligation 
to accept, and may well consider whether it is in the whole collective’s 
interests to accept the responsibility to defend some of its members’ 
flourishing lives. If an oppressed Catholic minority within a non-Catholic 
country petitioned the Catholic Church to step in and wage a defensive war on 
their behalf, for instance, the Catholic Church (if we assume that it fulfils the 
criteria) would seem to be able to refuse, as it has no existing obligation to 
defend its members’ lives, and does not necessarily have to accept one. 
Given that there is no moral requirement for states to accept the delegated 
defensive rights of non-members, and similarly no requirement that pre-
existing non-state collective entities accept rights that are not already 
delegated to them, by their own members or others, it would seem that some 
oppressed minorities may be left with no one to defend them unless they 
themselves can form an organisation dedicated to doing so. I may have to 
admit that this potentially might be the case – after all, it is often the case in 
practice, as without an obligation to help suffering civilians in Syria (for 
example), most of the world in fact does nothing to help them.  
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However, there is one thing I can say in response – assuming a collective 
entity has no good reasons not to accept the delegated defensive rights of a 
group of individuals (no conflicts of interest or exceptional danger to their 
collective or the lives of non-combatant members), then they may actually 
have an incentive to do so. Accepting these delegated defensive rights may 
save a large number of lives; and it seems likely that the collective that does so 
can be assured of future alliance with the community it defends.  
One could perhaps also argue that even if one is under no absolute moral 
obligation to take a particular action, it may still be morally praiseworthy, and 
avoiding it for no good reason may still be seen as morally blameworthy, not 
because one has failed in a necessary obligation but because one has 
consciously ignored the moral reasons for taking that action. 
For instance, even if we accept that I have no absolute moral obligation to 
donate to charity on any specific occasion, if I never do so, and indeed actively 
avoid giving to charity in cases where doing so would cost me next to nothing, 
I can still be criticised; not for being morally wrong in the sense of failing a 
moral obligation, but for deliberately avoiding taking a morally good action 
when there were no sufficient reasons for not doing so. The Kantian notion of 
perfect and imperfect duties is relevant to this argument, in that Kant argued a 
person may be subject to both ‘strict or narrow (rigorous) duty’ (2000: 87) and 
‘contingent (meritorious) duty’ (2000: 92), and that while the former, perfect 
duty ‘allows no exception in the interest of inclination’ (2000: 85, footnote), 
the latter, imperfect duty permits latitude according to inclination. But even 
though I am under no perfect duty to give to charity, if I consistently and 
deliberately avoid doing so, perhaps I can plausibly be held up to moral 
criticism. 
In the same way, while pre-existing collective entities may have no absolute 
obligation that requires them to always accept delegated defensive rights, if 
they refuse to accept them when careful consideration of the case reveals no 
relevant reasons not to do so (no conflict with their duty to defend the lives of 
their non-combatant members, for instance), then these collective entities 
have, by ignoring the requests for defence of those in need without good 
reason to do so, acted in a callous manner, a manner worthy of moral 
condemnation. Whether accepting these requests is considered as an imperfect 
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duty or a supererogatory act, I think that refusing them without a good reason 
may be morally blameworthy even though it is morally permissible.  
Admittedly, avoiding such moral blame may or may not act as an incentive 
for accepting the delegated defensive rights of a group of individuals. 
However, what we are discussing here is an extraordinary circumstance – 
cases in which the state to which individuals already belong does not accept or 
exercise their defensive rights, and they must find some other collective entity 
to delegate them to. Since explicit consent to delegate rights to the state is 
almost never in evidence, (with possible exceptions being immigrants who 
might sit a citizenship exam in the UK, or swear the Naturalization Oath of 
Allegiance to become citizens in the US); the method of consent commonly 
used to delegate defensive rights to the state would have to be a form of tacit 
consent. However, there is a potential problem with using tacit consent to 
establish the delegation of individual defensive rights to a collective entity.  
 
3ii) Difficulties with Traditional Tacit Consent, and an Alternative 
Definition 
 
If tacit consent is understood entirely in the Lockean sense, according to 
which ‘every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the 
Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent’ (Locke, 
1988: 348), then it is, in Michael Keeley’s words, ‘an implicit act’ (1995: 
243), and ‘anyone who participates in a system of law and enjoys its 
protection’ gives her tacit consent (1995: 243-4) to the rule of that law. In the 
specific case of tacit consent to state defence, this definition of tacit consent 
would suggest that citizens tacitly consent to delegate defensive rights to the 
state by means of enjoying the state’s defence of our flourishing lives, the 
protection of its armed forces etc., or by participating in the state’s defence of 
its citizens, for instance by working in a war-related industry. This leaves us 
with a problem. In order for consent to be meaningful, it must be possible for 
someone to dissent, and dissent does not seem possible when tacit consent is 
defined in this way.  
For instance, Hume writes that if tacit consent to political authority is 
construed as ‘living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave’ 
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(1987: 475), (and presumably receiving the benefits of living in that 
dominion), then we do not in fact have the choice to consent to or dissent from 
the authority of that ‘prince’, as in many cases simply leaving the country may 
not be an option one actually has, for financial reasons, or family ties, for 
instance. In this case, Hume suggests, it is as ridiculous to say citizens of a 
polity have the option of dissenting by leaving the country as it is to say that 
someone on board a boat has the option of leaving it when ‘he was carried on 
board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he 
leaves her’ (1987: 475). 
A. John Simmons argues likewise that ‘We are for the most part born into 
political societies and rise into our places as citizens of them without ever 
freely choosing to participate or to become members’ (1996: 248); the result 
being that if membership of a society and the benefits it confers constitute tacit 
consent, then ‘the nonvoluntary character of membership entails that our 
political obligations also fall on us independently of our voluntary choice’ 
(1996: 249). Similarly, we cannot avoid receiving benefits such as the 
protection of the state’s armed forces, and in many cases we cannot simply 
leave the country in order to avoid receiving them; so if receipt of such 
benefits establishes tacit consent to delegate defensive rights, dissent would 
appear to be impossible. Keeley makes the additional point that a ‘reliance on 
mere participation to indicate consent…dilutes the concept and confers 
legitimacy on questionable practices’ (1995: 244).  
However, I would respond that tacit consent to delegation of one’s defensive 
rights does not arise from merely ‘enjoying’ the benefits of being defended by 
one’s state – or even from participation in that defence, when such 
participation, like the paying of taxes that (among other things) support the 
armed forces, cannot reasonably be avoided. Rather, I suggest that it arises 
from the act of accepting those benefits. We do not, I believe, accept these 
benefits merely by receiving them. A person can receive something, even a 
benefit, without consenting to receive it; and this receipt does not imply that 
one has consented to receive that benefit, that one owes the benefactor 
anything in return, or that one has entered into any kind of contract with the 
benefactor by means of receiving that benefit (especially if one is powerless to 
avoid receiving it). Participation in state defence that cannot be reasonably 
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avoided is not indicative of consent, and nor is the receipt of benefits that 
cannot be reasonably rejected. 
In support of this point, Nozick argues that ‘You may not decide to give me 
something, for example a book, and then grab money from me to pay for it’ 
(1974: 95) – even if by receiving that book, I have arguably benefited from 
your action. He suggests, and I think persuasively, that ‘One cannot, whatever 
one’s purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or 
seize) payment’ (1974: 95), because the fact that those people have benefited 
from your actions does not mean that they wish, or consent, to receive those 
benefits, and asking them to pay seems therefore impermissible.  
For example, if a patient at a hospital refuses a life-saving blood transfusion 
on religious grounds, and the doctor chooses to give him that transfusion 
anyway (perhaps even while the patient is asleep or unconscious), then the 
doctor’s actions have undeniably benefited the patient. Nevertheless, it does 
not seem that this patient’s unwilling, unwitting receipt of the blood 
transfusion amounts to his acceptance of (or, therefore, his tacit consent to) the 
transfusion or its benefits.  
Obviously, this example differs in at least one way from the case of a citizen 
who receives the benefits of state defence. The patient has expressed his 
unwillingness to undergo blood transfusion prior to the doctor’s administering 
it, whereas the state may not be aware of the individual preferences of all of its 
citizens. Indeed, many citizens of the state, such as very young children or the 
severely mentally disabled, cannot even express an opinion either way prior to 
their defence by the state. However, I do not believe that this fact substantially 
alters my point. 
The state, like the doctor, may act so as to save an individual if unaware of 
that individual’s preferences. A doctor in an emergency situation, if unaware 
of whether his unconscious patient would accept a blood transfusion or not, 
might well presume upon that acceptance and perform the transfusion. If he 
does so, and it transpires that the patient did not want the transfusion, then the 
doctor has still acted in good faith, but the fact still remains that the patient did 
not and has not consented to the action that benefited him.  
In a similar way, a state may, and indeed must, presume upon the wishes of 
its citizens to be defended. Those who, like the very young, are unable to 
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either accept or reject the delegation of defensive rights of the state may be 
defended because, as with the unconscious patient, there is no way of telling 
what their future wishes upon the matter will be, and so their acceptance may 
likewise be presumed. 
In addition, there is no reliable way, in wartime, of defending only those 
non-combatant citizens who wish to be defended, given that the dissenters are 
likely to live and work in close proximity to other non-dissenting citizens, and 
also, as I will explain shortly, their refusal to delegate their defensive rights 
does not necessarily mean that they are no longer citizens of that state with the 
associated right to reside within its borders, so exiling them is out of the 
question. Therefore, the best, and possibly the only, way for a state to succeed 
in the defence of its citizens is to defend them all as a group, rather than 
attempting to defend some but not all of them.  
However, what this means is that a state must presume upon the acceptance 
of its defensive actions by all its citizens, even in the knowledge that some of 
them have not given that acceptance. Since a state cannot defend just those 
citizens who accept its defence, as dissenters still remain citizens of that state 
and (presumably) still reside within its borders, it must act as though all these 
citizens had accepted its defence, in the same way that, I believe, the doctor 
could permissibly use blood transfusions to save a group of patients that 
included both those who agreed and those who did not agree to that procedure, 
if he did not know which patients did or did not agree to the transfusions, and 
this was therefore the only way for him to save the lives of those who wished 
to be saved in this way. The state acts permissibly in doing so, as it is the only 
way for it to fulfil its obligations towards the majority of its citizens, even 
though those who benefit from the state’s defence of their flourishing lives but 
did not agree to this benefit, have not consented to be defended.  
I must take a moment to reinforce an important distinction here. When I 
discuss delegating rights to the state, I am referring to defensive rights, and 
when I argue that tacit consent to delegate these rights results from the 
acceptance of benefits from the state, I mean the benefits of being defended 
against external threats. This is distinct from the acceptance of other benefits 
provided by the state, such as internal stability, welfare or healthcare, upon 
which some social contract theorists such as Locke or Rousseau might ground 
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tacit consent to a more general state authority, not just authority to defend its 
citizens but a government’s political authority over its citizens, authority to 
require their obedience in other matters than defensive ones.  
To clarify, I am not necessarily advocating a full social contract approach to 
ground the political authority of states. My concern is merely to develop a 
plausible grounding for the delegation of individual defensive rights to a 
collective entity. Were a social contract approach used to ground political 
authority and political obligation in general, then tacit consent to delegate 
defensive rights might form a small part of the larger tacit consent that could 
perhaps establish political authority, but I believe that my arguments 
concerning the delegation of individual defensive rights can exist separately 
from a social contract approach to political authority.  
The more general tacit consent to this more general state authority is not my 
concern in this dissertation, as thrashing a social contract theory out in detail 
would probably double its length, and I do not rule out the possibility that the 
political authority of the state may also be established in some other way 
besides tacit consent. But I must mention it in order to establish that it is 
possible for an individual to refuse to accept the benefits of defence (even if he 
cannot avoid receiving them), but continue to remain a citizen of that state, 
and continue to be obligated to obey the state’s authority in all other matters 
except those directly pertaining to defence (such as conscription into the 
armed forces), as these particular obligations derive their force from the 
delegation of defensive rights to the state91.  
It is for this reason that I contend that a pacifist can refuse to delegate his 
defensive rights to the state in which he resides, but still accept that state’s 
authority in other matters, and still continue to be a citizen of that state, 
perhaps because of his consent to its general authority. Thus, an individual can 
dissent from his state’s authority to defend his life by means of war, and still 
                                                 
91 The obligation to pay taxes that go towards paying for the armed forces is not, I believe, an 
obligation that directly results from the delegation of defensive rights – paying taxes to the 
government, and accepting the government’s right to determine how those taxes are spent, 
subject (at least in democracies) to scrutiny by the voting public, is a part of our more general, 
non-defensive obligations to a particular political authority. For this reason, as I mentioned 
earlier, I do not believe that paying such taxes constitutes voluntary participation in the state’s 
defensive actions; the payment cannot be avoided without violating other, non-defensive 
obligations individuals might have as citizens of that state (which is a matter outside the scope 
of this dissertation). 
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be subject to the rights and obligations of a citizen of that state, with the 
exception of those directly resulting from the defensive right he does not wish 
to delegate. 
Having argued that receipt of the benefits of defence by one’s state is 
distinct from tacit acceptance of those benefits, and that tacit consent to 
delegate one’s defensive rights to the state is established by the latter, it now 
remains to explain what I mean by this kind of acceptance of the benefits of 
defence. It is distinct from the receipt of the benefits of defence in that one can 
receive a benefit whether or not wishes to, and indeed whether or not one 
acknowledges it is a benefit; but in order to tacitly accept this benefit one must 
at least not object to receiving it. This may be either because one actively 
wishes to receive it, or because one has simply failed to either welcome or 
reject it, not through lack of ability to do so but through lack of substantial 
consideration of the matter. A large number of people may take their 
government’s right to defend their lives for granted, without fully considering 
it; and it is my contention that this unacknowledged acquiescence is a form of 
tacit acceptance.  
For instance, if I take it for granted that I have an obligation to take care of 
an elderly member of my family92, without ever questioning that duty, then I 
have tacitly accepted such a duty, unless and until I begin to question it – in 
which case my acceptance would either become express, conscious consent, or 
I should reject the duty and my tacit consent would be withdrawn (whether or 
not this invalidates the duty in the case of familial obligations is another 
matter).  
In constructing an argument against the social contract approach to political 
authority as a whole, Simmons suggests that ‘ordinary people do not 
experience political life as voluntary and…they do experience many of their 
                                                 
92 Admittedly, Locke denies that familial obligations can be usefully compared to political 
obligations (describing ‘Political’ and ‘Paternal’ authority as being ‘perfectly distinct and 
separate’ (1988: 314)), but others, such as Ronald Dworkin, have questioned this and 
suggested that obligations to family, friends or colleagues might be similar to political 
obligations (1986: 196). However, Dworkin’s suggestion is that this is due to the nonvoluntary 
nature of political obligations, which is not the way I intend to direct my argument. Rather, I 
would suggest that a useful comparison can be made because some (though perhaps not all) 
familial obligations may be voluntary to some extent, and grounded upon an individual’s tacit 
consent to these obligations, an acceptance which may well result from the individual never 
questioning that she has such an obligation. Thus, the two kinds of obligation may be similar 
enough for a useful comparison to be made (though they are not, of course, the same). 
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duties (including their political duties) as nonvoluntary’ (1996: 249). His 
argument, therefore, is that voluntarism, the view that we actively, voluntarily 
consent to our duties to the state, is flawed because it is not ‘realistic’ and 
‘does not reflect our shared moral experience’ (1996: 249). This is similar to 
Hume’s argument that consent theorists’ use of tacit consent to political 
authority is problematic, because such tacit consent can only take place ‘where 
a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice’ (1987: 475), and, in 
fact, people do not ‘imagine’ that the state’s authority depends upon their 
consent. The same objection could perhaps be made against my argument – if 
people experience the state’s defensive role in their lives and their duties to 
support or take part in the state’s defence of their flourishing lives as 
nonvoluntary, then the argument that individuals’ tacit consent to delegate 
their defensive rights grounds both the state’s right to defend individuals, and 
these individuals’ duties to support that defence, is equally unrealistic. 
However, I would argue that Simmons and Hume’s objections do not 
successfully undermine the plausibility of tacit consent as grounds for the 
delegation of specifically defensive rights, for two reasons. Firstly, it is clearly 
not the case that everyone, without exception, experiences the delegation of 
defensive rights to the state as a nonvoluntary process. The very existence of 
pacifists and conscientious objectors, either those who object to the state’s 
involvement in a particular war or those who object to war in general, shows 
that it is at least possible for individuals to question, even deny, that they have 
obligations to participate in their state’s defence of their flourishing lives. This 
also suggests to me that the entire process of delegating these defensive rights 
can be experienced as voluntary, since in order to deny that war is ever 
justifiable, absolute pacifists must deny that the state has a right to defend 
them in any circumstances. 
Secondly, it seems to me that it may be possible for some people within a 
country to experience their obligations to their state in the matter of defence, 
or the delegation of their defensive rights, as nonvoluntary, without this posing 
quite the threat to voluntarism that Simmons and Hume would suggest. The 
fact that the majority of people may not stop to consider that they have a 
choice whether or not to accept the defensive role of the state or any 
obligations they might have to participate in that defence does not mean that 
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that choice is not there; especially if some people within that state are publicly 
questioning, even denying the state’s defensive role and their obligations to 
participate. To continue to experience these obligations, and the defensive role 
of the state, as nonvoluntary when others deny that the state should have such 
a role or that these obligations are morally binding is, it seems to me, a form of 
tacit acceptance.  
Even if an individual state punishes dissent, in the form of conscientious 
objection to state conscription, for instance, by stiff prison sentences, then so 
long as some people do publicly engage in conscientious objection (either in 
that state or another where that laws are more lenient), and so long as the non-
dissenting majority of its citizens are aware of the existence of dissent93, then 
there is clearly a possibility of denying the state’s defensive role and the 
individual obligations that result from it for those who wish to do so, and 
failure to see it amounts to tacit acceptance of the state’s defensive role.  
Therefore, citizens of a state may accept the delegation of their defensive 
rights to their state as nonvoluntary, without questioning it, simply because 
they know it is the commonly accepted role of states to defend the lives of 
their citizens94. But once they do begin to question it, perhaps because their 
own opinions on the effectiveness or morality of war in general have altered, 
or because they question the morality of a particular war their state intends to 
                                                 
93 It may, of course, be possible (in a state like North Korea, for instance) for the existence of 
dissent like this to be concealed from the average citizen. However, one could perhaps make 
an argument that under these circumstances North Korean citizens are not being permitted to 
fully consent, as full consent requires the possibility of dissent, and that this might establish a 
reason why (as I will argue later) they could withdraw their consent and delegate it elsewhere. 
In any case, the ‘realistic’ picture (Simmons, 1996: 249) in most democratic countries is that 
dissent does exist, and people are aware of it (and the same may be true in many non-
democratic states, except the citizens may not be as free to act upon their dissent).  
94 In criticising Gilbert’s ‘joint commitment’ (1993: 125) concept of political obligation, 
Simmons makes a point which might be relevant here. He suggests that there is a ‘confusion 
of political acquiescence with positive, obligation-generating acts or relationships’, and that ‘a 
preparedness to go along, even under conditions of full knowledge, is certainly not the same 
thing as consent or commitment, nor does it have the same normative consequences’ (1996: 
257). However, being prepared to go along with the state’s defensive role, for whatever 
reason, is not quite the same as accepting that the state should have such a role, since 
accepting that role requires believing that the state has, and should have, such a role, and mere 
acquiescence or submission does not. For instance, Simmons’ example of acquiescence which 
does not generate a commitment is that of ‘acquiescing to some pushy participant's efforts to 
organize our game’, which, he suggests, ‘in no way commits me to accepting his further plans 
or pronouncements about the game’ (1996: 257). This would seem to be a case in which I am 
acquiescing to the pushy person’s organizational role to save myself the trouble of arguing 
with him and potentially ruining the game, but (since I see him as pushy) I clearly do not 
agree with, or have faith in, his role as organizer. If I accept his role as organizer, it seems to 
me much more likely that I have thereby consented to it. 
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engage in, then the tacit consent arising from this tacit acceptance may be 
withdrawn. 
However, this kind of withdrawal is distinct from the kind that is 
necessitated when a state fails to fulfil one of the five general conditions to 
hold delegated defensive rights; it is voluntary, and there is no need to 
delegate defensive rights elsewhere even if the dissenter wished to do so, as 
the state in question could adequately defend the dissenter’s life. Pacifists who 
do not wish for the state to defend them by means of war at all, will obviously 
not wish to delegate their defensive rights elsewhere.  
But in the case of citizens of a state who disagree with a particular war, 
things may be different. Perhaps they may realise that the war their state is 
fighting is not a just war, and withdraw their tacit consent for the state to 
defend their lives by waging this particular war, but continue to accept the 
state’s role in defending their lives as a general principle – in which case, they 
temporarily withdraw their consent in the present instance, regarding the 
present enemy, while still accepting the state’s protection in other 
circumstances. Also, as I will argue shortly, if they do not give their consent 
for the state to wage a particular unjust war of aggression, but still wish to be 
defended once that war has put their lives at risk, it might be possible for them 
to temporarily delegate their defensive rights elsewhere, to a non-state 
collective entity with the power to protect them, for instance95.  
Hence, my account deals with the problem posed by refusal to delegate 
individual defensive rights; namely how individuals can dissent from doing so 
when consent is given tacitly. As tacit consent relies on accepting the benefits 
of protection by the armed forces as well as receiving it, then dissent consists 
of a public or private refusal to give that acceptance. In addition, this refusal 
does exempt the dissenter from obligations that would have been imposed on 
him by his tacit consent, such as the obligation to submit to conscription. The 
obligation to pay taxes that help to support the armed forces is the one 
exception, since I have argued that the obligation to pay taxes is not entirely 
                                                 
95 It might, of course, happen that these individuals mistakenly believe that their country is 
fighting an unjust war, whereas it is in fact fighting a just one. But if such a mistake was 
made, I would have to admit that they were simply mistaken in believing that they had good 
cause to withdraw their consent, and therefore while they were entitled to withdraw that 
consent, they were not in fact permitted to delegate their defensive rights to another entity. 
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based upon the delegation of defensive rights, since taxes paid to the 
government are used for many other purposes besides the armed forces. 
Therefore, I argue that consent is the means by which we, as individuals, 
delegate our individual defensive rights to a collective entity, authorising it to 
act in our defence. We tacitly consent to delegate our defensive rights to the 
state we live in, but if it fails to exercise those rights, or to exercise them fully, 
they revert to us and we can delegate them elsewhere, to another state or to a 
non-state collective entity such as a resistance movement. There remains the 
question of what results from the delegation of defensive rights to a collective 
entity; what rights and duties result from this process for the collective entity 
and for the individuals themselves. 
 
3iii) The Rights and Duties Arising from the Delegation of Individual Rights 
to a Collective Entity 
 
If a collective entity accepts the delegated rights of individuals, either its 
own members or non-members, then it would seem that certain rights and 
duties arise from this delegation, on both sides. To begin with, the state or 
collective entity has, as I have already mentioned, the duty to actually exercise 
the defensive rights that have been delegated to it. If it does not, if either it 
becomes so unstable that it is clearly incapable of doing so, or it refrains from 
action, voluntarily choosing not to defend its members, then it fails one of the 
conditions for being an appropriate recipient of delegated defensive rights, and 
the individuals whose delegated rights have not been properly exercised (by 
which I mean exercised as the individuals themselves would wish to do 
themselves if they could) are free to delegate these rights elsewhere.  
As this suggests, while the collective entity does fulfil the conditions I have 
mentioned and properly exercise the defensive rights delegated to it, the 
individuals who have consented to delegate those rights also have a 
corresponding duty to allow the collective entity to exercise them, to defend 
their lives, so long as it is able. They also have the duty to assist the collective 
in defending their lives, at least if requested to do so. But if the state proves 
unable or unwilling to defend them (thus ceasing to be an appropriate entity to 
which to delegate defensive rights), they may create a new collective entity to 
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enact their defence (i.e. organize themselves into a resistance movement or 
other non-state defensive entity) if possible, or delegate the right to another 
pre-existing collective if not.  
Indeed, individuals may, and do, choose to withdraw their defensive rights 
from one collective entity and delegate them to another at any time, simply by 
switching the collective entity to which they claim membership – for instance, 
emigrating from one country and applying for citizenship of another would 
seem to be an act of re-delegating, or at the very least extending one’s 
delegation of rights, from the first nation to the second. In addition, as I have 
already argued, pacifists and other dissenters who decide that they do not wish 
their state to defend them either generally or in one particular war with which 
they do not personally agree, thereby withdraw the defensive rights which had 
been previously delegated to their state through their tacit acceptance, whilst 
still remaining citizens of that state, with all the other rights and obligations of 
citizenship, save those relating to defence.  
However, it may seem counter-intuitive to suggest that individuals may both 
withdraw their defensive rights from their state and delegate them elsewhere, 
whilst still remaining a citizen of their state and resident within its borders, 
thus retaining (without accepting) all the benefits of defence by that state. For 
one thing, such split loyalties could lead to moral and practical dilemmas; for 
instance, to which state these citizens are obligated to pay the taxes that 
support an armed force, or whether their state has any right to demand their 
participation in the waging of a war. 
   For this reason, I would argue that individuals can in normal circumstances 
re-delegate their defensive rights to another state by means of becoming 
members of the state to which they now wish to delegate them96. They may re-
delegate their defensive rights, either to another state while remaining citizens 
of their original state, or to a non-state collective entity, only in three cases. 
The first is if the state proves to fail one of the conditions of being an 
                                                 
96 In addition, I would contend that an individual cannot take back her right of defence and 
exercise it herself, privately. As I said when arguing against Fabre, awarding private 
individuals the moral authority to wage private wars on their own behalf, is not only 
contradictory to just war theory’s aim of limiting the number of potentially justified wars, but 
it also seems like a recipe for social chaos, possibly empowering any private individuals 
wealthy enough to do so to raise their own personal armies and wage war in their own 
defence.  
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appropriate recipient of delegated defensive rights (for instance, either being 
unable or unwilling to exercise these rights). In these cases, the collective may 
no longer hold the defensive rights in question, and the individuals may 
delegate them to whomever they wish, whilst still remaining members of that 
collective entity if they wish to.  
   The second is if the state in question exercises delegated individual 
defensive rights but does so in a less than satisfactory way; for instance if it is 
isolationist, non-representative or an ineffective agent of just cause; or if it 
attempts to hide the existence of dissent to the state’s authority to wage war, in 
order to prevent its citizens from becoming aware that dissent is a possibility; 
or if it proves willing and able to defend the greater, but not the lesser, of the 
aspects of its citizens’ flourishing lives (if it protects them physically but 
refuses to defend their freedom of speech or freedom to practise their 
religions, for instance). I believe in such cases that the state may continue to 
hold delegated defensive rights if individuals wish to continue delegating 
them, but the individuals may permissibly choose whether to continue 
delegating their rights to this state, or delegate them elsewhere. 
   The final exception would be if a collective entity fulfils the conditions for 
being a potential legitimate authority, but fails one of the other jus ad bellum 
criteria. For instance, if a collective fully intends to exercise its members’ 
defensive rights, but its leaders also have a morally disreputable agenda for 
doing so. Say, Country A wages a genuinely defensive war against Country B, 
and genuinely intends to defend its citizens from B’s aggression, but also 
hopes that by winning the war, it can put itself in a position to take long-term 
control of Country B, at first using the excuse that it is necessary for the post-
conflict reconstruction of B’s infrastructure. In this case, A does not fail the 
conditions for being an appropriate recipient of delegated defensive rights, but 
it does fail the ad bellum criterion of right intention. 
   I think it is plausible that in this case, as with the other two exceptions, A’s 
citizens have a choice between continuing to delegate their rights to A, 
withdrawing their rights totally (refusing, as pacifists do, to accept that any 
collective entity may defend them), or delegating their rights elsewhere – the 
same choice faced by citizens of a state that fails to be a representative 
authority or an effective agent of just cause. They may withdraw their 
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defensive rights and delegate them elsewhere, as A is incapable of waging a 
just war in their defence. But if they choose to continue to delegate their 
defensive rights to A, perhaps because A may be the most capable or effective 
agent of their defence, or perhaps because of ignorance of A’s true intentions, 
then they have acted permissibly, and A was morally authorised to defend 
them, even though it chose an impermissible means of doing so (i.e. waging an 
unjust war).  
But when none of these three exceptions apply, then as long as the 
individual in question wishes to remain a citizen of their state and also to be 
defended by means of war, then he or she must allow that collective to defend 
them, even if they no longer accept that defence. They may not ask another 
state or non-state collective entity to defend them instead whilst remaining 
citizens of the first state.  
In the case of all other citizens, whose tacit consent establishes the 
delegation of their defensive rights to their state, this delegation creates a more 
straightforward obligation to allow the state to defend them. To return to the 
Police Defence example from Chapter 2, if Victim is attacked in the street, 
happens to possess a gun and there is no policeman or other instrument of the 
state’s defensive function present, she is permitted to shoot her attacker if this 
is a proportionate and necessary action to save her life (or other elements of 
her flourishing existence, such as bodily integrity). But if a policeman happens 
to be present, and not for some reason unwilling or unable to help, then Victim 
must, assuming her consent to delegate her defensive rights to the state, allow 
the policeman to defend her – she may not ignore the policeman and shoot the 
attacker dead if she knows the policeman can stop him.  
There are, as I said, other duties that individuals incur when delegating their 
defensive rights to a particular collective entity. They may have a duty to 
participate in that defence if the collective asks it of them, by submitting to be 
conscripted if conscription becomes a necessary part of that defence (and if 
they are physically capable, of course), by working in a war-related industry 
like a munitions factory, or by accepting certain hardships in order to further 
the chances of their own defence being successful – such as food rationing or 
refraining from strike action.  
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The collective therefore has the corresponding right to demand their 
participation in defensive wars. For instance, the collective has the 
aforementioned right to conscript its individual members who have consented 
to delegate their defensive rights, as well as non-members who have delegated 
their defensive rights to it, and these individuals have the corresponding duty 
to submit to conscription and fight as soldiers in a defensive war if they are 
capable of doing so.  
It would seem implausible to deny that one has an obligation to participate in 
one’s own defence97 if one does (as most people do) actually want to be 
defended, and if one has consented to be defended by this particular entity. 
Only a pacifist who does not agree with defending even his own life by the use 
of military force (and therefore does not give his consent) would be a 
complete exception to this98, although the specific requirements of the 
obligation would take account of certain limitations such as physical or mental 
disabilities, and individual expertise (i.e. if an individual person might be more 
necessary to that collective in her current occupation).  
As I explained in 2iii), any individuals refusing to aid in the defensive 
project for reasons such as pacifist convictions, have not consented to delegate 
their defensive rights, even if they happen to receive the benefits of such 
defence. The collective entity only has the right to conscript those who have 
truly consented to delegate their defensive rights, as it is this act of delegation 
that gives rise to this permission right – in agreeing to let the state defend us, 
we agree to support and participate in this defence, and in refusing either 
agreement we refuse both.  
This might appear to have potentially problematic consequences, however. If 
an individual citizen’s refusal to consent to be defended by her state means 
that that individual receives all the benefits of state defence but is subject to no 
corresponding duties or obligations, then what incentive has she to consent to 
                                                 
97 It might also be suggested that if the lives of the belligerent collective’s members are not the 
ones at stake (e.g. interventionist war), then these members do not necessarily have a duty to 
submit to conscription, unless the progress of the war means that their lives and those of their 
fellow citizens also become threatened. 
98 I do not rule out the possibility that pacifists or dissenters might reasonably be asked to take 
on some non-military services to assist in the war effort, as for instance in World War One 
when many conscientious objectors were recruited to serve as ambulance drivers and 
stretcher-bearers in organisations like the Friends Ambulance Unit – but I do not believe that a 
state can morally require such service of them. 
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that defence? She loses nothing by her dissension, and in fact continues to 
receive the benefits of defence without the need to participate in that defence 
in any way.  
However, I would respond that such parasitic ‘free riders’ (Nozick, 1974: 
90) would be subject to a contradiction in their thinking. By definition, if an 
individual chooses not to consent to defence because she wishes to continue 
being defended without being obligated to participate in that defence, then she 
has accepted that she wants to be defended by the state in these circumstances, 
even though she does not want the corresponding obligations. It is therefore 
impossible for her to withhold her consent to be defended, as by admitting that 
she wishes to receive the benefits of defence she has in fact accepted them, 
and by doing so given her tacit consent to delegate her defensive rights. The 
only citizens who genuinely do not accept the benefits of defence by their state 
are those who, because of their convictions about the lack of justification for 
war itself or for this particular war, genuinely do not want to receive the 
benefits of defence, and would willingly do without them if they could.  
To recap, then, in this section I have explained how the delegation of 
defensive rights to the appropriate collective entities results in a certain set of 
rights and duties pertaining to both the collective entities in question and the 
individuals themselves.  
 
 
4: Conclusion 
 
 
In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the best way to determine 
which collective entities are the appropriate recipients of a delegated right of 
defence would be to determine which collective entities have the legitimate 
authority to go to war, as the two are inextricably linked – to have legitimate 
authority is to be the appropriate recipient of a delegated defensive right, as 
this is what gives a collective entity the authority to wage war.  
I have therefore considered and ultimately rejected Estlund’s normative 
consent theory of authority and Fabre’s cosmopolitan definition of legitimate 
authority, and then argued in favour of a necessary condition of legitimate 
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authority, defined as moral authority based upon elements of consent theory; 
since tacit consent, as I have argued, is the method by which individuals may 
delegate their rights to their own states, and some form of active consent is the 
method by which individuals may delegate their rights to another state or to a 
non-state collective entity.  
I have also outlined four essential conditions that all collectives must fulfil 
in order to be the appropriate kind of collective to receive delegated defensive 
rights (as well as a further, non-essential condition that is desirable for 
collectives to fulfil). Fulfilling these four essential conditions would be 
sufficient to prove that a particular state may be delegated the defensive rights 
of its own individual citizens. However, while I believe that non-state entities 
can also be legitimate authorities, I also believe that it takes something more 
than these four conditions to determine which non-state collective entities may 
be legitimate authorities. I have therefore identified two further conditions that 
non-state entities must fulfil in addition to the main four. These are 
representative and consultative legitimacy, and effectiveness. Thus, I have 
concluded that both states and certain non-state entities (those which also fulfil 
the further conditions of representative and consultative legitimacy and 
effectiveness) can be legitimate authorities, and appropriate recipients of a 
delegated right of defence, and I have outlined the rights and obligations 
which a collective authority gains as a result of receiving delegated individual 
defensive rights. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Throughout my thesis, I have argued in favour of an individualist account of 
just cause, grounded upon the individual right to defence which may be 
delegated to states and certain non-state collective entities, thus creating a 
collective right of defence. These individual defensive rights, as I have argued, 
are specifically rights to defend a person’s flourishing life, to which they have 
a human right. This is a cluster-right, composed of a number of basic rights to 
all the aspects of life which go towards making an individual person’s life 
flourishing, including the right to continued physical existence – the 
traditional right to life.  
I also argued in favour of a dual account of liability to attack, under which a 
person who becomes weakly liable by reason of being causally responsible for 
an unjust threat of harm, is a legitimate target of defensive action but retains 
their own right of self-defence, and a person who becomes strongly liable by 
reason of being morally responsible for an unjust threat of harm, both becomes 
a legitimate target of defensive action and loses their own right of self-
defence. 
I then developed an account of just cause for war, based upon these 
individual defensive rights. As I said, collective entities such as states, or 
certain non-state groups, may be delegated these rights and thus possess a 
collective right of defence, and I explained how this collective right may 
ground the just causes of ‘self’ defence by a state or group against the threat to 
the flourishing lives of their members, and the defence of another state or 
group against a similar threat to their members – and I showed how both the 
other-defence of a state against external attackers and the other-defence of a 
non-state group of individuals against a threat posed by their own state 
(humanitarian intervention) might possibly be justified in this way. 
Following this, I went on to develop an account of the war rights and 
liabilities of combatants based upon my account of just cause. I argued in 
favour of a presumption of symmetric weak liability to attack, but concluded 
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that combatants fighting for a just cause had additional war rights deriving 
from the fact that their military actions played a part in a larger justified 
action99, namely the fulfilling of a just cause.  
I further argued that collective entities which possess delegated individual 
defensive rights are therefore legitimate authorities, in the sense that they 
possess the moral authority to wage war. I argued that this was the most 
plausible understanding of the legitimate authority criterion. 
Lastly, I developed a more detailed account of the delegation of individual 
defensive rights to collective entities, arguing that individuals may only 
delegate defensive rights to their state if it fulfils four essential conditions, and 
may only delegate their defensive rights to a non-state collective entity, or to 
another state, if the collective entity in question fulfils two further conditions, 
those of representative legitimacy and effectiveness, in addition to the four 
main criteria. I also argued that this delegation of individual defensive rights is 
established by consent, either (in the case of one’s own state) by tacit consent 
as I have defined it, or (in the case of another state or a non-state collective 
entity) by active consent.  
In conclusion, I hope I have shown that an individualist account of just cause 
which results in a collective right to exercise delegated individual defensive 
rights is fairly plausible, and has the advantage of avoiding some of the 
counter-intuitive suggestions that other individualist arguments make, such as 
McMahan’s suggestion that all unjust combatants necessarily lose their rights 
to individual self-defence, or Fabre’s conclusion that people can individually 
possess the right, and hence the moral authority to go to war.  
I conclude, instead, that the moral authority to go to war is limited to 
collective entities, and that both just and unjust combatants may retain the 
right to individual self-defence, without slipping into the equally implausible 
collectivist argument that the justice of a combatant’s cause makes no 
difference to his rights as a combatant. I hope, therefore, that I have 
demonstrated a fairly coherent and plausible account of just cause and 
legitimate authority based upon the individual right to defend one’s ability to 
lead a flourishing life. 
                                                 
99 Assuming reasonable chance of success, last resort and so on, of course.  
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